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ABSTRACT
"U.S."Soviet relations 1980-88 ; The Politics of Trade Pressure"
BY
Mohammed Abid Ishaq, University of Glasgow
Abstract of Ph.D dissertaion 
Martinmas Term, 1994
The United States applied trade pressure on the 
Soviet Union on a large scale during the 1980s for the 
attainment of political objectives. Although initially 
triggered by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, 
trade pressure became a concerted American policy aimed 
at influencing Soviet domestic and international 
behaviour, and expressing displeasure with Moscow's 
actions at home and abroad. The thesis looks at the 
ability of U.S. trade pressure to influence or shape 
Soviet behaviour and policy. The thesis, which is.based 
upon a combination of American and Soviet primary sources 
as well as memoir and other publications, assesses both 
the economic and political effect (with greater emphasis 
on the latter) of Washington's application of economic 
measures in the early 1980s on Soviet policy on human 
rights, dissent, Jewish emigration, and the Third World. 
Two introductory chapters chart the overall development 
of Soviet-American relations during the years concerned.
Four further chapters analyse the degree of economic and 
political success generated by American trade pressure. 
Two of these look at the economic effect of U.S. trade 
pressure in terms of denying the Soviet Union access to 
both strategic and non - strategic goods. The other two 
chapters concentrate on the political success of trade 
pressure, with particular reference to human rights and 
regional conflicts in the third world. A final chapter 
reviews the major literature on trade pressure, and sums 
up the results of the thesis which aims to alleviate some 
of the shortcomings prevalent in works on trade pressure 
and argues that U.S. trade pressure on the Soviet Union 
largely failed to have the desired effect of influencing 
Soviet domestic and international behaviour.
PREFACE
The United States government first under the 
Presidency of Jimmy Carter, and then most notably under a 
fervent anti - communist Ronald Reagan adopted a policy 
of using economic pressure in order to achieve political 
objectives. These political goals were to reduce or 
eliminate Soviet involvement in the third world and 
regional conflicts, and to foster an improvement in 
Soviet domestic policy on human rights including dissent 
and Jewish emigration.
Specific studies of trade pressure in the context of 
Soviet-American relations have been relatively few. Most 
(such as those of Philip Hanson and Gordon Smith) have 
tended to concentrate on trade presure applied in the 
framework of East-West relations (i.e. collective Western 
measures against the Eastern bloc). Since this study 
offers an analysis of trade pressure on the USSR applied 
solely by the United States rather than the West as a 
whole - acknowledging the fact that fundamental 
differences of opinion and approach existed within the 
Western alliance, particularly between the United States 
and its allies, which justify a separate study of trade 
pressure applied by a single nation like the United 
States - it has aimed to rectify this shortcoming. The 
thesis while offering an analysis of the economic impact 
of trade pressure, more importantly offers an in depth 
analysis of the political success of trade pressure using
evidence from governmental as well as non-governmental 
sources.
This study was prompted by the acknowledgment that 
in the modern age the use of trade pressure or as David 
Baldwin calls it "economic statecraft" has become an 
important tool of foreign policy, whether applied by 
individual countries or by international organisations. 
One can recollect a number of examples of both unilateral 
and multilateral trade pressure in the 1990s itself such 
as UN sanctions against Iraq and Serbia, and U.S. 
sanctions against Haiti. My reason for choosing U.S. 
trade pressure on the Soviet Union was based on my 
personal interest in superpower politics, and the Soviet 
Union in particular, and in the unique intensity of trade 
pressure applied in the period concerned.
The conventional view that trade pressure very 
rarely works, if at all, is I believe largely sustained 
by this study, which notes the limits of applying any 
sort of pressure on a global power like the former Soviet 
Union.
The thesis draws on both Soviet and American 
sources. A wealth of published Soviet sources were 
available for consultation in the Soviet Studies section 
of Glasgow University library, including official 
documents, statistics and other documentation. These were 
supplemented by some unpublished archival material 
acquired from the Centre for Contemporary Dqcumentation 
in Moscow. Data from the Soviet treaties project 
currently undertaken at the University of Glasgow was
also consulted. American sources were available from a 
variety of places such as the National Library of
Scotland in Edinburgh and the British Library document 
supply centre, which incidentally coped with my regular 
demand for sources rather well.
From an financial point of view I would most
sincerely like to thank the Carnegie Trust for the 
Universities of Scotland without whose support in paying 
my tuition fees I would not have been able to undertake 
this study. Likewise thanks also to the Glasgow 
Educational and Marshall Trust whose grant in support of 
maintenance did much to relieve my financial hardship.
I also owe a debt of gratitude to a number of 
individuals. I would firstly like to express my thanks 
to certain numbers of the academic and research staff at 
Glasgow University who with great kindness offered me 
advice and general help on matters or questions which 
arose from this study. They were Fred Hay and Ljubo Sire 
(Department of Political Economy) and Stephen Revel1 
(Department of Politics), and of course Stephen White who 
provided me with very useful guidance.
Last but not least a word of thanks to my dear 
parents for their moral support. And of course to my 
lovely fiancee, Asifa, the most important person in my 
life whose inspiration was behind this thesis, and
without whose loving support it would have been pointless
to have proceeded with it.
Mohammed Abid Ishaq 
Glasgow, December 1994
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CHAPTER ].
SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN TO GORBACHEV:
AN OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
The concept of trade pressure involves the 
manipulation of economic measures , and the utilization 
of economic instruments to influence the behaviour and 
actions of another nation with the hope of satisfying 
designated political goals. In other words it has to be 
remembered that economics is the means and politics is 
the intended end.
It should be understood that judging the success of 
trade pressure is really a two part task. The first task 
is to see whether economic pressure had the desired 
economic: impact, since this will go a long way in ;
determining whether trade pressure will be successful |
from a political standpoint, which is then the second jj
task. j
In this respect, as most writers on the issue also c
appear to recognise, "the political success of sanctions !
is an independent variable separate from the economic 
impact of sanctions".^’ The term economic sanctions is 
used very readily in most discussions of trade pressure.
Although it is only one form of trade pressure, it is the 
form in which trade pressure manifests itself more than 
any other way.
The true measurement of whether trade pressure is 
successful from an overall perspective has to be whether 
the political aims of the practising state are met, and 
to what extent. This is because the ability of trade 
pressure to have the intended negative economic impact on 
the target state will not in itself guarantee that 
political objectives will be met. Although economic 
measures such as embargoes and sanctions can be used, and 
have been used for purely economic reasons, when they are 
deployed as part of trade pressure then they are being 
used in a political capacity.
It is fair to say that if trade pressure fails to 
have the desired negative economic impact on the target 
nation the chances of it having the desired political 
impact are virtueilly zero. Its economic failure will 
only serve to boost the political will and morale of the 
target country, which will become less inclined to alter 
its policies. The only hope then is that other factors 
such as leadership changes or changes in government may 
force the target to alter its behaviour. The exception 
to this idea that if trade pressure fails to have the 
intended economic effects its chances of achieving the 
political objectives are low, would be when trade 
pressure measures such as sanctions are imposed which are 
of a purely symbolic nature and where no change in 
political behaviour of the target is expected.
However, although the success of trade pressure from 
an economic viewpoint boosts the chances of it altering 
the political behaviour of the target state, this need
not be the case since pride, reputation, and sheer 
stubbornness may make the target state unwilling to budge 
even in the face of economic adversity brought on by 
trade pressure measures like sanctions. Also the target 
may hope to hold out and hope that trade pressure may be 
relaxed in the near future. Certainly in the case of US 
trade pressure against the Soviet Union throughout the 
1980's its failure to impose significant economic costs 
on the USSR made the chances of it succeeding in 
satisfying its political objectives much more difficult.
Although this study looks at the use of trade 
pressure by the U.S. against the USSR in a specific time 
period (1980 - 88), it is worth stressing that the use of 
this policy of trade pressure was not new in US - Soviet 
relations and had infact been part of US strategy towards 
the Soviet Union in the early days of the Cold War, and 
it is even fair to argue that Ronald Reagan's policy 
bordering on economic warfare bears striking resemblance 
to US policy in the early years of the cold war. As 
Mastanduno points out part of US economic containment 
policy in the years immediately after 1945 involved 
the"...use of US economic instruments.. . to shape 
Soviet behaviour.
The end of the Second World War saw the emergence of
the United States as a leading economic as well as
military power. The US sought to use its economic power 
against the Soviet Union as part of its cold war conflict
and rivalry with Moscow. As can be witnessed from the
U.S. at the time, it. became clear that a policy of
Economie Containment would, be part of US strategy toward 
the USSR which was not as powerful economically. Taking 
into account the fact that trading with an adversary can 
be detrimental as it can contribute towards its military 
strength, for these reasons as Mastanduno points out 
"....throughout the Cold War US officials treated trade 
with the Soviet Union and its allies differently from US 
trade with other destinations ..."^ The historical
debate in the West on trade with the Soviet Union centred 
largely on the question of the export of goods to the 
Soviet Union which would contribute to the military 
potential of Moscow. Western efforts to coordinate 
allied controls over exports to the Soviet Union and its 
allies saw the formation of COCOM in 1949 at a time when 
the West recognised the strategic risks of trading with 
the Soviet bloc. In decades to come COCOM came to 
represent the strategic embargo, the aim of which was to 
hinder Warsaw Pact access to militarily useful technology 
in which the West had a lead.
While the allies of America in Western Europe 
accepted the dangers of trading with the USSR
particularly in strategic items and technology and were 
as a result willing to cooperate with the US in 
controlling strategic exports they had initially been 
wary of using economic means as a policy instrument
especially to the extreme of economic warfare. From the 
1945 period up to the late 1950s the West denied the
Soviet Union the benefits of any significant trade with 
the West. Clearly at this time international or Western
Security assumed priority over economic interests. This 
period from 1945 well into the 1950's was generally 
depicted as the period of economic containment. The 
force that initially brought COCOM into being and held it 
together in the early years was the enormous economic 
leverage the US could exert on its Western allies in the 
immediate aftermath of the Cold War.
This was typified by the 1951 US Mutual Defence 
Assistance Act which was seen as an attempt by the US to 
use aid to Western Europe as a lever to compel allied 
compliance on export controls by providing for the 
discontinuance of US financial assistance to countries 
that exported restricted commodities to communist 
countries. As Mastanduno points out"^  Western European 
nations were not entirely happy with the strategy of 
economic warfare which was adopted through such means as 
COCOM but were virtually compelled to participate through 
US pressure and coercion, even though they acknowledged 
the principle behind the need to control the export of 
strategic items. A major concern for Western European 
nations was that the US was overstating the problem of 
strategic exports to the Soviet bloc to the extent that 
items with little or no strategic significance would be 
restricted, and that this would prove an unnecessary 
detriment to already minute East - West trade that there 
was .
Indeed initial COCOM controls saw a compromise 
between a longer US control list and a shorter list 
proposed by Britain and France. For Western Europe the
desire was "...to limit controls to those of a more 
narrow strategic embargo".
As highlighted by Mastanduno^ there was somewhat of 
a retreat from Economic Warfare beginning to take place 
from 1953 . This saw West European nations in particular 
calling for a liberalisation of COCOM export controls and 
cuts in the COCOM control list.
This trend or movement towards liberalisation of the 
western strategic embargo was viewed with alarm by the 
United States who continued to stress the overwhelming 
security threat posed by the Soviet Union as well as 
China.
However, the West Europeans got their way to a great 
extent and in 1945 during negotiations the COCOM control 
list was reduced by 50%. Furthermore there was a 
narrowing of control criteria that would in future cover 
only those items which made a direct contribution to the 
Soviet Military Sector.
In addition to this, in 195 8 there was a review of 
the COCOM list which "...resulted in a significant 
liberalisation of controls " . ^  This was much to the
delight of the West European governments who had been 
unhappy about the inclusion in the control list of many 
items which were not regarded as strategically important.
The period beginning from the 19 60s saw changes in 
East - West trade. Trade ties began to emerge on a 
measurable scale by the 1960s and were to benefit greatly 
from detente during the 1970s. Much of this change was 
due to Western European governments beginning to
reestablish traditional links with markets in Eastern
Europe. The United States no longer exercised leadership 
of Western policies on East - West trade. In view of
this the West Europeans moved towards liberalisation of
controls within COCOM. This saw the number of items on 
the COCOM lists decline. The US attempted to stave off 
this movement towards liberalisation or easing of
controls by maintaining its more extensive national
controls.
The end of the 1960 s to the mid 197 0s saw or
witnessed what can be called a further liberalisation of
East - West trade. It. was the period of economic detente 
(in line with the political detente at the time) with the 
belief in the West that increased economic ties between 
East and West may help to foster improved political
relations. Even in the United States this view or line 
was being promoted, and there were calls for a relaxation 
of controls.
During the 1970s COCOM had almost threatened to
become obsolete. Member States had infact become rather 
casual in their enforcement of controls. At the same
time East - West trade had increased in comparison to
previous years. The second half of the 1970s witnessed
problems in Western policies towards economic relations
with the Soviet bloc. Disagreements once again began
emerging within the Western alliance. The U.S. had began 
to end its liberal approach of the early 197 0s to trade 
with the Soviet Union in response to concerns over
Moscow's behaviour. The new more stricter US approach
was not to the liking of the West Europeans who by now 
had considerable economic interests at stake in their 
trade links with the Soviet bloc. The divisions 
primarily between the US and. its European allies 
intensified going into the 1980s. On top of this, as we 
shall see, the renewed period of conflict in East - West 
relations in the early 1980s proved a disaster for Soviet 
American economic relations in particular, and saw 
economic warfare one of the initial features of the cold 
war dictate Soviet - American issues.
It might be appropriate to briefly look at the 
reason for the development of Soviet - American relations 
in the manner in which they did in particular the 
reasoning behind the Cold War, which actually contributed 
in attracting the use of U.S. trade pressure in the post 
- 1945 period
Since 194 5 the Soviet-American relationship has 
oscillated rather like a business or trade cycle. The 
period immediately following the Second World War saw the 
onset of what became known as the 'Cold War'. This term 
was used to describe the extreme state of tension and 
hostility that developed between the Western powers led 
by the United States, and the Communist bloc of Eastern 
Europe led in turn by the Soviet Union. The 'Cold War' 
in fact became the norm by which Soviet-American (and 
East-West relations which were naturally closely 
interconnected) were governed, and was characterised for 
much of the post-war period by : political manoeuvring;
diplomatic wrangling, psychological warfare ; ideological
hostility; economic warfare; a major arms race; 
peripheral wars; and other power contests; falling short 
of an actual 'hot war'.
It can be said that the Cold War which emerged 
between the United States and the USSR was waiting to 
happen long before major developments in Europe after the 
Second World War made it a reality. The fact is that 
suspicion and dislike between the two countries could be 
traced as far back as the Russian Revolution. American 
troops had took part in the abortive 'White' counter 
revolution against the Bolsheviks during 1918 - 19. The 
U.S. as a major capitalist state was in ideological terms 
in clear conflict with the communist ideology of the 
Bolsheviks. The Americans continued to oppose diplomatic 
links with the USSR, and it was only the mutual objective 
to defeat Hitler's Germany that brought the Soviets and 
Americans together during the Second World War.
However, once Germany had been defeated the uneasy 
American - Soviet cooperation soon began to disintegrate 
and the two faced each other suspicious of each others 
motives and intentions. Could the Cold War have been 
avoided? From the point of view that there existed a 
dislike between the two well before 1945 maybe not. 
However, having fought alongside each other could have 
acted as a catalyst towards a possible reconciliation. 
This did not materialize because the traditional hatred 
resurfaced, and hopes of rapprochement were dashed by a 
series of events and developments which took place in the 
years immediately after the Second World War.
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A significant development was the Soviet 'take 
over' of Eastern Europe between 1945 - 47. As the Red
Army advanced through Eastern Europe, pro - communist 
temporary governments were set up. Post - war elections 
.in these countries were held under the watchful eyes of 
the Red Army which had not yet withdrawn. The West did 
not regard them as free elections and disliked even more 
the subsequent communisation of the coalition governments 
which were elected. They saw Stalin as having broken his 
promise of free elections he had made at the Yalta 
Conference. Western leaders had clearly become concerned 
that Western Europe might suffer the same fate as Eastern 
Europe.
This concern was highlighted in 1946 by Winston 
Churchill in his speech in the USA where he warned that 
an 'Iron Curtain' had descended across Europe and that 
the USSR wanted indefinite expansion of their power and 
doctrines. He proposed an Anglo - American military 
alliance to prevent this.
In 194 7 came the Truman Doctrine which said that 
America would aid 'free peoples' to resist threats by 
armed minorities or by 'outside pressures'. Truman 
carefully did not name communism as the enemy but no one 
had any doubt as to what he meant. The doctrine was 
applied and American aid sent to any government which 
could prove itself anti - communist. The Truman doctrine 
became the cornerstone of America's entire Cold War 
policy. In June 1947 came the Marshall Plan, a vast 
programme of American economic aid to Europe. In effect
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this was the economic arm of the Truman Doctrine in 
Europe.
The setting up of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation in 1949 - a military alliance of Western
nations can be seen as providing final proof that the 
West under principally American leadership, and Eastern 
Europe under the Soviet Union were now in direct 
opposition and hostility to each other.
Many rival views had developed as to the origins of 
the Cold War. The Traditionalist or Orthodox view was 
that Soviet aggression and expansionism was responsible 
and further that this aggressive Soviet behaviour came 
from communist ideology, Russian imperialist traditions 
and Stalins personality. The view of the Revisionists 
was that it was actually Western distrust of the Soviet 
Union, and attempts by the West to try and establish 
economic control of Europe that was the cause.
However, the Post - revisionist view adopted a more 
neutral stance and I believe a more accurate one. It 
blamed both sides for inaugurating the cold war.
Nevertheless the cold war did not always dictate the 
thrust of Soviet-American relations, and gave way to 
detente by about 1969, a concept denoting a relaxation of 
tensions.  ^ This period of detente was at its peak between 
1969 and 1976. Detente was based on a recognition that 
peaceful coexistence was an essential ingredient in 
American - Soviet relations, and that in its absence the 
cold war and an expanding arms race could lead to the 
calamity of a nuclear war.
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After two decades of confrontational cold war 
politics, the two superpower's began to negotiate their 
différencies in the 1960's as a result of the military 
situational factors.
The period of detente produced a number of arms 
limitation agreements, increased East - West trade, the 
Helsinki Accord aimed at obtaining a general agreement to 
the post - World War II European Status quo, and an 
increase in cultural exchanges. It began to encounter 
problems from 1977-79 and eventually collapsed following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
Having now outlined the general framework behind 
this study we come to the purpose of this chapter, which 
is to chart the state of Soviet-American relations 
beginning from the events in 7kfghanistan in December 197 9 
through to Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power in March 
1985. With this in mind the chapter is divided for 
convenience into three sections. Section one has as its 
starting point the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which 
triggered off a massive deterioration in Soviet-American 
relations during the course of 1980 in what was to be 
President Carter's final year in office. Section two 
analyses the superpower relationship under Reagan's first 
three years in office, during which time there was a 
marked intensification in the renewed conflict generated 
since the end of 1979, and which shattered any hopes of a 
possible revival of detente, instead inaugurating what 
commonly became known as the Second cold war. And 
finally Section three looks at the first signs of a
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possible thaw in the newly invigorated Cold war, which 
began to emerge or take shape at the outset of 1984 with 
Reagan's more conciliatory tone towards Moscow and the 
subsequent ascent to bhe Soviet leadership of a strong 
past advocate of detente, Konstantin Chernenko. This 
slowly developing rapprochement in Soviet-American 
relations continued through to 1985, ar^ was still 
much alive when Chernenko's death brought Gorbachev to 
power.
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SECTION ONE - THE DISINTEGRATION OF DETENTE
Soviet--American relations during the course of 19 80 
were shaped by a number of key developments in the last 
few months of 1979 which were later to culminate in the 
eventual downfall of ani already weakened detente. 
these developments were U.S. charges in September 1979 
concerning a Soviet Combat brigade in Cuba, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation's unanimous approval of the 
two track, plan for development of American medium range 
missiles in Europe coupled with simultaneous negotiations 
on arms control, and perhaps the most significant of all 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was to mark 
the instant death of detente and crumbling of the fragile 
consensus which had begun to emerge under detente during 
most, of the 1970s. The 'Cold War' appeared to be 
returning from self-imposed exile.^ The events in 
Afghanistan attracted a stiff response from the United 
States. President Carter called it a "radical and 
aggressive invasion" which "could pose the most serious 
threat to the peace since the Second World War". The 
United states took steps to isolate Moscow including 
mobilising the international community against the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent American 
sponsored resolution of censure at the United Nations 
which was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
President Carter's state of the Union address to a 
joint session of Congress on January 23, 1980, made it
abundantly clear that the American response would not be
15
confined to mere verbal condemnation. Carter emphasised 
that "the Soviet Union rmis! pay a concrete price for 
their aggression. The American president announced a 
package of economic sanctions against the USSR.^^ These 
included: an embargo on future grain exports leading to a 
cancellation of an offer of 17 million metric tonnes of 
wheat æmd corn; suspension of licensing of all high 
technology and other products requiring validated export 
licences pending review; reduction of Soviet fishing 
privileges in U.S. waters; and limitation of the Aeroflot 
service to the United States. On top of these Carter 
threatened to pull the U.S. out of the 1980 Olympic games 
which were to be held in Moscow. These measures were 
clearly intended to send a message to the Soviet Union 
that "... .its decision to use military force in 
Afghanistan will be costly to every political and 
economic relationship it v a l u e s . Carter backed up the 
American economic and political response with a stern 
warning emphasising that the United States would be 
willing to use military force if necessary to protect its 
vital interests such as those in the Persian Gulf region 
which Washington saw as being threatened by the Soviet 
presence in Afghanistan. This reffirmation of the 
geostrategic importance of the Persian Gulf and the area 
immediately surrounding it to American interests became 
known as the 'Carter Doctrine'.
A major casualty of the renewed confrontation in 
Soviet-American relations following Afghanistan was the 
Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT 1 1 ) , signed by
16
Carter and Brezhnev at the Vienna Summit on 18 June 1979 
but yet to be ratified by the U.S. Senate. Ratification 
of the treaty was already in a precarious position even 
before the events in Afghanistan, the treaty having been 
"fatally wounded" during the 1979 hearings held by the 
Senate Foreign relations and Armed Services Committees. 
Under much debate and scrutiny regarding the SALT 11 
treaty, and despite Carter's support for it,^^ the
president stated that ".....  because of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, I do not believe it is advisable 
to have the senate consider the treaty now".^'^ Despite 
the fact that Carter had only asked the Senate to 
temporarily delay consideration of the treaty it never 
again received formal attention. President Carter's 
decision was simply a response to the political reality 
in the U.S., and the prevailing anti-Soviet sentiment 
which would not only have made ratification of the treaty 
impossible^^ but would have been construed as sending the 
wrong signal to Moscow at the wrong time.
The Soviet response to the sharp deterioration in 
bilateral relations was to place the blame for this 
solely on the Unites States and exonerate itself. There 
was total disagreement between both sides as to the 
version of events in Afghanistan. The Soviets launched 
their own verbal offensive against Washington, coupled 
with fervent defiance, accusing the United States of 
misrepresenting the events in Afghanistan, According to
the official Soviet view "....  there has been, and is,
no Russian intervention in Afghanistan. The USSR acted
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on the basis of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 
f r i e n d s h i p " . M o s c o w ' s  version of events v^ is that it 
was giving help to the Afghan people to assist them in 
their struggle to repel ".... outside imperialist
interference  r indeed at the Central Committee
Plenum on 23 June 1980^^, Brezhnev stated the Soviet view 
of the events in Afghanistan accusing the US of armed 
aggression against the Afghan people, and all the USSR 
did was help its neighbour to repel this aggression. He 
staunchly defended the decision to send in Soviet troops 
as the correct one. The USSR further assailed the 
economic sanctions imposed by the United States as a 
".... continuation of the old policy of using trade as an 
instrument of political pressure".
The American decision to postpone ratification of 
the SALT 1]. treaty Ccmæ under heEu^ Soviet criticism. 
Moscow argued that the decision was hard to justify 
considering that the treaty "... . is in the interests of 
the US no less than those of the USSR".^^ Indeed Leonid 
Brezhnev, answering questions from a Pravda 
correspondent, claimed that the American decision to 
shelve the treaty meant that major progress in the field 
of disarmament had been lost. The USSR increasingly
believed that Soviet-American relations were back on the 
'Cold War' track, and that the gains from detente were 
lost because of a new militaristic course adopted by 
America. At the heart of Soviet accusations against the 
United States was the view that Washington was on a 
irreversible path aimed at attaining military superiority
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over the Soviet state. Such Soviet charges were not 
altogether unfounded.. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
had turned Soviet-American relations on their head and 
confrontation had replaced cooperation. It also 
encouraged the Carter administration to pursue a nmnre 
hardline and vigorous defence policy. So it came as no 
surprise when Congress, without much opposition, approved 
development of two weapons - the MX missile and new nerve 
gas weapons labelled binary munitions, a move said to be 
a serious blow to the future success of arms control 
efforts. Moreover, Congress increased the level of 
defence appropriations suggested by the administration 
for the first time in thirteen y e a r s . Commenting on 
Carter's state of the Union address, a Pravda editorial 
accused the U.S. of seeking outright military superiority 
and claimed that Washington pursuing a course aimed
at disrupting the present military balance between the 
U.S. and the USSR.^^ A leading Soviet academician, 
Georgi Arbatov, dismissed Afghanistan as the issue which 
was responsible for the downturn in Soviet-American 
relations and the consequent policy adopted by the United 
States which was characterised by an accelerated build-up 
of military power. Instead he argued that the American 
reversion to this militaristic approach was the root 
cause of the deteriorating international climate and that 
this policy was not the result of Soviet action in 
Afghanistan but in fact was based on a number of 
decisions taken by the U.S. and its allies prior to the 
events in Afghanistan. He cited the NATO decision to
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increase military budgets over a period of fifteen years, 
and to deploy new American medium range missiles in 
Europe. ^
As the year progressed there appeared to be no sign 
of dissipation of the cold war climate created at the 
start of the year. In a speech on May 10 to the World 
Affairs Council in Philadelphia, President Carter pinned 
any hopes of an improvement in American-Soviet relations 
on an improvement in Soviet b e h a v i o u r . I n  light of the 
US administration's current policy of enhancing America's 
military capabilities, this speech was judged as 
hypocritical as well as hostile to the Soviet Union by 
the Soviet press. In .remarks made at the Central 
Committee Plenum on 23 June 1980^^ Andrei Gromyko 
reiterated the Soviet view that the West had been 
responsible for the rise in tension and hostility, and 
that this could be seen in the decision of the western 
countries " to increase their military budgets, stepping 
up the arms race, and placing new; American medium range 
missiles in Western Europe". He went on to note that the 
reason why the West had initiated such measures, which 
had contributed to East-West tension, was because of its 
quest "to attain a military-strategic predominance over 
the Soviet Union" and secondly because of its "concern 
that global developments were not proceeding...." as they 
would like. He underlined that military supremacy 
remained the overriding goal of the US government.
Soviet apprehension about what it saw as the 
dangerous militaristic course embarked upon by the United
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States was compounded by Presidential Directive No. 59 
signed by Carter on July 25, 1980, and later leaked to
the press. According to Moscow the directive essentially 
amounted to a new U.S. nuclear strategy. This so
called new nuclear strategy was viewed as particularly 
provocative since it appeared that the United States had 
acceded to the concept that waging a "limited nuclear 
war" was possible. On October 14 Brezhnev received at 
the Kremlin a prominent U.S. businessman, Dr Armand 
Hammer, to whom he expressed his deep concern at the poor 
state of Soviet-American r e l a t i o n s . He reiterated
comments made earlier in the year "....  that
continuation by the United States of a policy of 
exacerbating international tension and whipping up the 
arms race will lead to further disorder in international 
relations and an increase in the threat of war".^^ He 
went on to stress that a U.S. policy geared to dialogue 
with the Soviet Union would be more desirable and would 
".... meet with a positive response on the part of the 
Soviet Union". This was typical of the echoes from 
Moscow which tended to c omit i ne harsh critique of U.S. 
policy with support for cooperation and dialogue on an 
"equitable basis".
The Soviet use of military force in Afghanistan had
"....  produced a virtual cut off in substantive contact
between t.he United States and the Soviet Union". It was 
not surprising therefore that there was no progress on 
bilateral issues, illustrated by the fact that no 
bilateral documents were signed during the whole of
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1980.^^' Many Americans felt a sense of betrayal on the 
part of the USSR for the faith they had invested in
detente during the 197 0s only to see Moscow (as they 
believed) exploit the period of relaxed tensions for its 
own ends. The American nation appeared to have descended 
into a state or mood of belligerency epitomized on
election day when voters opted for "....  politicians
whose chief foreign policy prescriptions were more 
defence spending and a tougher stance against the 
S o v i e t s " , t h u s  shattering any prospect of a Soviet- 
American rapprochement for the time being. It appears as 
though the Soviet leadership did not fully comprehend the 
scale of anti-Soviet feeling prevailing in the United 
States or were unwilling to accept it. Indeed the 
initial Soviet reaction to Reagan's victory was one of 
o p t i m i s m . M o s c o w  presumed that Carter's defeat was the 
result of voters rejecting his bellicose foreign policy, 
while at the same time Moscow detected moderation in 
Reagan's rhetoric. It was not until Reagan took office
in January 1981 that the USSR fully appreciated his
administration's strong anti-Soviet credentials. No 
doubt Moscow had hoped, that by adopting a more moderate 
tone in response to Reagan's victory it might be able to 
dissuade the new administration from continuing with its 
predecessor's confrontational stance.
The chance to salvage something from a disastrous 
year for Soviet-American relations came with the opening 
of the second stage of talks on European security and 
cooperation under the CSCE Helsinki accord in Madrid on
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11 November 19 80. However no headway was made, and 
instead the conference provided both sides with a forum 
from which to launch their own propaganda offensive, thus 
concluding Carter's final year in office in much the same 
way as it had began. The Carter administration was to 
leave behind nnuy pressing points of contention on its 
Soviet policy. The confidence and trust between the 
superpowers, one of the hallmarks of detente, had 
vanished^ ^ and a steady return to the cold war left the 
next President Ronald Reagan, with a major foreign policy 
challenge with which to contend.
SECTION TWO - CONFRONTATION INTENSIFIED: THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY - THE FIRST THREE YEARS 
(1 981 -1983 )
Ronald Reagan's early pronouncements regarding the 
Soviet Union set a ominous precedent for the future
conduct of Soviet-American relations. Having ascended to 
the presidency on a crest of anti-Soviet fervour Reagan 
proceeded with plans which would put the United States on 
a new collision course with Moscow. While attempting to 
woo Reagan at the start the Soviet leadership soon came 
to realise the futility of such efforts. The Reagan 
administration arrived in office against a backdrop of 
failure in American foreign policy (such as the Iran
hostage crisis) . Therefore at the core of the new
administration's foreign policy was the need to reassert 
America once again including militarily, particularly in 
response to charges that the United States was lagging
behind the Soviet Union in the military arena with the
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overall balance of forces favouring Moscow. The Reagan 
administration quickly embraced a policy of containment 
reminiscent of the immediate post-second world war 
period. It was becoming clear from the utterances 
emanating frimn Washington bhat Soviet-American global 
rivalry vms ]back on tfæ agenda with Washington's clear 
espousal of a policy aimed at rolling back Soviet gains 
in the third world and with Reagan more willing to 
intervene in regional conflicts in order to check Soviet 
expansionism and add credibility to his anti-communist 
commitments. The provision of economic, humanitarian, 
and military assistance were the means by which this 
indirect interventionist policy was to be executed, with 
the main beneficiaries of this aid being right wing 
governments and rebel movements in Central America and 
Africa.
Any hopes of a positive breakthrough in Soviet- 
American relations and a relaxation of tension had been 
dashed by the new administration's unequivocal rejection 
of the concept of d e t e n t e . D u r i n g  his first press 
conference Reagan had slammed detente as being a one way 
street which the Soviet Union had used to foster its own 
aims, and that it was more advantageous to the USSR than 
to the United S t a t e s . T h e  Reagan administration's harsh 
rhetoric towards the Soviet Union was a common feature 
early on.
Also in his first press conference on January 31, 
President Reagan accused the Soviet Union of pursuing 
world domination. He further added that the Soviets
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"reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, 
to lie, to cheat, in order to attain that, and that is 
moral (in their view) , not immoral, and we operate on a 
different set of s t a n d a r d s " . T h e  Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haig, continued the bitter attacks on the USSR 
by claiming that Moscow was "training, funding and 
equipping international terrorism". The Haig and Reagan 
remarks drew an angry response from the Soviet Union who 
accused the administration of deliberately trying "....to 
discredit the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union"... 
and for dragging the world into a cold war situation by 
hurling unsubstantiated accusations at it.^^
Soviet-American relations suffered not only as a 
result of the bitter exchanges at the start of the year 
but also from what Moscow saw as a concerted policy of 
the Reagan administration to rebuild America's military 
capabilities, thus altering what the USSR saw as the 
existing equilibrium. This view was given further 
credence when Reagan rejected outright the SALT 11 
treaty, calling it "fatally flawed", and appeared to make 
no suggestions about modifying or amending the treaty.
In late March 1981 a Pravda article accused the 
United States of plunging into a new arms race with plans 
to increase defence spending to $178 billion. Commenting 
on the new U.S. government the newspaper said that the
Reagan administration had set itself ".....  the goal not
of correcting but of multiplying the mistakes made by the 
preceding administration...
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On the important issue of arms control and 
disarmament both Reagan and Secretary of State Haig had 
earlier in the year declared that further negotiations 
with the Soviets would depend on Soviet behaviour around 
the world. This policy of linking Soviet behaviour in 
specific areas with progress on particular Soviet- 
American issues was rejected outright by the Soviet 
Union. A leading meniber of the Politburo, Konstantin 
Chernenko, poured scorn over this policy of linkage 
arguing that it was a U.S. ploy to avoid arms talks and 
to exacerbate existing points of conflict in Soviet- 
American relations, and that it served no purpose since 
progress hampered by such a policy would be a mutual 
loss.^^ Throughout the course of the year the USSR had 
constantly accused Washington of being uninterested in 
arms control.
In August 1981 the Soviet Union took the opportunity 
to attack Reagan for his decision to start production of 
the neutron bonis, warning of the dangerous consequences 
of this step.^^ Reagan further left himself open to the 
charge of insensitivity since the decision to proceed 
with manufacture of the bomb came on August 6 which was 
the memorial day for the victims of Hiroshima. More to 
the point, the U.S. decision to proceed with the neutron 
bomb played into Soviet hands since it gave some credence 
to Moscow's earlier pronouncements that the Reagan 
administration was not committed to arms control.
When taking office President Reagan and Alexander 
Haig had made it clear that on arras control their
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emphasis would be on the need to negotiate from a 
position of s t r e n g t h ^ ^  since only then could they 
persuade the USSR to take arms control seriously. This 
approach was highlighted by Reagan on October 2 when he 
announced his strategic arms p o l i c y . During this he 
"pledged to halt the decline in America's military 
strength" and presented a comprehensive plan to 
strengthen and modernize the strategic triad of forces. 
He went on to clarify that such a programme would provide 
"the keystone to any genuine arms reduction agreement 
with the Soviets". This American approach to arms control 
did nothing to quell tense exchanges with Moscow over 
this issue, and was probably a major determinant in the 
growing peace movement in Europe and the United States.
The Soviet Union itself, while in need of a 
substantial arms accord, was never going to allow itself 
to be dictated to by the United States and was willing to 
negotiate only once major obstacles in the arms control 
field were removed. Moscow continued to campaign to 
reverse the NATO two track decision for deployment of 
Pershing and Cruise missiles in Western Europe. This 
issue, which had been largely overshadowed during 
Carter's final year by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the adverse repercussions which stemmed from that, 
always proved to be a major irritant during questions of 
arms control and disarmament. The USSR welcomed with 
much satisfaction the upsurge in pacifist sentiment in 
Western Europe which culminated in demonstrations on a 
large scale in major cities such as London, Bonn and Rome
27
during October 1981 against the NATO plans to deploy new 
U.S. missiles in E u r o p e . This increasing wave of 
protest ar^ the concern portrayed by airn^ control 
advocates in the United States were prompted to a large 
extent by "the strong anti-Soviet line adopted" by the 
Reagan administration and the extensive programme of 
rearmament which Reagan had committed himself to 
undertake which in turn "had raised fears of nuclear 
war" . The USSR attempted to outfox Washington by 
playing the advent of peace. America thus risked 
forfeiting the peace card to Moscow if it totally ignored 
the peace movement, at the same time as the Soviet Union 
was calling for arms talks and tabling arms proposals.
In view of all this Reagan made an attempt to regain 
the initiative when he delivered a major foreign policy 
address before the National Press Club on November 18.^0 
During this occasion he announced the so called 'zero 
option' according to which the United States would forgo 
entirely deployment of the planned missiles in Europe if 
the Soviet Union was prepared to dismantle its own 
similar weapons. Not surprisingly^^ this proposal was 
rejected outright by the Soviet Union as not serious, and 
many in the West did not expect Moscow to agree to this 
latest Reagan initiative.
The unacceptability of Reagan's 'zero option' is not 
entirely difficult to comprehend, particularly from a 
Soviet viewpoint. In short, Reagan's proposal for a 
'zero option' meant in effect that NATO would not go 
ahead with the planned deployment of 572 or so U.S.
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missiles in Europe on condition that the Soviets would be 
required to eliminate all their deployment of SS-20 
missiles including dismantling the 600 or so intermediate 
range missiles installed since the 1950s. Furthermore the 
proposal excluded British and French missile systems 
which the Soviets reminded were also pointed at them. 
The Soviet newspaper Izvestia called the Reagan arms cut 
proposal a "propaganda ploy" to show that the American 
President wanted p e a c e . F u r t h e r m o r e  his proposals were 
viewed by the Soviets as not in good faith and were 
according to them deliberately framed to be unacceptable. 
The Soviet press referring to the Reagan proposal once 
again in 1982 cynically dubbed it as "zero-option again" 
in conjunction with new U.S. proposals.
Aside from the zero option offered by Reagan, he 
used the November 18 address as a platform from which to 
illustrate his concern at what he described as a steady 
Soviet military build-up over the past decade which had 
allowed Moscow to develop an overwhelming advantage. He 
rejected the Soviet claim that a balance of Intermediate 
Nuclear forces already existed in Europe, and announced 
that he had proposed a defence programme 22"which will
remedy the neglect of the past decade ..... " All in all
this Reagan address combining unacceptable arms proposals 
with plans for strengthening America's military 
capabilities did not go down well in Soviet eyes as one 
would have expected.
Negotiations on Intermediate Nuclear forces 
officially opened in Geneva on November 30. Arms talks
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particularly those involving INF in Europe were always a 
contentious issue in Soviet-American relations. This was 
because Europe was regarded as the major theatre of 
operation in the event of any future world war and both 
sides were therefore anxious to avoid being perceived as 
having a military-strategic disadvantage in Europe. The 
importance of Europe was spelled out by Reagan during his 
afore mentioned November 18 address when he talked about 
the growing threat to Western Europe posed by Soviet 
intermediate range missile systems, and explained that 
this reason was paramount in the NATO two track decision 
to deploy missiles capable of reaching targets in the 
Soviet Union. Any hope of serious progress at the Geneva 
negotiations had been severely dented by Reagan's 
controversial 'zero option' proposal which was heavily 
weighted against the Soviet Union, and which the American 
side restated at the negotiations. The American 
delegation led by Paul Nitze"^ presented Reagan's 
proposals in detail. The Soviet team headed by Yuli 
Kvitsinsky insisted that only weapons deployed in Europe 
be discussed, a move aimed at deflecting the talks away 
from the Soviet SS-20s stationed in Siberia (outside 
European Russia) but still capable of striking targets in 
Western Europe. Moreover they demanded that British and 
French nuclear systems be counted in the overall Western 
tally of forces. As a result the failure of these latest 
INF negotiations, plagued as they were by major 
differences, was no surprise.
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The downhill course which Soviet-American relations 
had assumed since December 1979 showed no signs of 
abating i: nroughout 1981, a year which was rife with 
charge and countercharge. Towards the end of the year 
Soviet-American relations plunged to an even deeper level 
of hostility when on December 13 the authorities in 
Poland imposed martial law. During the course of the 
year the United States had warned Moscow not to intervene 
in the Polish crisis amidst increasing concern that the 
Soviet Union might send troops to quash the Solidarity 
movement. Despite the fact that the USSR did not 
intervene, at least not directly, to determine the events 
in Poland, the military crack-down was blamed on Moscow 
by the United States. As a result, Reagan announced on 
December 29 a whole package of sanctions on economic 
relations with the Soviet U n i o n . T h e s e  wide ranging 
sanctions involved: the suspension of the issuance and
renewed of all validated export licences; the suspension 
of all Aeroflot services; the postponement of 
negotiations on a new long term agreement; as well as 
various other measures including sanctions on oil and gas 
technology. The Soviet response to the line taken by 
Washington over Poland was one of utter dismay. The 
Soviet leader Brezhnev in a letter to Reagan on the 
situation in Poland accused America of interference in 
the internal Affairs of Poland and alleged that "the
present US administration had done a lot ....  to
undermine everything positive that had been achieved .... 
in relations between the two countries. . . " , and that the
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further erosion of Soviet-American relations would be the 
sole responsibility of Washington. On the question of 
sanctions imposed by the United States, the Soviet trade 
minister Nikolai Patolichev said that "the US
administration has again resorted to an unlawful play 
.... anti is trying to use trade ar^ economic relations 
with the USSR and other socialist countries to bring 
pressure to bear on them".^^
The sharp verbal exchanges between the superpowers 
were reminiscent of the cold war climate created in the 
aftermath of Afghanistan. Thus it was becoming
increasingly evident in early 1982 that Soviet-American 
relations were settling down into their now customary 
adverse state.
Another area of Soviet-American conflict, in 
addition to the Polish crisis, which arose in early 1982 
was the construction of a natural gas pipeline from 
Siberia to Western Europe (an East-West project between 
the Soviet Union and Western Europe). The United States 
was highly critical of its Western allies in Europe for 
the close economic cooperation that the pipeline project 
would entail. Many in the US administration were 
beginning to feel a sense of betrayal on the part of 
allies who were cooperating far too intimately with 
Moscow on economic matters. A major objection voiced by 
America was that "the natural gas pipeline would make 
Western Europe overly dependent on the Soviet Union for 
energy supplies and would provide billions of dollars in 
hard currency to prop up the ailing Soviet economy"
which Reagan argued was already heavily militarized and 
which would thus threaten a principal objective of his 
administration, to check and contain the growth in Soviet 
military power. Reagan deliberately made an effort to 
prevent completion of the pipeline, and this opportunity 
conveniently arose over the events in Poland which 
prompted Reagan to announce sanctions against Moscow 
which included "a prohibition on U.S. exports of 
equipment for construction of a natural gas pipeline from 
Siberia to Western E u r o p e " . T h i s  led to a certain 
amount of friction between the United States and its 
European allies many of whom believed that economic 
detente was a useful way of easing East-West tensions and 
who also had strong commercial and economic links with 
the Soviet Union.
The Soviet reaction was one of total fury at
Reagan's "discriminatory measures" and attempts by the 
United States ".... to wreck East-West economic links- 
links which are mutually b e n e f i c i a l " . M o s c o w  was also 
quick to highlight the critical reaction of America's 
European allies, claiming that Washington was trying "to 
deprive them of the undoubted advantages which they 
obtain from economic cooperation with socialist 
countries". The USSR was quite clearly infuriated by 
Reagan's attempts to sabotage the completion of the
pipeline particularly as it was on the verge of
finalising arrangements concerning the pipeline 
pro]ect.
33
Preoccupation with the events in Poland and the 
pipeline fiasco meant that other issues had been largely 
forced into the background during the first few months of 
1982.
In a key speech on March 16, 1982^^ widely regarded
as having the makings of a peace initiative, Brezhnev 
declared ti unilateral moratorium on the deployment of 
intermediate range nuclear weapons in European Russia, 
and a halt in the replacement of the old SS-4 and SS-5 
missiles with the more modern SS-20 missiles. This 
moratorium was to remain in effect, until an agreement had 
been reached on the reduction of intermediate weapons or 
until the deployment of the American Pershing 11 and 
cruise missiles in Europe would begin. Brezhnev's 
proposals helped further buttress the already growing 
peace movement in Europe.
The USSR, although critical of the Reagan 
administration's decision to abandon detente, urged the 
need for dialogue. At the 26th party congress the Soviet 
leader Brezhnev suggested a possible summit meeting in 
the autumn with Reagan while speaking " about the 
usefulness of an active dialogue with the United States 
on all l e v e l s " . While attracting much favourable 
commentary from the foreign media, Brezhnev's comments 
produced only a lukewarm response from Washington.
It seemed at last that there would be some scope for 
the positive development of Soviet-American relations. 
This was given a boost by Reagan's address on East-West 
relations delivered at Eureka C o l l e g e , I l l i n o i s ^ ^  on May 9
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during which he announced the resumption of the strategic 
arms reduction talks or START to culminate later in a 
joint US--Soviet statement announcing the beginning of 
such talks on June 29. More importantly Reagan during 
his speech at Eureka College pledged efforts to reduce 
the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers, providing 
further encouragement for the impending arms talks. In 
another important point Reagan stressed the necessity of 
dialogue in East-West relations remarking " that peoples' 
problems can be solved when people talk to each other 
instead of about each other", a significant statement 
when one considers that in cold war rhetoric the latter 
tended to predominate.
Reagan put forward further positive overtures during 
the summer of 19 82 when during a speech delivered to the 
West German Bundestag^^ he announced a NATO initiative to 
be put forward at the Vienna talks, with the objective of 
reducing the ground forces in Central Europe in stages.
Despite the positive signals which had been evident 
from both Washington and Moscow concerning arms control, 
it was becoming clear that Moscow at least was still not 
fully convinced of the Reagan administration's wholesale 
commitment to substantive progress on arms limitations. 
The Soviets were wary of Reagan's latest arms proposals, 
and the Soviet press accused the United States of seeking 
unilateral advantages for itself and unilateral 
disarmament for the USSR.^^ Moreover Reagan's new 
proposals were seen as a ploy timed as a response to the 
" widening anti-nuclear movement in the United States,
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as well as the growth of anti-nuclear, pacifistic
sentiments in Western Europe" thus raising once again the 
question of Reagan's sincerity. Most political
commentators saw echoes of Reagan's zero option in his 
latest proposals. Some in the Soviet Union acknowledged. 
Reagan's efforts to move the arms control process forward 
but were not at all satisfied with the specific contents 
of his proposals. A prime condition which Moscow wanted 
met was that any talks on arms reductions should take 
account " of the legitimate interests of each side and 
the strict observance of the basic principles of equality
and equal security", an ingredient which they saw
missing from Reagan's arms control and disarmament 
package.
Just two weeks before the resumption of the START
talks in Geneva, the Soviet foreign minister Gromyko in a
speech to the UN General Assembly read out a message from 
the Soviet leader Brezhnev stating that the USSR would
not be the first to use nuclear weapons in E u r o p e . H e
reiterated this point at a later press conference in New 
York calling his country's renunciation of the first use 
of nuclear weapons an "historic d e c i s i o n " . D u r i n g  his 
visit to America Gromyko held discussions with his U.S. 
counterpart Alexander Haig.^^ The meetings were not 
particularly productive, achieved no pre-Geneva boost and 
merely provided a stage on which both sides could set out 
their stall for the oncoming START talks.
US-Allied wrangling over the question of economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union had not wholly
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subsided, and it resurfaced in June when Reagan expanded 
the sanctions he had imposed on the Soviet Union in 
December 1981 to include exports of pipeline equipment by 
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms or by foreign firms 
holding American licences. This move enraged America's 
allies who saw it as an encroachment upon their 
sovereignty and ignored Reagan's new stricter sanctions, 
instead ordering their firms to continue fulfilling 
contracts made with the Soviets. "American sanctions a 
flop" was the heading in one Soviet newspaper, commenting 
on the "economic war" which it argued Reagan had declared 
on the Soviet Union, and which it stressed actually 
amounted to a trade wur against its own allies. U.S 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig resigned over his 
"disagreement with Reagan's economic sanctions against 
the Soviet Union". His departure just days before the 
START talks attracted expressions of concern from Moscow 
who feared that his replacement by George Shultz raised 
the possibility that U.S. foreign policy might become 
more confrontational.
Three days after the death of Soviet President 
Leonid Brezhnev on 10th November 1982, Reagan announced 
that he was lifting sanctions imposed on the Soviet Union 
for its alleged complicity in the imposition of martial 
law in Poland. However Reagan's decision did not 
represent a sweeping reversal of the initial sanctions 
imposed in December 1981 and later added to in June 1982. 
Instead a number of measures were to remain in force 
because according to the State Department they had "a
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heavier short term economic effect on the Soviet Union" 
than the mainly pipeline related sanctions which were the 
subject of r e m o v a l . I n  reality, Reagan's decision to 
remove some of the sanctions represented the 
administration's realisation of the failure of such a 
policy, the unnecessary strains which it led to with 
America's NATO allies, and all this quite apart from the 
considerable damage to the U.S. economy itself. Thus the 
whole sanctions issue signalled a defeat for Reagan who 
was able "to reverse his policy on the sanctions with 
only a minimum of embarrassment"^^, thanks mainly to the 
quiet diplomacy of Secretary of State Shultz with 
America's European a l l i e s w h i c h  allowed Reagan a face 
saving formula. Reagan announced that he was able to 
lift the sanctions in return for allied assurances that 
they would be extra vigilant in the future when engaging 
in trade with the Soviet Union which contributed "... to 
the military or strategic advantage of the USSR "
Despite the fact that a new leader, Yuri Andropov, 
was now at the helm in the Kremlin, U.S.-Soviet relations 
showed no sign of improvement towards the end of 1982. 
None of the major underlying problems which had soured 
relations between the two sides ever since the start of 
the 1980s looked any nearer resolution.
On November 22 Reagan announced his 'dense pack' 
plan for deployment of the new; MX intercontinental 
ballistic missile which was likely to add further 
tensions to the superpower relationship.^^ The plan was 
part of a speech televised nationally with the intention
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of bolstering "support in the United States for his 
nuclear weapons policies and for his approach to arms 
control negotiations with the Soviet Union". During this 
speech Reagan emphasised the need to restore the military 
balance which he argued was heavily weighted in favour of 
Moscow. The Soviet Union quickly denounced Reagan's 
adoption of the 'dense pack' mode of basing for the MX 
missile as a serious violation of both the SALT 1 and 
SALT 11 treaties and later announced itself that the USSR 
would match the MX missile.
The new general secretary Yuri Andropov raised hopes 
of a fresh injection of life into Soviet foreign 
policy. Andropov reaffirmed the Soviet Union's
rejection of the U.S. policy of linkage and at the same 
time expressed the importance of peace and reaching 
agreements based on support for detente. Andropov did 
nevertheless make a new offer on missile cuts in Europe 
on December 21 at a meeting commemorating the 60th 
anniversary of the Soviet U n i o n . T h i s  was seen as a 
modification of earlier Soviet positions. Among the 
major elements in the arms proposals were that the USSR 
would be prepared to reduce its strategic arms by more 
than 25%, propose a substantial cutback in the number of 
nuclear warheads and the greatest possible restrictions 
on the improvement of nuclear weapons.
1983 began as a year of hopeful expectation with 
arms control talks set to resume in late January. These 
expectations were somewhat blunted by Reagan's state of 
the Union address^® during which he once again announced
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his administration's defence programme aimed at 
rectifying "the neglect of the past decade" . Talk of 
major defence systems needing modernisation was hardly 
the most appropriate rhetoric at a time of important arms 
control talks. Reagan's aiddress did not indicate any 
softening of the U.S. line towards Moscow.
In its analysis of the speech, the Soviet newspaper 
Pravda described it as a disappointing restatement of old 
positions and noted that the Reagan administration had 
"not learned from the sad experience of the past two 
years and intends to persist in its bankrupt policy of 
increasing military expenditures as much as possible".
It seems evident from Reagan's state of the Union address 
that his administration did not detect any change for the 
better in Soviet policy towards the United States, as 
exemplified in the new Soviet leader, Andropov's first 
few speeches, to warrant any significant change in its 
own policy towards the Soviet Union. Even Andropov's new 
arms proposals were more or less rejected by the U.S. as 
a mere propaganda manoeuvre. This prompted charges from 
the Soviet Union that the United States had caused a 
deadlock at the Geneva arms talks. Moscow accused the 
Americans of dragging their feet and avoiding proposals 
on the issue of arms reductions. Later in February it 
was the turn of Andropov to reject Reagan's missile 
scrapping plan which Moscow said amounted to unilateral 
disarmament on the part of the Soviet Union, a concept 
which it would never a c c e p t . R e a g a n ' s  "unrealistic 
proposal" was viewed by the USSR as a perfect example
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showing that Washington did not want to "find a mutually 
acceptable accord with the Soviet Union",
By late February if was becoming increasingly
apparent that any upturn in Soviet-American relations was
not forthcoming for the time being at least . The Geneva 
arms talks had been a. total failure with both sides
having made proposals unacceptable to the other. The 
major bones of contention centred on the planned
deployment of missiles scheduled to begin at the end of 
the year, the U.S. zero option which would halt the 
proposed deployment but which was unacceptable to the
Soviet side, and the question of Soviet SS-20 rockets
aimed at Western Europe and which the Soviets were 
refusing to dismantle.
During the course of March Ronald Reagan made a 
number of speeches which resulted only in souring 
relations with Moscow. One of those speeches saw Reagan
make particularly inflammatory references to the Soviet
Union. This speech was delivered on March 8 to the U.S. 
National Association of Evangelicals, and in it Reagan 
depicted the leaders of the Soviet Union as "evil" and
the country itself an "evil e m p i r e " . A n o t h e r  speech 
made by Reagan on March 2 3 cast doubt on the future 
conduct of the already fledgling arms control and
disarmament p r o c e s s . T h i s  was the so called 'Star 
Wars' speech during which Reagan challenged the American 
scientific and strategic community to develop means of 
intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles before
they reached the territory of the United States or its
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allies. This speech served as the foundation from which 
later emerged Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI).^^ The Soviet response was predictable. The 'Star 
Wars' programme symbolised to them an attempt by the 
United States to attain a position of superiority over 
them. The programme also added a whole new dimension to 
the concept of nuclear deterrence by implying with its 
defensive nature the capacity to survive a first strike 
and itself sense the possibility of victory with a more 
effective retaliatory strike, or even be induced into a 
first strike with the added assurance of an adequate 
defensive cover that such a programme would entail. Thus 
the whole idea of such an Anti-Ballistic Missile System 
would serve <mrly to dangerously destabilise hhe 
concept of deterrence.
On May 17 the fourth round of Geneva talks began 
with the outlook very bleak. Ahead of the talks the 
Soviets had already rejected an American proposal 
concerning the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe as 
a prelude towards the eventual elimination of medium 
range missiles from the continent, on the grounds that it 
was yet another attempt to impose unilateral reductions 
on the U S S R . In late May Moscow toughened its own 
stance by indicating that the USSR would respond to the 
proposed NATO deployment scheduled for the end of the 
year with new weapons of its own in Europe to 
counterbalance what it saw as the threat posed by the new 
U.S. missiles.
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The persistent climate of suspicion and. distrust in 
Soviet-American relations fuelled largely by poor 
progress at the talks on arms reductions continued 
throughout the summer, and to an extent was illustrated 
by a statement made by Secretary of State Shultz titled 
'Soviet-American relations in the context of U.S. foreign 
policy' delivered before the Senate foreign relations 
committee on June 15, 1 9 8 3 . During this statement
Shultz acknowledged that "we and the Soviets have sharply 
divergent goals and philosophies of political and moral 
order" and stressed the now familiar line of US policy 
"that peace must be based on strength" while committing 
the US to a "constructive dialogue" with Moscow based on 
this premise. The statement was largely one of pessimism, 
underlining U.S.-Soviet differences, and went on to 
criticise Soviet behaviour over the past decade which had 
come into conflict (said Shultz) "with many of our 
objectives". Shultz then proceeded to review what he 
called the Soviet challenge citing various developments 
such as the "Soviet quest for military superiority" and 
the "unconstructive Soviet involvement in the third 
world" as indicators which had caused America most 
concern, and used this to justify the U.S. programme to 
boost its defences. Signs that the United States was not 
altogether optimistic about a successful outcome to the 
present negotiations with the Soviet Union were 
highlighted by Shultz's comment that "we have not staked 
so much on the prospect of a successful negotiating
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outcome that we have neglected to secure ourselves 
against the possibility of failure".
Shultz's statement came under intense criticism in 
the Soviet press. The USSR saw it as evidence "that
one should not look for results as long as President 
Reagan remains in the White House, a view given further 
credence by Shultz's own comment that one should not 
"expect any agreement to be achieved in the near future" 
in any of the Soviet-American negotiations at that time 
underway in the area of arms control. This gave support 
to the Soviet view that the Reagan administration would 
continue to rely on military strength and would sabotage 
efforts to limit nuclear weapons and curb the arms race.
Sporadic rumours of a possible U.S.-Soviet Summit 
reported to have originated in the West were dismissed as 
premature by Andrei Gromyko, speaking in June.^^ Gromyko 
emphasised that whilst the Soviet Union had always 
expressed its interest in the desirability of a Soviet- 
American summit meeting, American talk of such a meeting 
had to be backed up by American policy which exhibited 
"real signs of a willingness to conduct business in a 
serious and constructive manner" before it could be 
considered a reality.
The faltering Soviet-American relationship was put 
under strain once again following the shooting down of an 
unarmed South Korean airliner by Soviet warplanes on 
September 1.^^ The airliner had strayed into Soviet 
airspace and the ensuing incident led to an exchange of 
harsh accusations between Moscow and Washington. At a
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meeting of his National Security Council Reagan said the
Soviets had carried out a "barbaric act" that caused him
"anger disbelief and profound s a d n e s s " . F o r  its part 
the Soviet Union insisted that it did not know that the 
airliner was a civilian plane and maintained that the 
plane was spying on sensitive military installations on 
Sakhalin island. It also accused Washington of using the 
incident to whip up anti-Soviet propaganda, and called 
the presence of the South Korean airliner in Soviet 
airspace a deliberate provocation, planned in advance and 
which only Washington knew about.
News of the downing of the airliner had provoked
massive indignation in American's highest political
circles. Both the Senate and House of Representatives 
voted unanimously to condemn the Soviet action.
Despite Reagan's tough verbal response there was much
dissatisfaction among hardline conservatives who urged 
the President to take sterner action. The incident had 
made clear, yet again, the extreme fragility of Soviet- 
American's relations.
As the political wrangling generated by the incident 
petered out there was a return to the issue of arms
control and disarmament which had dominated Soviet-
American relations throughout the year. In late October 
Andropov made a new offer of missile cuts in order to 
relieve the impasse at the Geneva talks which he alleged 
had resulted from American inflexibility.^'^ As the date 
for the deployment of new U.S. missiles approached 
Andropov stated that the USSR would pull out of the
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Geneva talks if the proposed deployment took place. The 
American response tms a negative one, and appeared to 
indicate that with the date for the arrival of the
'Euromissiles' moving ever nearer, Washington had lost 
its zeal to negotiate a last ditch agreement.
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The final blow to the fate of the already beleaguered 
arms talks came in Geneva on November 23 when the Soviet 
delegation announced that it was pulling out of the talks 
in response to the arrival of the new American missiles in 
E u r o p e . In a statement on November 25 Andropov listed 
steps^^ he said the Soviet Union would take in order to 
counter the 'Euromissile' deployment including no further 
participation in the talks on the nuclear arms limitations 
in Europe. Andropov expressed his concern at the
deployment of the missiles which he envisaged as increasing 
"the real danger that the U.S. may bring a catastrophe on 
the peoples of Europe". The START talks were adjourned 
without a resumption date, thus signalling the total 
collapse of the Soviet-American arms negotiating process.
SECTION 3 (1984 - March 1985)
During Reagan's first three years in office US-Soviet 
relations had been characterised by mutual hostility with 
regard to most issues enhanced by the confrontational 
stance adhered to by the new U.S. administration towards 
Moscow. In view of this, and the deteriorating climate of 
Soviet-American relations at the end of 1983, Reagan's 
final year of his first term in office began in sharp 
contrast to his previous three. In his annual state of the 
Union address, the President appeared to have remarkably 
softened his tone towards the USSR.^^ In the part of the 
speech addressed to the Soviet Union he spoke of the danger 
of a nuclear war and stressed that the onus was on both 
superpowers to avoid such a conflict, and urged the need
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for both countries to come together "to build a safer and 
far better world" with peace being his central theme. The 
degree of moderation detected in this Reagan address was a 
welcome relief from the problems which had dogged Soviet- 
American relations since the beginning of the 1980s, and it 
came just two weeks after Andropov restated Moscow's terms 
for resuming arms t a l k s . ^^0 Thus both leaders appeared to 
indicate at the start of 1984 a willingness to resume some 
sort of dialogue which looked to have been shattered by the 
decision to proceed with the deployment of the new American 
missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union's willingness to
resume talks with the United States however was conditional 
on the NATO countries displaying a readiness "to return to 
the situation that existed before the deployment of the
American medium range missiles in Europe began  i, 101
Later Andropov once again reiterated calls for dialogue 
with the United States but only on the basis of what he 
called "an equal footing, and not from a position of 
strength as R. Reagan proposes".
After Andropov's death on February 9 1984 the new
Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko continued his 
predecessor's policy of open dialogue with the U.S.
Chernenko's accession to power provided the impetus for
fresh hopes of a possible return to detente since he was 
seen as a past advocate of it.^^2
This euphoria over a possible turn for the better in 
Soviet-American relations was not sustained chiefly because 
of the lack of any substantive progress on the most 
important determinants of the superpower relationship.
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Soviet policy towards the U.S. began to settle down into 
its familiar pattern of combining peace overtures with 
criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. Answering questions 
from the Soviet press in April, Chernenko expressed his 
concern at the deteriorating international situation which 
he said was the result of the dangerous policy pursued by 
the U.S. administration which relied on military force.
He held the view that there had been "no real changes in 
U.S. policy" and any peace-loving rhetoric heard from 
Washington was never backed up by "practical deeds".
In May 19 84 the USSR decided to boycott the Los 
Angeles Olympics. This was probably in retaliation for
America's boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980, and 
represented a random action unconditional on the state of 
Soviet-American relations at the time. The explanation
offered by the Soviet Union through its Olympic Committee 
was that participation in the games was impossible on the 
grounds of lax security, and fear for the safety of its
athletes.
As the U.S. presidential elections approached, Moscow
was in no mood to assist Reagan in his bid to win a second 
term. Most Reagan statements on relations with the Soviet 
Union were closely scrutinized to establish whether they 
were "purely tactical moves in the interest of the 
election campaign" and intended to mask the still
relatively belligerent American policy towards Moscow. 
This was indeed how the USSR viewed the remarks by Reagan 
on a possible Soviet-U.S. summit in June. Pravda labelled 
the American president's talk of a summit meeting as
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'frivolous' and intended to bolster his re-election 
chances .
A major impediment in Soviet-American relations had
emerged during 1984. This was the question of an arms race 
in space or the militarisation of space, a product of
Reagan's 'Star Wars speech' of March 1983. Moscow, which
could ill afford an escalation of the arms race into space 
quite apart from the serious strategic-military implication 
that space - based weapons would entail, pushed the 
question of space weapons near the top of its arms
negotiating agenda. To the USSR Reagan's plan for outer 
space was yet another example of his administration's 
desire to continue the arms race and thwart any chance of 
serious negotiations.
The upgrading of the U.S.- USSR hotline indicated a 
minor lull in the growing differences between Washington 
and Moscow. Senior Soviet academician Georgi Arbatov 
attacked Reagan's policy as still blatantly anti-Soviet, 
with its central goal being military superiority over the 
USSR allowing it to "wage any type of nuclear war and win
The first meeting in a long time between Gromyko and 
U.S. Secretary of State Shultz took place in late 
September^^^ on the occasion of the 39th Session of the UN 
General Assembly. In his meeting with Shultz, Gromyko 
blamed the U.S for "soured relations", and at the address 
to the Assembly^^^ repeated this hard line on the United 
States that he had constantly deployed throughout 1984, 
accusing Washington of blocking arms stock and calling for
action against the militarisation of space. Gromyko also 
met Reagan on September 28, and like his previous meeting 
with Shultz, this produced rather meagre results with 
Gromyko envisaging no positive changes in American 
policy.
By October it was becoming increasingly obvious that 
Reagan was going to be re-elected, and with this in mind 
Moscow was keen to improve relations with Washington 
knowing that it would be better to work with Reagan on a 
more conciliatory basis rather that risk renewed 
confrontation which would jeopardise the chance of an arms 
control agreement badly needed by Moscow. This cause was 
helped by the fact that in Reagan's re-election campaign 
"confrontational and anti-Soviet rhetoric was far less 
common than in his early years in office".
A positive restructuring of Soviet-American relations 
began to take shape in the last few months of the year. 
For a start. Secretary of State Shultz, speaking in late 
October, appeared to indicate if not an end but a 
substantial phasing down of the policy of linkage^^^ so 
abhorred by Moscow, and which had been a part of U.S 
negotiating strategy with regard to the Soviet Union at 
different times and under various American Presidents 
including Reagan. In a speech in Los Angeles Shultz was
quoted as saying that "on the whole .....  linkage as a
policy has its l i m i t a t i o n s S h u l t z ' s  apparent 
renunciation of linkage could only help to improve the 
climate of bilateral relations.
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Furthermore the Soviet leader Chernenko answering 
questions from the NBC Television Company^^^ was reported 
as saying that better U.S-USSR relations were possible if 
the spirit of detente returned in Washington. Clearly by 
the end of the year Chernenko was offering the U.S an olive 
branch in the hope of engaging Washington in constructive 
dialogue. On November 23 it was announced in the Soviet 
press^^^ that "the Soviet Union and the United States of 
America have agreed to enter into new talks with a view to 
reaching mutually acceptable accords on the entire range of 
questions relating to nuclear and space arms" with Gromyko 
and Shultz to meet on January 7-8 19 85 in Geneva to set a 
precise agenda for the talks. In this way U.S. - Soviet 
relations ended on a high note and prospects for the new 
year appeared very much brighter.
On January, Gromyko and Shultz met as planned and 
announced^^^ that the two countries would at the proposed 
resumption of talks on March 12 negotiate about three 
weapons: strategic nuclear weapons/bombers, intermediate
range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe, and space weaponry. 
In a press conference held on January 9, Reagan pledged his 
commitment to a positive dialogue with Moscow by stating 
that he would be "flexible, patient and determined" in 
order to keep that dialogue alive. Nevertheless the U.S- 
Soviet arms talks to be held were in danger of being 
destroyed by the issue of space arms. In the weeks leading 
up to the talks statements from Moscow attacked the 
American 'Star Wars' programme^^^ and Reagan's determined 
and defiant commitment to it was seen as causing a shadow
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over the impending Geneva t a l k s . J u s t  two days before 
opening the talks the Soviet leader Chernenko died. He was 
replaced by Mikhail Gorbachev under whose leadership the 
Soviet Union embarked on the path to arguably its warmest 
relations with Washington since the heyday of detente.
CONCLUSIONS
It can b e  concluded that Soviet-American relations 
were in a state of adversity for the most part of 1980 
through to March 1985. Even though there were momentary 
hopes of an upturn these were often unrealized. The lack 
of measurable progress is particularly evident from the 
fact that between 1980 and 1984 only five bilateral 
documents were signed by the USSR with the USA, with none 
at all in 1980 and 1983.^^^ This was a low figure in 
comparison to the previous five year period when 17 
bilateral documents were signed. The low figure for 1980 
to 1984 is not unusual in view of the deterioration in 
superpower relations which occurred at this time. The 
depression in relations began in late December 1979 with 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which provoked a 
response of outrage from Washington. This led Carter to 
adopt a more confrontational policy towards Moscow which 
contrasted sharply with his previous three years in office 
and was an approach dictated by Soviet international 
behaviour, putting the USSR largely on the defensive.
In the wake of a wave of anti-Soviet sentiment Ronald 
Reagan, a hardline proponent of anti - communism, was 
elected. Reagan's foreign policy was based on an attempt
to compensate for, and to a large extent, rectify the loss 
of U.S power and prestige which has occurred during the 
1970s. Reagan's presidency injected a new intensity in its 
confrontational posture towards Moscow. It became rapidly 
apparent that Reagan and the Soviet Union were 
incompatible. In contrast to Carter, Reagan's approach to 
Moscow was dictated not primarily by world events or Soviet 
international behaviour as such but was part of a 
deliberate strategy to put into practice his anti communist 
credentials. The Reagan administration decided to
challenge what it saw as the Soviet threat to American 
interests, a view perpetuated by alleged Soviet military 
superiority.
Soviet policy towards the U.S was a combination of 
calls for a return to detente and outright criticism of the 
tough militaristic course undertaken by Washington. To 
Moscow, Reagan was questioning as well as threatening the 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Reagan's 
swift renunciation of detente implied immediately that he 
was not about to embark on a policy of rapprochement with 
the Soviet Union, not at least until he had restored U.S 
pride and prestige.
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With regard to most bilateral issues Washington and 
Moscow were between 1980 and 1984 on a collision course. 
The U.S fostered a policy of containment concerning 
regional conflicts in order to deter or check the 
increasing Soviet influence in the third world. Reagan's 
assured support for any government or guerilla movement 
that could prove itself anti-communist often left him open 
to the charge from Moscow that America was aiding 
authoritarian and corrupt regimes known for their human 
rights abuses, for example the right wing government in El 
Salvador, and also supporting right wing guerilla groups 
responsible for the indiscriminate killing of civilians. 
The superpowers intervened indirectly around the globe in 
various regional flashpoints through economic, military and 
humanitarian assistance to governments and rebel movements 
of their respective inclinations.
There was no progress on arms control and disarmament 
despite numerous proposals and counterproposals, largely 
because of what appeared to be on the surface intractable 
obstacles such as the NATO decision to deploy new U.S. 
missiles in Europe, Reagan's plans for an Anti-Ballistic 
Missile system (ABM) in space, and the general American 
policy of accelerated rearmament.
1984 proved to be a more positive year, and although 
such hopes were dented during the middle of the year, they 
were revived towards the end with Moscow and Washington 
building some sort of rapprochement which was later 
substantially enhanced with Gorbachev and Reagan.
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CHAPTER 2
SOVIET - AMERICAN RELATIONS: REAGAN,GORBACHEV AND SUMMIT DIPLOMACY - AN OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Soviet-American relations had began to show signs of 
improvement during the thirteenth month or so leadership 
of Konstantin Chernenko but this was yet to be translated 
into practical results. When -Mikhail Gorbachev assumed 
the leadership of the Soviet Union upon Chernenko's death 
on March 10, 1985, he inherited a number of problems
which were impeding the attainment of practical goals in 
areas of the Soviet-American relationship. The arms 
negotiations at Geneva were in deadlock and their 
resumption on March 12 gave little cause for optimism. 
The latest stalemate at the arms talks was primarily due 
to the inability of both sides to resolve the issue of 
anti missile defence systems in space. Regional
conflicts in the horn of Africa, Central America, and 
Afghanistan were fuelling much discord between Moscow and 
Washington. Soviet internal policies particularly on the 
issue of human rights were attracting Western criticism, 
and at the same time had led to the USSR's near ostracism 
from participation in the international economy.
The new Soviet leader however sparked fresh cause 
for optimism. Gorbachev like his predecessor was in 
favour of relaxing East-West tension.^ He showed a 
willingness to go much further b y  revealing a desire to
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back up increased dialogue vzitli Washington with deeds, 
and during the course of 1985-1988 made some startling 
proposals in the field of arms control and disarmament. 
On top of this, President Reagan's more conciliatory 
posture towards Moscow during his second term allowed the 
two countries to embark upon an unprecedented road to 
high level diplomacy characterised by a wave of high 
level meetings between American and Soviet leaders.^
What probably contributed in a major way to the 
improvement in American-Soviet relations was the changing 
Soviet approach to international relations which became
known as the 'new political thinking^. Gorbachev
outlined this 'new thinking' in pronouncements he made 
even before he assumed the leadership, and then 
throughout the years that followed including in his book: 
Perestroika^ . The 'new thinking' was linked to 
Gorbachev's agenda for domestic restructuring. Gorbachev 
saw a radical reappraisal of the Soviet approach to
foreign relations as one answer to the Soviet Union's 
social and economic ills.
The evolution of the 'new thinking' was perhaps most 
clearly set out in Gorbachev's address to the United 
Nations General Assembly on 7 December 19 88^, and saw the 
abandonment of some of the traditional premises of Soviet 
foreign policy. The 'new thinking' envisaged a future 
based on cooperation of all countries, even those on 
opposing sides. The essential features of this 'new 
thinking' in international relations were^: the United
Nations should play a wider global role, particularly
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with regard to ecological and environmental issues, and 
in aiding Third World development; the attainment of 
comprehensive security through nuclear disarmament and 
political decisions rather than by military means 
emphasising that a nuclear war could not be won, and that 
the arms build up had put the survival of mankind in 
danger; that there was a growing interdependence between 
the nations of the world; and the principle of reasonable 
sufficiency for defence.
The implications of the new thinking for US-Soviet 
relations were that it played a large part in the 
improvement of superpower relations, as seen during the 
year 19 85-88, by helping to put cooperation and dialogue, 
instead of confrontation, at the top of the agenda, with 
results on issues such as arms control and regional 
conflicts (e.g. The INF Treaty, peace settlement in 
Afghanistan, and the Angola Peace Accords), that had 
embittered relations in the past.
This chapter will analyse the state of Soviet- 
American relations beginning from March 1985 to the end 
of Ronald Reagan's presidency.^ It will show a slow but 
steady improvement in superpower relations in 1985 and 
1986 which gathered pace in 1987 and 1988, and was marked 
by substantial progress, the high point coming with the 
signing of the INF treaty at the Washington Summit.
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SECTION QBE: Soviet-American Relations Under Gorbachev
and Reacran: The First Two Years (1985 and 1986)
On March 11 19 85 a meeting of the Communist party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee appointed 
Mikhail Gorbachev as its new General Secretary following 
the death of Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachev's 
appointment as Soviet leader did not attract any 
immediate optimistic commentary in the United States. 
President Reagan for one admitted^ that he did not 
believe from the start that Gorbachev was going to be 
different from previous Soviet leaders whom he had never 
held in particularly high regard, and the American 
ambassador to the Soviet Union, Art Hartmann confirmed 
Reagan's belief that Gorbachev would be as tough as any 
previous Soviet leaders^.
Nevertheless the initial communication between 
Gorbachev and Reagan was positive. Reagan had sent in 
the hands of vice-president George Bush an invitation to 
Gorbachev for a Summit meeting during the vice- 
president's visit to Moscow to attend the funeral of 
Chernenko, and at the same time emphasised his commitment 
to working with the new Soviet leader ".... and the rest 
of the Soviet leadership in serious negotiations".^^ 
Gorbachev's reply^^ was equally encouraging, indicating 
his own inclination towards the idea of a Summit.
Despite the initial positive exchanges between 
Gorbachev and Reagan, Soviet-American relations under the 
new Soviet leader got off to a rather shaky start. On 
March 18 1985 Reagan delivered a tough anti-Soviet speech 
in the Canadian province of Quebec where he criticised
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the Soviet record on compliance with international 
agreements and attacked the foreign policy of the Soviet 
U n i o n . T h e  speech came under considerable criticism in 
the Soviet press. One leading Soviet newspaper, Pravda, 
depicted it as "blind anti-communism, " aimed at dampening 
hopes "... for a normalization of Soviet-American 
relations" . To add to this, in late March 1985 an
American army officer based in East Germany - Major
Arthur Nicholson Jr. was shot and killed by a Soviet 
border guard. In a letter to Gorbachev, Reagan protested 
about the killing of Major Nicholson.
Putting aside these negative developments at the 
start of Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviet leader made 
it abundantly clear that he wished to build on the
improvement in superpower relations which had begun to 
emerge under C h e r n e n k o . I n  an interview published in 
the Soviet press Gorbachev asked for better US-Soviet 
relations and "honest dialogue" to ease tension and
expressed what he saw as the urgent "need to end the arms 
race".^^ He backed his words with deeds and announced
that the Soviet Union was introducing a unilateral
freeze, until November 1985, on the deployment of 
Euromissiles, and at the same time stated that he was
1 7ready to meet Reagan.
Later in April 1985 Moscow expressed its regret at
what it saw as the hasty dismissal by Washington of
Gorbachev's decision to impose a moratorium on the 
deployment of its medium range missiles in Europe, and 
the West's unwillingness to reciprocate by ceasing
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deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western 
E u r o p e . T h e  United States had dismissed Gorbachev's 
missile moratorium as a "propaganda gesture".
2On May 8 1985 President Reagan delivered an address 
to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, on the 
occasion of the 4 0th anniversary of the end of World War
11. During this speech Reagan made mixed references to 
the Soviet Union, citing on one hand Soviet aggression 
and adventurism in the third world, and on the other, 
embracing dialogue and "fruitful cooperation with the 
Soviet Union" backed up with a whole-hearted commitment 
to the process of arms control. This Reagan address was 
now becoming typical of his remarks towards the USSR 
which tended to combine the usual criticism of Moscow 
with proposals to ease East-West tension.
The arms talks in Geneva, which had resumed in March 
1985, were yielding few results with the now familiar 
uncompromising stances of both sides leading to a 
deadlock situation once a g a i n . T h e  Soviet Union blamed 
Washington for the latest failure of the talks, accusing 
the United States of persisting in plans for what it 
called an "unlawful" space-based missile defence, a 
reference to Reagan's strategic defence initiative or by 
critics as "Star Wars".^^ The Soviet newspaper Pravda 
said that the American position at Geneva "was devoid of
any elements of constructiveness ....  and ran counter to
the meaning of the January accord on the objectives and 
subject of the talks".
68
It was becoming increasingly apparent that while the 
Soviet Union and the United States had both shown a 
genuine desire to substantially improve their
relationship, this was not being realised in terms of 
concrete results. Differences between the two sides on a 
whole host of issues meant that the generally developing 
dialogue which had been steadily emerging since
Gorbachev's arrival on the scene would not be easily 
translated into major accords.
Also in May 1985 the SALT 11 treaty re-emerged as a 
potential obstacle to an improvement in Soviet-American 
relations. The treaty had become a victim of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan^^ in late December 1979,
preventing its ratification by the U.S. Senate. 
Nevertheless the two countries had been voluntarily 
adhering to the treaty which was due to expire in 
December 1985. Reagan had always been wary of the 
treaty^^ and his central reservation against the treaty 
now was whether the United States should continue to 
abide by the SALT treaty's limits amidst growing concern 
over Soviet violations of arms control agreements. The 
SALT 11 issue was made more contentious by the fact that 
the United States was to launch its first new trident 
missile firing submarine later in 1985, and if Washington 
was to remain within the limits of the treaty it would 
have to scrap the older Poseidon submarines. The Soviet 
press immediately attacked the United States saying that 
"the situation is such that only one trident submarine 
separates the United States from an open pointed
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violation" of the SALT 11 t r e a t y . I t  accused America 
of a deliberate bid to sabotage agreements on arms
limitation and reduction.
At the same time members of the Reagan 
administration, most noticeably Casper Weinberger, 
encouraged the President to go ahead with the deployment 
of the trident submarines but not remove the older 
Poseidon Submarines. Their argument was that it made no 
sense to continue observing the treaty limits in the face 
of clear Soviet cheating, and "that denouncing the treaty
would highlight alleged Soviet violations  n 27
Reagan made his decision on the question of SALT 11 on 
June 6 19 85, two days after a meeting with his National 
Security C o u n c i l . H e  decided "on a policy of guarded 
and cautious restraint" indicating that "restraint will 
keep us generally within the framework of the SALT 11 but 
only commensurate with the Soviet observance of the SALT
11 restraints and for only as long as the Soviets abide
by SALT 11 restraints'',^^
On June 10 1985 Reagan announced his decision in a 
formal s t a t e m e n t . D u r i n g  this statement he severely 
criticised the Soviet Union for failing to comply with 
several provisions of the SALT 11 treaty and expressed 
"serious concerns regarding their compliance with the 
provision of other accords". At the same time he 
reiterated the decision of the United States to continue 
abiding by the SALT limitations. But there was one 
important qualification in the U.S. decision to continue 
observance of the treaty: this was that the United States
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reserved the right to change its mind if it became 
further convinced of Soviet violations. For their part, 
the Soviets voiced anger over Reagan's remarks concerning 
the treaty. Gorbachev sent a tough letter to Reagan
attacking U.S. criticism of what he called "imaginary 
Soviet violations of the SALT agreement . . . His
letter was reminiscent of the many sharp exchanges which 
took place between the two countries, particularly in the 
early 1980s.
On July 3 1985 the United States and the Soviet
Union formally announced that Reagan and Gorbachev would 
meet in Geneva, Switzerland, on November 19 and 20 
1985.32 Thus, the long awaited date for a summit meeting 
had now been set. At a press conference in the White
House, US Secretary of State Shultz remarked that 
President Reagan saw the planned meeting with Gorbachev 
"as an opportunity to expand the dialogue between the US 
and the USSR and to lay the foundation for practical
steps to improve Soviet-American relations".3^ It was 
becoming clear from the comments emerging from both
countries that the summit would be nothing more than a 
trial run, a kind of getting to know each other meeting 
for the two leaders that would vastly advance the cause
of bilateral relations. Indeed U.S. officials said that
they did not expect any important agreements to be 
reached at the November event.
Shortly afterwards, a new Soviet foreign minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze was appointed3^, replacing Andrei 
Gromyko who was promoted to the purely ceremonial
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position of head of State of the USSR having held the 
position of foreign minister for twenty eight years. 
Shevardnadze's appointment appeared to breathe new life 
into Soviet foreign policy. Past Soviet policy under 
Gromyko had been largely characterised by hostility and 
inflexibility particularly regarding relations with the 
United States. Indeed Shevardnadze made a favourable 
impression immediately upon Shultz who had flown to 
Finland to meet the new foreign minister, and make 
arrangements for the forthcoming summit.
Towards the end of July 1985, the Soviet Union 
announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear 
explosions to take effect from August 6 19 85 and to be
valid until the end of the year. 3*^  Gorbachev said later 
that this was an example of the USSR paving the way "by 
creating a more favourable climate" in preparation for 
the summit. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing
was just one of a number of arms initiatives announced by 
Moscow in the months preceding the Geneva summit in what 
was widely seen as an attempt to attain the propaganda 
high ground. On September 3 0 19 85 the Soviets made what 
appeared on the surface a spectacular new arms 
negotiating offer: a fifty per cent cut in strategic
nuclear w e a p o n s . 33 A month later the United States put 
forward a counter offer which included as one of its 
elements Gorbachev's idea of a fifty per cent reduction 
in nuclear weapons,3^
However what appeared to be a convergence of the 
American and Soviet position on arms reductions actually
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masked the deep rift between the two countries over the 
Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). In the run up to the 
summit in Geneva, the Soviet Union attacked the Reagan 
administration's refusal to negotiate on "Star Wars" and 
limit research on the SDI programme, and by doing so
increased its propaganda offensive against SDI prior to
the s u m m i t . i t  had become evident that the pre-summit 
arms proposals made by the Soviet Union were actually 
conditional on deep restrictions on the American SDI
programme, a trade-off that Reagan unequivocally
rejected. SDI, which had been a major irritant in
Soviet-American relations since 1983, was proving just
that once again. In a meeting preparatory to the summit 
Shultz met Gorbachev in Moscow^^ in early November 1985 
to go over the issues that were to be considered at 
Geneva. It turned out to be a rather fruitless exercise, 
and Shultz later commented that there was not going to be 
much hope of progress at Geneva since "Gorbachev is 
adamant we must cave in on SDI".'^^
Since September 19 85 both superpowers had been
engaged in a substantial pre-summit jockeying for 
positions aimed at gaining some political advantage. The 
Soviets had made various arms proposals and had escalated 
their propaganda war against SDI hoping to show the world 
that the U.S. space programme was the only major obstacle 
to far-reaching arms accords at Geneva. The Americans 
for their part had made it clear that their agenda for
the summit would be a broad one touching on a range of 
subjects such as the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
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and human rights in the USSR, thus hoping to put Moscow
on the defensive.^3
The first Soviet-American Summit in six years got 
underway on November 19 19 85 in Geneva. Apart from the 
two leaders both sides had brought an experienced team of 
officials, indicating the importance of the meeting and 
the wide range of topics to be discussed. On arrival at 
the airport Gorbachev said he and Reagan would see what 
they could do "to halt the unprecedented arms race .... 
to stop it from spreading to new spheres, to avert the
threat of nuclear war  and to ensure peace and
continued fruitful cooperation among p e o p l e s " . H e  went 
further and affirmed that both leaders would be seeking a 
positive outcome from the meeting. Therefore the Soviet 
leader had set an optimistic tone for the summit.
The opening session of the summit began with a short 
private meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan at which 
only their interpreters were present. They then joined 
their respective officials^^ for a two hour session at 
which each gave his own view of the current state of U.S- 
Soviet relations and the problems that divided their 
countries. The key session of the summit dealing with 
arms control and disarmament was to take place in the 
afternoon. American officials had earlier emphasised that 
the President was not prepared to bargain away his 
Strategic Defence Initiative in exchange for cuts in 
Soviet offensive weapons. Gorbachev for his part was 
expected to repeat his insistence that there could be no 
progress on reducing strategic weapons until the US
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abandoned "Star Wars". As the two countries' arms 
control experts were given the floor for the afternoon 
session Reagan suggested to Gorbachev that they go for a 
walk, an offer the Soviet leader accepted without 
hesitation. Both then walked down to the boat house 
where they had a fireside chat beside a glowing hearth. 
A unique sight it was indeed, not to mention unimaginable 
not so long ago for the leaders of the two countries to 
be in such a position.
The second day of day of talks began on November 2 0 
with firstly a private conservation between the two 
leaders and then a continuation of the session, with the 
participation of both delegations during which some 
strong words were exchanged on SDI.
At the concluding session both leaders summed up the 
results of their meeting in Geneva over the two days to 
be made known in the form of a joint Soviet-American 
statement released later. The two sides had discussed 
regional conflicts, human rights, arms control and 
bilateral issues.
On November 21 both delegations left for the 
International Press Centre to attend the closing ceremony 
hosted by the President of Switzerland Furgler. At the 
ceremony both Gorbachev and Reagan made speeches. The 
Soviet leader spoke first and said that while the talks 
had been useful it had not proved possible "to find 
solutions to the most important issues connected with the 
task of halting the arms race and strengthening peace, 
and there remain major disagreements on fundamental
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issues between us". But he vowed that the USSR would 
continue working together with the United States to find 
solutions to these p r o b l e m s . R e a g a n ' s  utterance was 
not much different. He too expressed the usefulness of 
the Summit talks saying that they had injected a certain 
amount of momentum "into our work on the issues between 
us - a momentum we can continue" at future meetings, and 
viewing the Summit as a "fresh start" he asked Gorbachev 
to join him in the hard work which lay ahead.
The full extent of the agreements 
reached at Geneva became apparent with the release of the 
joint Soviet-American Summit s t a t e m e n t . This 
communique pointed out that "serious differences remain 
on a number of critical issues" but that the two leaders 
had agreed "about the need to improve US-Soviet relations 
and the international situation as a whole". Among the 
most important areas of agreement reached were the 
following: that "nuclear war cannot be won and must never 
be fought", emphasising "the importance of preventing any 
war between the two countries whether nuclear or 
conventional"; early progress on the principle of a 50 
per cent reduction in nuclear weapons "as well as the 
idea of an interim agreement on medium range missiles in 
Europe"; the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to 
the nuclear no-proliférâtion treaty (NPT); emphasised the 
importance of the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of 
armed forces in Central Europe, and on accelerating a new 
round of arms talks ; and " on the need to place on a 
regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels"
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including most importantly an agreement to hold follow-up 
Summits in 1986 and 1987. The Summit also yielded a
number of accords on less controversial issues such as 
cultural, educational and scientific - technical 
exchanges.
At a post-summit press conference Gorbachev stated 
that he was hopeful about the start of a US-Soviet 
dialogue but blamed Reagan's intransigence on "Star Wars" 
for the lack of progress on arms reduction. After the 
Summit both leaders briefed their respective allies in
Europe. Reagan addressed NATO ministers in Brussels, 
while Gorbachev reported to Warsaw Pact leaders who 
approved his performance expressing their "full support 
for the constructive position set forth" by Gorbachev at 
the talks with President R e a g a n . ^0 Back in their own 
countries the two leaders also addressed their domestic 
audiences. On November 21 1985, Reagan delivered his
remarks on the Summit to a joint session of Congress, 
describing his meeting with Gorbachev as "constructive." 
He praised the Soviet leader for being "an eloquent 
speaker and a good listener" and said that the best part 
of the Summit for him was what he called the "fireside 
Summit" during which he spent hours in private
conversation with Gorbachev. In his report to the fourth 
session of the 11th USSR Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev
indicated that the results of the Summit had been 
positive and that there was now a growing basis for trust 
between the two countries. But as before he once again
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slammed US inflexibility on SDI, arguing that this had 
prevented accords on nuclear and space arms.^^
A closer analysis of the Summit makes clear that the 
two superpowers were still profoundly divided over the 
American Space defence programme, and that it had 
produced little concrete progress on other important 
issues such as regional flashpoints and the question of 
the missile balance in Europe. If one were to evaluate 
the Summit in terms of winners and losers then Reagan 
probably came out ahead on points. He made no
concessions on SDI and resisted intense Soviet pressure 
to do so. Gorbachev may be regarded as having come out 
second best on the grounds that he failed to achieve any 
substantial progress on the issue of major importance to 
Moscow - arms control.
However such an evaluation would be misleading on 
the grounds that it was the first Summit, both sides were 
always likely to be cautious and resistant to compromise.
Despite the general lack of progress both leaders 
were relatively satisfied with the outcome, and in 
particular with the knowledge that there would be more 
opportunities. Also the optimism expressed by Gorbachev 
and Reagan stemmed from the fact that both leaders got on 
really well together, and indeed this was probably the 
most talked about aspect of the Summit. A vivid 
indication of how well the leaders had got on was 
represented by the fact that they spent more than two 
hours in private conversation on the first day, eight 
times longer than planned - in a move clearly intended to
inject a personal dimension into the superpower 
relationship. Their talks had been more cordial and 
constructive than expected. American officials pointed 
out that there would probably not even have been a joint 
statement but for the rapport built up between the two 
leaders. This relationship which they d e v e l o p e d ^ ^  z^as 
seen as the most positive achievement of the Geneva 
Summit. The Soviet newspaper Pravda claimed that the 
Reagan-Gorbachev private sessions had created a "new 
psychological c l i m a t e " .
The Summit, also attracted considerable favourable 
commentary from both the Soviet and Western press, 
despite the lack of major agreements. Part of the reason 
was that no one really expected major breakthroughs, and 
proof that this was the case was provided by a commentary 
in the Soviet newspaper Izvestia which said that only 
those who expected a miracle could be disappointed in 
"modest" results.
Indeed what the Summit certainly did was to lay the 
foundation for a fresh dialogue, and a basis for trust 
between the two sides which was to bode well for the 
future. Evidence that Geneva had boosted Soviet-American 
relations towards the end of 1985 was exemplified by the 
fact that the superpowers agreed on an unprecedented 
exchange of new year's greetings. It was announced that 
Reagan would speak to the people of the Soviet Union via 
radio and television, and that Gorbachev would deliver a 
similar message to the American people. As a result 1986 
got off to a hopeful start from the viewpoint of Soviet-
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American relations. Further cause for optimism was 
provided by the announcement on 15 January 198 6 by the 
Soviet Union of a far-reaching Nuclear Disarmament 
p r o g r a m m e , 36 which Gorbachev later said provided a 
"unique opportunity to fundamentally improve Soviet-
American relations". The Soviet proposals involved a 
plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons by the year 2000/ a 
plan to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet intermediate
nuclear forces (INF) in Europe over a five to seven year 
period, in effect accepting Reagan's 1 9 8 2  zero option 
proposal but publicising it as a Soviet idea; and an
extension for another three months of the USSR's
unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, calling on the 
United States to follow suit. What was more, Moscow
appeared to have dropped its long time insistence that
both British and French nuclear systems be counted in the 
overall Western tally of forces. But there was one major 
sticking point which meant that any euphoria which the 
proposals might have created was short lived: Gorbachev
said that the United States must renounce "the
development, testing and deployment of space - strike
weapons", a reference to SDI.^^ As a result the USSR's 
disarmament programme was dismissed by the United States 
as a propaganda move, even though Reagan agreed with the 
goals outlined by Gorbachev. Reagan also emphasised the 
enormous problems which would have to be overcome before 
any agreement could be reached such as the issue of 
effective verification, Warsaw Pact superiority in
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conventional forces, and the threat posed to Europe by 
the presence of Soviet missiles in Asia.
On February 4 19 86 Reagan delivered his annual state 
of the Union address to C o n g r e s s . ^3 Commenting on 
relations with the Soviet Union he stressed the American 
desire for a more peaceful world, and an arms control 
agreement if the Soviet government truly wanted one. He 
couldn't help but have an indirect jibe at the Soviet 
Union accusing the communist system of exporting its 
ideology by force, and of commanding people's lives.
Also in February 1986 Gorbachev received US Senator 
Edward Kennedy at the K r e m l i n . During his conversation 
with the Senator, the Soviet leader pointed out that the 
next US“Soviet Summit would be pointless without 
practical results. He argued that although the Geneva 
Summit had created "the prerequisites for an improvement 
in relations between our two countries ...mere lip 
service .... is not enough" . He pointed out that the 
Soviet Union had already paved the way for achieving 
practical results at a new Summit with its announcement 
on January 15 1986 of a Disarmament P r o g r a m m e . I t
appears as though the urgency expressed by Gorbachev 
regarding an agreement on arms reductions indicated 
Moscow's desperation, given the further deterioration of 
the Soviet economy. An arms control agreement with the 
United States would remove future overwhelming strains on 
Soviet resources, and allow resources to be deployed for 
civilian needs.
On March 13 1986 Gorbachev once again extended the
Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear t e s t i n g . Much to 
Moscow's dismay the United States did not follow the 
Soviet example with Reagan actually ordering a 
continuation of nuclear testing. This prompted charges 
from Moscow that Washington was not committed to peace. 
In a letter to Reagan in early April, Gorbachev conveyed 
his disillusionment with the American policy on nuclear 
testing and proposed that the two should meet in Europe 
to discuss specifically this i s s u e . ^2 Also in April 1986 
the USSR cancelled a meeting which was to take place 
between Shevardnadze and Shultz to discuss a possible 
date for a future summit, to protest at the American 
bombing of Libya. This was followed a few weeks later by 
the Chernobyl disaster, regarded by many as the worst 
public relations setback for Moscow since the Korean 
airliner incident in 1983.^3
What was by now becoming a sore point in Soviet- 
American relations ever since Afghanistan was rekindled 
towards the end of May 1986. This was the SALT II Treaty 
on which both sides traded bitter words in 1985. The 
United States had constantly accused Moscow of violating 
the provisions of the treaty, while the Soviet Union 
sensed a conspiracy in Washington to sabotage and then 
scrap the treaty altogether. On May 27 1986 Reagan made 
a statement during which he announced that the United 
States would no longer observe the terms of the SALT II 
T r e a t y . 34 This decision ended a six year policy of 
informal compliance with the agreement. Reagan said that
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he was taking this step "because the Soviets had 
repeatedly violated the terms of the t r e a t y " . in the 
statement Reagan reiterated that the United States had 
"fully kept its part of the bargain" while the Soviets 
had not, noting that a country "cannot be serious about 
effective arms control unless it is equally serious about 
compliance". He outlined the Soviet pattern of non- 
compliance with both the SALT and ABM agreements. The 
Reagan statement came only days after Soviet officials 
reiterated support for the SALT II Treaty claiming that 
it remained "an effective document that embodied the 
results of many years of cooperation between the USSR and 
the U.S. during the — 19 7 0s to halt the nuclear missile 
arms race and strengthen strategic s t a b i l i t y 33 Clearly 
Reagan was not convinced and his decision cast doubt on 
any future arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, 
for the time being at least. The fear now was that it 
might trigger off a new arms race with both sides less 
inhibited by a treaty, and would also weaken their desire 
to conclude a new treaty. A Soviet government statement 
attacked Reagan's announcement with the now familiar 
charge that the United States was pursuing a militaristic 
2foreign p o l i c y . 3 ^  Moscow viewed Reagan's abandonment of 
SALT II as an attempt to free the U.S. of restraints that 
the treaty imposed on Washington's bid to implement its 
comprehensive strategic nuclear programme, and therefore 
came to them as no surprise.
Reagan's May 27 announcement attracted considerable 
criticism from Congress as well. Arms control advocates
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in Congress were highly critical of the President while 
other critics warned that "abrogation of the treaty 
limits will allow Moscow to expand its nuclear force far 
more rapidly than the United S t a t e s " . 3 3
Towards the end of July 1986, Reagan proved that he 
was still serious about arms control when in a letter to 
Gorbachev he made sweeping new arms reduction 
p r o p o s a l s . 3^ This new arms initiative called for both 
sides to scrap all ballistic missiles while research on 
missile defence systems (SDI) would continue. In the 
event that such a defence proved feasible it would be 
shared with all nations. However, Gorbachev appeared less 
than convinced about this latest U.S. offer and in his 
reply to Reagan showed little i n t e r e s t . ^3
What didn't help the chances of a positive Soviet 
response to the Reagan arms offer was that, in between, a 
Moscow correspondent Nicholas Daniloff, was arrested by 
Soviet officials and accused of spying for the United 
States on August 30 1986. The arrest of Daniloff, an
American journalist of Russian origin, came just days 
after KGB agents were arrested in the United States on 
espionage charges. The whole affair threatened to 
undermine U.S.-Soviet relations and destroy the progress 
made in superpower relations between Reagan and 
Gorbachev. The incident highlighted yet again the great 
sensitivity to which American-Soviet relations were prone 
when confronted by adverse developments. There was total 
fury at the arrest of Daniloff from Washington. The 
seriousness of the situation became quickly apparent
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when the U.S. administration "insisted that there could 
be no progress toward the INF reduction agreement nor 
towards scheduling the Summit until Daniloff was 
f r e e d " . T h e  Soviet Union insisted that Daniloff was a 
spy, and detailed charges against him. After intense
negotiations including a number of meetings between 
Shultz and Shevardnadze, and a Reagan-Shevardnadze 
meeting on September 19 the two sides agreed to a 
settlement on September 2 9 whereby the charges against 
Daniloff were dropped and a prominent Soviet employee of 
the United Nations, Gennadi Zakharov - who had been
arrested a week before Daniloff - was sentenced to five 
years probation providing that he left the country and 
never returned. The whole fiasco was prevented from
inflicting serious damage to U.S.-Soviet relations by the 
politically skilful manoeuvring of both superpowers. The 
result was that on September 3 0 1986 Reagan announced
that he would meet Gorbachev in Iceland on the following 
October 11 and 12.
Soviet-American relations experienced a rough ride 
in the months leading up to the Reykjavik Summit, with 
the Daniloff affair casting a shadow at one stage over a 
future summit, and with Gorbachev's insistence that a 
summit must lead to results. Added to this, there had
been little progress at the arms negotiations in
Geneva34,
Nevertheless, the summit went ahead as planned. On 
October 10 1986 Gorbachev arrived in Reykjavik for his
meeting with Reagan. On arrival at the airport Gorbachev
85
made a short statement for the press during which he 
stressed that the dominant topic at the summit meetings 
should be nuclear d i s a r m a m e n t ^3. On October 11, the two 
leaders held their first conversations during which they 
discussed the state of the international situation, 
Soviet-American relations, and problems of ending the 
arms race. As expected Gorbachev was keen to limit 
discussions to arms control. But in accordance with 
American plans Reagan broadened the agenda to include 
regional conflicts - in particular the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan, and human rights, during which he 
emphasised the question of emigration saying that "Soviet 
human rights policies were impeding the improvement of 
our r e l a t i o n s h i p " . 33 After these early exchanges on a 
number of issues the rest of the day, indeed the 
remainder of the summit talks concentrated solely on arms 
control.
The remaining one and half days saw the two 
countries make considerable progress on arms reductions, 
along the following lines: Gorbachev accepted in
principle Reagan's zero-zero proposal for the elimination 
of intermediate nuclear forces in Europe (INF) including 
the proposals made by the U.S. President in July 1986, 
calling for the elimination of all ballistic missiles 
over a 10 year period. He also agreed to scrap 50% of 
the USSR's arsenal of nuclear weapons on a reciprocal 
basis, in the course of five years,- and the Soviet Union 
agreed in principle to the U.S. verification approach 
with Gorbachev pledging his commitment to strong and
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mutually acceptable procedures. The two sides also agreed 
to freeze shorter range missiles; in addition Gorbachev 
accepted a 10 instead of 15 year period for observance of 
the ABM treaty. The two countries in fact ignored their
noon deadline on October 12 and continued working until
the evening. The superpowers appeared to have "negotiated
the most massive weapons reductions in h i s t o r y " ^  So it
seemed at the time, than Gorbachev dropped a bombshell. 
He stated that the agreements negotiated were conditional 
on stringent limits to the strategic defence initiative. 
To put it precisely, the Soviet leader demanded that SDI 
be limited to laboratory research during the 10 years 
observance of the ABM treaty. At this point Reagan could 
not hide his anger and the talks broke down immediately 
with the U.S. President making it plain that his SDI was 
not negotiable.
The post-summit comments summed up the mood in both 
camps. Shultz said that the United States was "deeply 
disappointed" at the outcome.33 At a press conference, 
Gorbachev for his part blamed Reagan's insistence on SDI 
for thwarting accords on eliminating strategic nuclear 
arms and Euromissiles saying that an "historic chance" 
had been missed.3^
Back in the United States Reagan addressed the 
nation on October 13 on the Iceland Summit^^. During 
this speech he gave details of his various meetings with 
Gorbachev insisting that he placed on the agenda issues 
which America believed were at the heart of the 
differences between the United States and the Soviet
Union, namely human rights and regional flashpoints 
including Soviet military actions around the world. Then 
he went on to explain the importance of SDI and why the 
United States refused to bargain it away. He argued that 
SDI was America's insurance policy and "security 
guarantee" against Soviet cheating and believed that it 
was the "key to a world without nuclear weapons".
Like Reagan, Gorbachev also addressed his nation on 
television on two occasions. His first televised speech^^ 
to the Soviet people on October 14, 1986 was similar to
his past summit press conference during which he was 
highly critical of American instransigence on SDI 
testing, and argued that this had prevented the taking of 
historic steps in the field of arms control and
disarmament. He also gave a brief rundown on developments 
as they had unfolded in Reykjavik, outlining a whole 
package of measures which he said the Soviet Union had 
put on the negotiating table while arguing that "the 
Americans had come to Reykjavik with nothing at all" 
(this clearly contradicted Reagan's comment on American 
television that the United States "proposed the most
sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history").
In the second speech on Soviet television on October 
22, 1986^3 Gorbachev accused the United States of
distorting the true outcome of the Reykjavik summit and 
claimed that the American administration had misled the 
American public by telling it that Moscow blocked
potential accords by setting a trap on "Star Wars" and
went on to insist that the strategic defence initiative
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was the "... .chief obstacle on the path to a nuclear 
weapon free world".
From an overall perspective the summit ended in 
deadlock after Reagan refused to accept any limitation on 
his SDI research programme. The two leaders had 
communicated quite well together as they had done in 
Geneva. In fact they spent far longer together arguing 
over the details of arms control than either had 
expected.
However, despite their rigourous negotiations, and 
what appeared for a moment substantial agreements 
everything more or less fell apart over SDI. Both 
leaders were disappointed, and this was plain to see at 
the end of the summit. The two sides departed with a 
rather bitter taste in their mouths and at that point the 
outlook for a future summit seemed bleak to say the 
least. The general opinion then was that the summit had 
been a failure. This view was echoed by both the U.S. 
and the USSR who blamed each other for the negative 
outcome. The United States argued that Gorbachev did not 
understand the importance of "Star Wars" as a defensive 
shield against devastating ballistic missiles, while the 
Soviet leader launched scathing attacks against SDI, 
explaining that he did not see the need for it when both 
sides had agreed that their goal would be the ultimate 
eradication of nuclear weapons.
Since the Reykjavik summit was initially billed as 
"pre-summit" talks preparatory to a formal summit to be 
held in the United States, the superpowers did not regard
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the outcome as a total disaster but merely as a setback, 
and believed as they had done in the aftermath of the 
Geneva summit that they could build in the future on 
areas where they shared common ground.
The summit at Reykjavik did nothing positive for the 
state of Soviet-American relations, and developments in 
the final two months of 1986 did not augur well for the 
superpower relationship. First there was the Iran/Contra 
affair which arose in November 1986, and concerned 
revelations that the United States had been secretly 
selling arms to Iran and diverting the funds to the 
Contra rebels in Nicaragua. After initially denying 
reports about the arms sales Reagan eventually 
acknowledged that he had allowed transfers to Iran of 
what he labelled as "defensive" weapons. Not only did 
it undermine Reagan's credibility, the Iran-Contra affair 
threatened to endanger any chances of progress on arms 
control and disarmament because it weakened Reagan's 
position at home and made it questionable whether a "lame 
duck" President could get the Senate to ratify any treaty 
reached with the Soviets. Secondly, in November 1986 the 
Geneva arms talks were dogged once again by the question 
of arms in space. A statement by Karpov, the head of the 
USSR delegation to the Soviet-American talks, criticised 
the American plan for space which he said would send arms 
into space and said that it was the chief obstacle in the 
way of nuclear disarmament. He further attacked the 
overall stance of the American delegation at the talks.
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which he said was aimed at blocking work that would lead 
to mutually acceptable agreements.
In December 198 6 Moscow condemned the United States 
for exceeding the limits set by the SALT II treaty by 
adding another bomber to its strategic arsenal. A Soviet 
government statement denounced Washington's repudiation 
of the treaty and said that the Soviet Union would 
continue to observe the treaty "for the time b e i n g " . ^5 
Since the Soviets already knew that the United States had 
expressed its rejection of SALT II earlier in the year, 
this latest criticism from Moscow was nothing more than 
an attempt to score a public relations victory by drawing 
world attention to the fact that Washington was actually 
putting its earlier rejection of the SALT II treaty into 
practice.
On December 17 1986 the Soviets hardened their
position on a moratorium on nuclear testing by announcing 
that its unilateral halt to tests would continue in 1987 
only if the U.S. refrained from further tests.
S E C TI ON TWO ; Soviet-American Relations Under Reacran and.
Gorbachev - The Last Two Years
19 87 began in a rather gloomy fashion from the 
viewpoint of Soviet-American relations. On January 27 
Reagan delivered a tough state of the union address^? 
which was reminiscent of some of his earlier ones. He 
attacked Soviet expansionism, and at the same time, the 
colossal Soviet military budgets since the 1970s. The 
President also staunchly defended SDI calling it " the 
most positive and promising defence programme we have
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undertaken". Reagan pointed out that while the United 
States remained open to "more constructive relations with 
the Soviet Union" this depended largely upon more 
responsible Soviet conduct around the world and progress 
in other areas such as human rights. It was clear that 
the Reykjavik Summit had led to a certain amount of 
mutual bitterness between the USSR and the United States, 
and to an extent this was reflected in Reagan's address 
to Congress when he remarked that "In Iceland last 
October, we had one moment of opportunity that the 
Soviets dashed because they sought to cripple our 
strategic defence initiative".
A statement by Gorbachev on February 2 8 19 87
encouraged hopes that an agreement on the elimination of 
medium range missiles in Europe would be forthcoming very 
s h o r t l y . 88 This new Soviet offer saw Gorbachev propose 
the formula adopted at Reykjavik whereby both sides had 
agreed on eliminating all their medium range missiles 
within five years, except this time the USSR appeared to 
have removed a major obstacle by dropping its insistence 
that any such agreement be linked to settlement of the 
anti-missile defence issue which had provoked much 
squabbling at Reykjavik. This paved the way for the 
signing of a treaty eliminating intermediate nuclear 
forces (INF) possibly at the next summit.
In mid-April 1987 the superpowers resumed their high 
level dialogue when Shultz travelled to Moscow for three 
days of meetings with Soviet leaders, seen as the most 
important East-West talks since the Reykjavik Summit.
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The aim of the talks was largely to achieve progress 
toward an agreement on abolishing Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces (INF) in Europe, and to discuss prospects for a 
Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington. During the
conversation between Gorbachev and Shultz8^ it became 
clear that although both countries expressed their 
readiness to conclude an agreement on the question of 
medium range missiles (or INF) in Europe, there was one 
major sticking point: this was the question of how to
address Soviet superiority in short range nuclear 
missiles which could circumvent any benefit of an INF 
agreement. Despite Gorbachev's proposal to abolish all 
Soviet shorter range missiles in Europe if the West 
agreed not to build its own, Shultz relayed the American 
position which was that the United States had the right 
to build such weapons and deploy them in amounts 
approximately equal to those that the USSR would have 
remained after it eliminated its shorter range missiles 
in Europe. This American position was criticised by the 
Soviets, who also attacked what they saw as a departure 
by the United States from the positions which the two 
countries had adopted at Reykjavik accusing Washington of 
adding "other pretexts" to complicate m a t t e r s .
Nevertheless, according to the Soviet press "a 
greater understanding of each other's position showed up 
in the course of a thorough exchange of o p i n i o n s A  
Soviet spokesman characterised the atmosphere as 
favourable. Gorbachev also stated that he was ready to 
meet Reagan.
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It was becoming evident by the middle of 1987 that 
Soviet-American relations were gradually warming up after 
being slightly cool following the Reykjavik summit. This 
was picked up by various Soviet newspapers. In late May 
19 87, Izvestia claimed that the "winds of change for the 
better in Soviet-American relations are gaining strength 
in the United States". It also went on to say that a 
growing number of Americans were answering the question 
"can the Russians be trusted"? with the answer yes, with 
a growing number of them showing greater interest in 
establishing normal Soviet-American relations than ever 
b e f o r e . A  Tass statement issued in early July 1987 
claimed that an "historic opportunity" existed for better 
US-Soviet relations and that the two countries should 
take advantage of this chance. It went further and 
declared that the "necessary prerequisites now existed 
for carrying out the understandings reached in 
Reykjavik", particularly an agreement to eliminate INF in 
Europe the conclusion of which would "help bring about a 
substantial improvement in Soviet-American and 
international relations"
In mid-September 1987, Soviet foreign minister 
Shevardnadze arrived in Washington continuing the now 
familiar regular high level American - Soviet meetings, 
for more discussions on removing the obstacles to a 
positive INF treaty. When Reagan met Shevardnadze he 
reiterated that he was not going to cave in on SDI. The 
meetings were generally described as making a favourable 
contribution to Soviet-American relations and Reagan
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commented that "they were good meetings, free of the 
hostility we used to see even if we were disagreeing on 
some t h i n g s " . Shultz and Shevardnadze also signed an 
agreement establishing crisis centres in each country, 
the aim of which was to reduce the threat of an 
accidental war between the s u p e r p o w e r s . Before leaving, 
Shevardnadze gave a upbeat press conference in Washington 
on the completion of the Soviet-American t a l k s . H e  
announced that the two countries were completely 
confident that an INF treaty would be signed before the 
end of the year. Just two weeks later a final problem 
pivotal to reaching agreement on the INF treaty was 
resolved. This was the question of West Germany's older 
Pershing missiles. Under a compromise reached these 
missiles were excluded from the U.S.-Soviet agreement, 
but the. Germans agreed to remove them once the agreement 
took effect.
In late October 1987, it was the turn of U.S.
Secretary of State Shultz to travel to Moscow where he
met Soviet l e a d e r s . ^8 Welcoming Shultz at the Kremlin 
Gorbachev pointed out "the positive significance of the
  contacts and talks between the representatives of
the governments" which were now regularly taking place. 
However commenting on a possible summit meeting Gorbachev
sounded rather cautious and stated that the possible
signing of an INF treaty itself would not be enough to 
justify coming to Washington, and that some work still 
had to be done over the next month or so before a firm 
date could be set for a summit with Reagan.
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Less than a week later, in early November 19 87, 
Shevardnadze was back in Washington for more meetings on 
INF and plans for the summit. He brought with him a 
letter from Gorbachev in which the Soviet leader stated 
he wanted to discuss the SDI at the next summit but 
dropped his insistence that limits on SDI development be 
accepted by the Americans as a prerequisite to signing 
the INF treaty. In their talks in Washington, 
Shevardnadze and Reagan managed to set a date for the 
summit - to be held in Washington on December 7 1987. So 
after initial doubts about the next meeting between 
Gorbachev and Reagan, summit diplomacy was back on track.
From December 8-10 198 7 Reagan and Gorbachev held
their third summit meeting, this time in Washington. On 
arrival at Andrews air force base near Washington on 
December 7 Gorbachev was greeted by Shultz. The Soviet 
leader made a brief statement in which he said that the 
purpose of his visit was to sign a treaty eliminating 
intermediate and short range missiles. He added that at 
the heart of his discussions with Reagan would be 
questions concerning strategic arms reductions which he 
described as "the pivotal problem of Soviet-American 
r e l a t i o n s ^80 on December 8, after the customary 
welcoming ceremony on Gorbachev's arrival at the White 
House, the Soviet leader and President Reagan held a 
2meeting where they exchanged differences of opinion on 
human rights and on their respective systems - Capitalism 
and Communism. It was more of an informal debate and 
chat than anything else. Then it was time for the
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serious business of the day, and both Gorbachev and 
Reagan made brief remarks before they signed the historic 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. This treaty 
provided for the elimination of all missiles with ranges 
between 500 and 5000 miles together with their launching 
and support facilities. The final stumbling block was 
eliminated when the two sides agreed to unprecedented 
verification procedures under which each would be able to 
send inspection teams to the other's missile sites.
After signing the treaty both leaders delivered 
speeches to the Soviet and American peoples. In his 
address,. Reagan said that the countries had made history 
because they had signed "the first agreement over to 
eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear 
weapons." He added that discussions would continue at 
the summit on further arms reductions and other issues, 
and stressed that as with the INF treaty "it will take 
time and patience to reach a g r e e m e n t s ^81 his speech,
the Soviet leader also viewed the signing of the INF 
Treaty as an historic step, but stressed that it was only 
a first step toward nuclear disarmament and "moving ahead 
will require further intensive intellectual endeavour and 
honest effort....".^^2
On December 9, the summit continued with both sides 
now concentrating largely on their next aim: to achieve a 
fifty per cent reduction in the strategic missile stocks 
of both sides. Indeed the remainder of the summit 
centred mainly on discussions on this issue.
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At the end. of the summit a joint Soviet-American 
summit statement on the outcome of the summit was
i s s u e d . ^82 y p g  document revealed that the leaders of the 
two countries had held "comprehensive and detailed 
discussions" on a broad range of issues. These were
primarily arms reductions, human rights, settlement of 
regional conflicts and bilateral relations. Both sides
agreed that "official contacts at all levels should be 
further expanded and intensified...". The joint statement 
also revealed the matters on which there was mutual 
understanding and also those on which big differences 
still remained, emphasising that the talks which had been 
"candid and constructive" had led to an understanding 
that areas of differences would not be barriers to
agreement on areas of mutual interest.
The post - summit reaction of both leaders was
extremely positive. In a television speech to the Soviet 
people on December 14 1987, Gorbachev told them that
relations with the United States were now better, and the
signing of the IMF treaty represented "a victory for new
political thinking" and was only the prelude "toward the 
actual destruction of the nuclear a r s e n a l " . ^^4 Reagan's 
address to the nation, at the conclusion of the summit on 
December 10, was similar in tone to Gorbachev's. He said 
that the INF treaty represented a landmark in postwar 
history as it abolished an "entire class of U.S. and
Soviet nuclear missiles", and called the summit a "clear 
success", saying that there was reason for "both hope and 
optimism".^^5
98
Overall the Washington summit had been a resounding 
success and arguably the most productive American-Soviet 
summit to this date. Most progress was made on arms 
control, although the two countries were unable to make 
any headway on other contentious issues such as human 
rights and regional conflicts. Both Reagan and Gorbachev 
were clearly in buoyant mood after their talks, and the 
personal rapport which the two had developed since the 
Geneva summit in 1985 had contributed greatly to the 
positive movements in the superpower relationship. 
Reagan summed up this fact when he said that "Mr. 
Gorbachev and I continued to build a foundation for 
better relations between our governments and our 
peoples".205
Fresh from the success of the Washington summit, 
Reagan delivered an upbeat state of the union address on 
January 25 1988.207 Remarking on arms reduction he hailed 
the historic INF agreement and urged the Senate to ratify 
it. He expressed optimism on the possibility of an even 
more significant agreement which would reduce U.S. and 
Soviet long range (strategic) missiles by 50%, but yet 
again stressed what he saw as the importance of his 
Strategic Defence Initiative as a programme which 
"supports the same goals of arms reduction .... and 
reduces the risk of war".
On the same day as Reagan's annual state of the 
union address, the Senate began its hearings on the INF 
t r e a t y . ^88 Reagan had campaigned vigorously for its 
approval by the Senate, and the general view was that the
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treaty would not encounter any serious difficulties since 
it appeared to have widespread support across the country 
and across the political spectrum, with large numbers of 
both Democrats and Republicans expressing their 
unreserved support for it.
Nevertheless, as with any agreement involving the 
Soviet Union, the treaty did have its critics - mainly 
conservatives. As a result the debate on the INF Treaty 
which started on January 25 pitted these critics against 
the vast number who supported the treaty, including the 
administration which emphasised the treaty as a 
"substantive and tactical triumph". The danger was that 
if the opponents of the treaty succeeded in fatally 
wounding it, the implications of that could be serious 
for Soviet - American relations given the widespread 
euphoria that this historic agreement had attracted at 
the last superpower summit. The arguments put forward by 
opponents of the treaty were essentially that the treaty 
could not be verified and that the Soviets could not be 
trusted. According to Senator Helms the USSR had already 
begun cheating by concealing hundreds of missiles that 
should have been s c r a p p e d .  209 They also argued that the 
agreement undermined an important part of the nuclear 
arsenal "upon which the NATO alliance relied to offset 
the numerically superior conventional forces of the 
Soviet-led Warsaw pact".220 Other critics were less 
hardline in their opposition to the treaty. They were 
merely looking for loopholes which would allow them to 
argue for modifications or amendments to the INF pact
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"without making the kind of sweeping changes that would 
send it back to the drawing b o a r d " .
Proponents of the treaty including those in the 
administration contended that "it served the U.S. 
interest since it required the Soviets to remove from 
service substantially more nuclear firepower than the 
United S t a t e s " . ^22 The INF treaty was very important to 
Reagan as it gave him a major arms accord in the final 
year of his Presidency, and allowed him to argue that his 
policy of peace through strength had paid dividends.
One area of Soviet-American relations on which there 
had been scant progress was the issue of regional 
conflicts. Both superpowers had been either directly or 
indirectly involved in various regions of the world 
providing economic, military, and humanitarian aid to 
guerilla movements and governments of their respective 
political persuasion. On February 2 1988 Reagan
delivered a speech on television to lobby for new aid for 
the Contra rebels fighting the Moscow-backed left wing 
Sandinista government in N i c a r a g u a .^^8 The address
highlighted the intensity of the differences which 
existed between Moscow and Washington on regional
flashpoints. Concentrating on Central America, Reagan 
claimed that the Sandinista regime was a threat to 
democracy in the region and to the security of other 
states in the area. He accused the government of 
Nicaragua of flouting its promises to endorace democracy, 
respect human rights, and adopt a non-aligned foreign 
policy. Despite the recent upward trend in Soviet-
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American relations, Reagan did not hesitate to criticise 
the Soviet backing for the Sandinistas, and questioned 
the logic behind the substantial military and economic 
aid the Soviet Union was providing its ally. Reagan made 
a determined appeal for aid to the Contras, even 
overplaying the extent of the Soviet backed Communist 
threat in order to make a stronger case. In reality 
however. Congress was not really convinced by Reagan's at 
times impassioned arguments, and on the following day, 
the House of Representatives rejected the President's 
request for $36.75 million in combined humanitarian and 
military aid. Nevertheless Reagan had proved with this 
speech that despite the recent rapprochement with Moscow 
he was more than willing to speak out in defence of his 
political beliefs.
The spring of 1988 saw a number of top level 
meetings between American and Soviet leaders the contents 
of which included preparations for the impending summit 
in Moscow, a review of the state of Soviet-American 
relations, and intensive efforts by both sides to 
conclude a draft treaty on a 50% reduction of strategic 
offensive weapons which could then be signed at the next 
summit. It was obvious that the superpowers were keen to 
complete a START treaty but much work remained to be done 
since negotiations were more complicated, in particular 
there were technical problems especially on verification 
with regard to sea-launched nuclear cruise missiles 
these, as Reagan put it, "were the hardest to count and 
verify" , 224 and even from space it was virtually
102
impossible with the aid of satellites to tell whether 
such missiles could fire nuclear or conventional 
warheads.
The final set of meetings between the two countries 
prior to the Moscow summit took place in late April 19 8 8 
when Shultz revisited Moscow where he held talks with 
Soviet leaders including G o r b a c h e v . 225 During their
discussion Gorbachev complained to the U.S. Secretary of 
State about recent Reagan speeches which he said cast 
Soviet foreign policy in a negative light, and he 
ridiculed Reagan for implying that the achievements being 
made in Soviet-American relations were the result of 
America's pressure, which had influenced Soviet 
behaviour. But Gorbachev and Shultz did agree on a draft 
agenda for the upcoming summit and expressed optimism 
that concrete and major results would be achieved.
The long-awaited breakthrough on regional 
flashpoints came when on April 14 1988 a United Nations - 
brokered agreement providing for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops from Afghanistan was reached in G e n e v a .  225 
Soviet government statement issued in Moscow on April 2 6 
announced that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would 
begin on May 15 and be completed not later than February 
15 1989. At the same time the statement hailed the
Geneva accords "as an event of exceptional importance 
.... creating the external conditions required to settle 
the Afghanistan problem".
However, the Geneva agreement did not lead to a 
resolution of the Afghan problem and the war continued.
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The problem was that both Moscow and Washington disputed 
the details of how the agreement reached would be carried 
out. Washington complained that Moscow was continuing to 
arm the government of Afghanistan, and said it too would 
continue to aid the Mujahideen rebels fighting the 
Moscow-backed Kabul regime. The Soviets for their part 
accused outside forces - by inference Pakistan and the 
United States - of violating the Geneva agreement by 
sending supplies to the rebels. Indeed on November 4 
19 88 the Soviet Union announced a delay to further 
withdrawals because of concern that the anti-Soviet 
guerillas were being supplied with more Western military 
aid. Furthermore the Afghan guerillas had no formal role 
in the Geneva accords and said that they would ignore it 
and fight on. The Geneva agreement provoked indignation 
in the United States. Some Conservatives charged that 
"the administration was overly eager to get the agreement 
.... prior to the summit" and accused it of a 
" s e l l o u t " . 227 They argued that the USSR would continue 
to aid the Kabul regime while Pakistan would face 
international pressure to shut down the major arms routes 
to the rebels.
By agreeing to leave Afghanistan the Soviets made 
clear they were serious about concentrating on internal 
reforms, and the decision to withdraw would "reduce a 
significant drain on their sagging e c o n o m y " . 228 it would 
also help to facilitate an improvement in Soviet-American 
relations since it illustrated that the two superpowers 
were capable of meaningful cooperation on issues other
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than arms control, and coming not long before the Moscow 
summit, it was seen as a major boost to the prospects for 
an agreement.
A further boost to the forthcoming summit came when 
on May 27 the U.S. Senate overwhelmingly ratified the INF 
treaty by a 93-5 v o t e .  229 This paved the way for the 
treaty to be formally ratified by Reagan and Gorbachev at 
the next summit.
This summit was to be the fourth in less than four 
years. It began on May 29 1988. The first two days of 
the summit, May 29 and May 30, were dominated largely by 
Reagan's outspoken criticism of the Soviet record on 
human rights,in particular on the issue of emigration. 
On May 3 0 Reagan caused a stir when he held a meeting 
with a number of well known "refuseniks" and "dissidents" 
who wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union. They asked 
the President to keep up pressure on the USSR to improve 
its behaviour on human rights. The meeting was quickly 
slammed by the Soviet press as a propaganda stunt, and 
after Gorbachev appeared to express annoyance and 
irritation, Reagan toned down his criticism during the 
remainder of his visit and accused the Soviet bureaucracy 
rather than the leaders of the USSR as being responsible 
for human rights abuses.
On June 1 came the high point of the summit when the 
two leaders exchanged the ratification documents of the 
INF t r e a t y . 220 During the ceremony Gorbachev made a 
speech in which he said that the exchange of the 
instruments of ratification meant that "the era of
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nuclear disarmament lias b e g u n " .  221 in his speech Reagan 
argued that the treaty had made possible "a new dimension 
of cooperation between us" but that much remained to be 
accomplished and that the two countries must not stop at
this p o i n t . 222
In their final meeting, Reagan and Gorbachev 
concluded their discussion of what was a broad agenda 
encompassing disarmament, regional conflicts, bilateral 
relations, and humanitarian issues. The results of the 
summit were summed up in a joint U.S.-Soviet summit 
s t a t e m e n t . 223 The two sides signed two minor arms 
control agreements. One required each side to give the 
other 24 hours notice of a ballistic missile test, 
whether over land or sea, and the other set up procedures 
for joint experiments to test techniques to measure 
nuclear explosions. The two sides also signed seven 
other bilateral agreements ranging from an expansion of 
cultural exchanges to cooperation on atomic energy and 
space research. An agreement in principle emerged in 
discussions on regional issues, specifically with respect 
to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, that in 
the long term proved to be very significant. Among the 
major achievements was the exchange of INF ratification 
instruments. At a press conference, Gorbachev argued 
that there now existed a new realism in U.S-USSR 
relations, although he regretted the "missed 
opportunities" in the summit and expressed dismay with 
Reagan's performance on human r i g h t s . 224
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All in all the summit was a success in its promotion 
of a better understanding between the U.S. and the USSR 
even although the practical achievements were modest. 
The expectations on both sides were limited and so were 
the results. Most disappointingly there was no real 
progress on the goal of concluding a treaty which would 
reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the superpowers 
by half. As with previous summits the two leaders 
communicated remarkably well, considering some of the 
tough exchanges which had taken place on the issue of 
human rights. On the third day of the summit Gorbachev 
and Reagan took an historic 20 minute stroll through Red
Square bringing the American President close to the
Soviet people through television. Afterwards, Reagan 
said it was wonderful and agreed that he and Gorbachev 
had become old friends after so many meetings. One
Soviet political commentator said that the Moscow summit 
marked a new "normalcy, stability, and constructiveness" 
in Soviet-American relations, and saw this improvement in 
relations as the direct fruit of the USSR's domestic and
foreign policy r e s t r u c t u r i n g . 22 5
The period from May to August 1988 saw a critical
review of past Soviet foreign policy, in the Soviet 
Union. In an article published in the Soviet press a 
scholar blamed Brezhnev for initiating a new arms race 
which had proved very costly for the USSR, by his 
decision to involve the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. He 
added that "errors and the incompetent approach of the 
Brezhnev leadership to the accomplishment of foreign
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policy talks" had created a crisis characterised by an 
exacerbation of tension in the USSR's relations with the 
West. He went on to remark that the realities of the
nuclear age and advancements in science and technology 
made it imperative that "a new thinking and new 
approaches" to the attainment of foreign policy tasks be 
developed.225
Addressing a foreign ministry conference which
opened on July 2 5 1988, the Soviet foreign minister
Shevardnadze took the debate a step further when he 
outlined Soviet foreign policy's new l o o k . 227 During the 
conference Shervardnadze discussed the possibility of 
involving elected bodies and the public in the decision 
making process of foreign policy. He also pointed out 
that the world was no longer characterised by a clash or 
struggle between the two opposing systems of Communism 
and Capitalism, In his report the Soviet foreign 
minister severely criticised the old style of 
confrontation and inflexibility which had been a hallmark 
of Soviet foreign policy under his predecessor Andrei
Gromyko. He also blamed problems in domestic policy or 
wrong turns in domestic policy as having "exerted a 
serious negative impact on Soviet diplomacy" and remarked 
that positive changes had occurred in Soviet foreign 
policy over the past three years through considerable 
restructuring. This restructuring had already began to 
pay dividends, particularly with regard to relations with 
the United States, an example of how the new thinking was 
making headway. The years since Gorbachev became Soviet
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leader had seen growing progress in relations between 
America and the Soviet Union and a movement away from the 
confrontational cold war thinking which had been the 
predominant feature of East-West relations since 1945.
In late September 19 88 Shevardnadze visited 
Washington for yet another round of Soviet-American 
talks. But by now it was becoming increasingly obvious 
that despite extensive work on the START treaty there 
were still a number of problems which were not going to 
be resolved before Reagan left o f f i c e . 228 The two major 
hurdles were how to verify cut-backs in sea launch and 
other missiles, and the continuing refusal of the Soviet 
Union to destroy the huge radar station it was 
constructing at Krasnoyarsk, which according to 
Washington was in violation of the ABM treaty.
In what was seen by many as an attempt to influence 
the incoming President George Bush to sustain the 
momentous progress made in Soviet-American relations 
during Reagan's second term of office, Gorbachev came to 
New York to make a speech on December 7 to the United 
Nations where he announced a major package of proposals 
which included substantial unilateral cuts in the 
conventional forces of the Warsaw P a c t . 229 According to 
Gorbachev's plan, in the two following years the number 
of troops would be decreased by 500,000 men. There would 
also be a substantial reduction in conventional weapons; 
the withdrawals of six tank divisions from the GDR, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991 and their disbandment; 
a reduction in Soviet troops in these countries by 50,000
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men and a cut in armaments of 5000 tanks ; and a major
reorganisation of the remaining Soviet divisions in 
Eastern Europe, assigning them a new "strictly defensive" 
role. Although Gorbachev stated "these reductions will 
be conducted unilaterally with no connection to the talks 
on the mandate of the Vienna m e e t i n g " 23 0 he stressed
however that he hoped the West would "also take some 
steps".
Further evidence that Gorbachev was attempting to 
create a favourable atmosphere in preparation for dealing
with the new US President was provided by his proposals
on the issue of human rights which went some way to
addressing American concerns at the dismal Soviet record
on human rights. Gorbachev pledged that no persons
would be refused emigration or persecuted in the USSR 
because of their political or religious beliefs.
Furthermore he accepted the rulings of the world court 
regarding international agreements on human rights.
The Western reaction to Gorbachev's unilateral arms 
cutbacks was generally full of p r a i s e . 232 However,
reservations were expressed: Chairman of the joint chiefs 
of staff. Admiral W.J.Crowe, argued that Gorbachev's plan 
"falls far short of redressing the conventional balance" 
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. 233 responded on
December 8, 1988 with its own proposals for sweeping arms
cutbacks which would limit both the Warsaw Pact and NATO 
to no more than 20,000 tanks with the further stipulation 
that no one country could deploy more than 3 0 per cent of
the tanks in its a l l i a n c e . 234
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Gorbachev's military cuts announced at the UN, 
although largely supported by the Soviet m i l i t a r y ,  235 
attract an element of dissension from some in the 
military. A senior Soviet military officer. Marshal 
Akhromeyev, who had argued against any unilateral 
reduction, unexpectedly retired just hours before 
Gorbachev's UN address, fuelling speculation that the 
military would oppose the arms cutbacks. Also a Soviet 
Lieutenant Colonel complained that the troop cuts were 
hard to come to terms with, and cited the grievances of 
many officers who were concerned at the loss of housing 
since many military compounds housed the families of many 
officers, and the problems in adjusting to civilian 
life.235
Soviet-American relations under Reagan were ending 
on a high note, and in a farewell address reviewing U.S. 
foreign policy during his tenure Reagan spoke about the 
improvement in relations with the Soviet Union. Although 
he acknowledged that differences remained, he stressed 
that the relationship "once marked by sterility and 
confrontation .... is now characterised by dialogue 
realistic candid dialogue - serious diplomatic 
dialogue..." and personally praised Gorbachev, who, he 
said had taken "some daring steps" and deserved 
credit.237
CONCLUSIONS
Overall then the story of Soviet-American relations 
in the period 1985-1988 revolves largely around
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Gorbachev, Reagan and summit diplomacy. The leaders of 
two superpowers developed a noticeable rapport which 
allowed the Soviet-American relationship to flourish with 
diplomatic dialogue replacing the wrangling of the early 
1980s. This was most evident in a series of summit 
meetings between the two leaders held from 1985 to 1988. 
During these summits Reagan and Gorbachev displayed their 
ability to have a frank or candid dialogue allowing them 
to absorb more easily any criticism which each threw at
the other. At these summit meetings there were detailed
discussions on a variety of major issues which had a
bearing on the superpower relationship. More dialogue 
meant more opportunities for resolving differences.
As a result the years from 1985 through to 1988 saw 
a remarkable improvement in Soviet-American relations. 
In comparison to the period 1981-1984 (when only 5 
bilateral documents were signed)238 ig bilateral
documents were signed in the period from 1985 to 1988,
the most in any four year period since 1973-76. Also in 
1988, 12 documents were signed, the most in any single
year since 1973.239 The two countries were more willing 
to sign accords after having done much under Gorbachev 
and Reagan to remove the climate of suspicion and fear. 
1985 and 1986 witnessed slow but continuous progress. 
There were shaky or difficult moments such as the 
Daniloff incident which threatened to undermine
relations, and the abrupt break-up of the Reykjavik
Summit. There was also the Strategic Defence Initiative 
(SDI) which remained a bone of contention in relations
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between the two countries, and which was responsible for 
jeopardizing progress in 1985 and 1986.
However Soviet insistence that SDI be linked to 
progress on arms control issues had been dropped by 1987 
allowing the superpowers to make historic headway on arms 
control and disarmament culminating in the INF treaty. 
Furthermore in 1988 the conflict in Afghanistan which had 
been responsible for sparking off the "new cold war" in 
1980 moved a step nearer resolution with the signing of 
the Geneva peace agreement on April 14. Throughout the 
1980s Afghanistan had long highlighted the intense 
differences which existed between Moscow and Washington 
on the question of regional conflicts. As a result 1987 
and 1988 saw the upward trend in Soviet-American 
relations gather increasing momentum.
While both Reagan and Gorbachev were quite rightly 
accorded much credit for pursuing the path to cooperation 
it is important to keep in mind that the USSR's internal 
problems, especially the dire state of the economy, made 
Moscow conscious of the fact that competition and 
confrontation with Washington was not profitable.' This 
was especially so since Reagan had demonstrated between 
1981-85 that he would deal very strictly with the USSR 
and threatened to engage Moscow in a new arms race which 
it could ill afford. A top Soviet priority was to 
achieve substantial arms reduction agreements with 
Washington that would release much-needed resources for 
civilian purposes. Gorbachev's "new thinking" in line 
with his programmes of Perestroika and Glasnost involved
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a considerable restructuring of Moscow's foreign policy 
and contributed a sharp reduction in East-west tension. 
Gorbachev's internal reforms saw him take steps to 
improve human rights particularly on emigration, and on 
the international scene he showed a willingness to 
disengage Moscow from third world "adventurism". All this 
helped to enhance his stature in the West and meant that 
previous objections to Soviet behaviour voiced by the 
West were no longer wholly applicable.
If there was a scene which symbolised more than 
anything else the new level of understanding which had 
been established between the U.S and the USSR, it was 
when Gorbachev and Reagan, at the Moscow summit, put 
their arms around each other's waist almost as if posing 
for a photograph. When Reagan departed from office he 
and Gorbachev had reached agreement in principle on a 
number of issue areas which was to bode well for the 
future.
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CHAPTER 3
THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN TRADE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION: 1 - THE QUESTION OF HON-STRATEGIC TRADE
INTRODUCTION
There has always been a strong interrelationship 
between Soviet-American political and economic relations 
(with trade forming the key component of economic 
relations). It is clear that superpower economic 
relations have been governed by a different set of rules 
and principles, dictated more by political considerations 
than the economic benefits that either side might have 
derived.^ This is particularly true of the United States, 
which has sought to use its powerful economic position in 
relation to the Soviet Union to exert a degree of trade 
pressure^ on the USSR for the attainment of political 
obj ectives.^
The instruments of trade pressure used by the United 
States have ranged from comprehensive economic sanctions 
and embargoes of particular goods to the denial of most 
favoured nations status, credit and export controls. 
These have been used at various times, though not always 
simultaneously. The various political goals have 
included: to punish Soviet International behaviour; to
impose economic leverage or influence in the hope of 
altering particular Soviet policies - domestic and 
foreign; and to maintain American military superiority
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through the denial of Western technology and knowhow to 
Moscow.
The debate over how to conduct trade with the Soviet 
Union, the aggregate level and composition of which has 
been the subject of much scrutiny and controversy in 
America, heightened with the onset of the 'new cold war' 
at the beginning of 1980, and trade pressure became a 
central plank of America's trade policy towards Moscow 
when Reagan was elected to the Presidency.^ The political 
'Cold War' was thus supplemented by an economic 'Cold 
War' .
It is true that the United States also used trade as 
a political weapon during the 1970s but in a more 
positive sense. In other words increased trade and 
economic ties were used in order to bolster detente and 
provide an incentive for the Soviets to improve their 
international behaviour and some areas of domestic
policy. Trade was offered as more of a 'carrot' rather 
than as a 'stick' for the most part of the 1970s. ^
However with the renewal of cold war rivalry and 
increased tension at the start of the 1980s, the Carter 
and then the Reagan administration adopted a policy of
comprehensive trade pressure against the Soviet Union
which it put into practice throughout the 1980s. Trade 
was now being used as a 'stick' rather than as a 
'carrot'.
The aim of this chapter is basically twofold. One 
is to provide an analysis of the impact of US trade
pressure on the total level of Soviet-American trade.
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The second, and perhaps more important task is to look at 
the economic impact of trade pressure on the target 
country - the USSR - and assess the extent to which it 
was punished. The chapter is divided into two sections.
Section one will analyze the impact of American 
trade pressure on the aggregate level of trade flows, and 
on the direction of trade between the two superpowers. 
The second section will look more specifically at the 
economic impact on the USSR of selective commodity 
sanctions, denial or limits on particular goods to the 
USSR (excluding technology and other strategic items 
which are the subject of the next chapter) , and boycotts 
of various Soviet exports. In this section the following 
questions will need to be addressed: were American
sanctions and restrictions on particular exports to the 
Soviet Union successful or was Moscow able to circumvent 
the U.S. measures by finding alternative suppliers? And 
what about Soviet exports? How much did American limits, 
and boycott of Soviet exports harm the USSR's hard 
currency earnings, or did Moscow find alternative buyers 
for its goods? The answers to these questions will allow 
us to determine the extent to which the USSR was punished 
and if indeed the U.S. measures had the intended negative 
economic impact.
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SECTION ONE: IMPACT OF U.S. TRADE PRESSURE ON THE
AGGREGATE LEVEL OF U.S. - USSR TRADE AND 
ON THE PATTERN OF TRADE
1.1 The Scale of American - Soviet Economic Activity
A look at any Soviet-American trade figures since 
1945 will reveal that bilateral trade amounted to a very 
insignificant proportion of the overall trade conducted 
by each side, and hence the level of economic activity 
has been very small. This can be explained by a number 
of factors.
The autarkic nature of the communist bloc led by the 
Soviet Union meant that trade with the world was minute, 
let alone with the principal adversary, the United States 
of America. Only the need for the most essential 
commodities saw the Soviet bloc break out of its shell. 
Even though the scale of Soviet trade with the capitalist 
countries did increase since the 19 60s most of the upward 
trend was confined to Western Europe rather than the 
United States.
Other problems associated with communist countries 
such as the non-convertibility of their currencies, and 
the production of often low? quality and shoddy goods 
coupled with a lack of variety did not make these 
countries an appealing proposition for the non-communist 
world.
Not least. Cold war rivalry also played a major part 
in the small scale economic activity generated between 
the two superpowers. As two superpowers confronting each 
other on a global scale their mutual mistrust spilled 
over into the economic sphere. In the early days of the
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Cold War economic ties were almost unthinkable. Trade 
ties began to emerge on a measurable scale by the 1960s, 
and benefited greatly from detente during the 1970s. The 
renewed period of conflict in the early 1980s 
characterised by major world events, and the election of 
Ronald Reagan, a fervent anti-communist, proved a 
disaster for Soviet - American economic relations. As 
part of Reagan's overall strategy toward Moscow, the 
President made clear his desire to deny the USSR advanced 
Western technology and punish it economically through the 
use of American trade and economic coercion. That
Reagan's policy was indeed to punish Moscow economically 
was picked up by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai
Patolichev who noted what he saw as US attempts to try 
"to eliminate trade and economic relations with the 
Soviet Union ...." by the use of discriminatory economic 
measures.^
Appendix Table 3.1 (a) and (b) illustrates how
little bilateral trade amounts to as a proportion of the 
overall foreign trade conducted by both countries. In 
the case of the United States, the USSR has never
accounted for more than 1% of overall American foreign
trade with the exception of 1979 (in the period 1979-88). 
Throughout the 1980s trade with Moscow consistently 
amounted to less than 1% of the total value of American 
foreign trade (see Appendix Table 3.1 (b)).
If we look at the proportion of Soviet trade 
conducted with the United States the figure is only 
slightly higher (see Appendix Table 3.1a). America
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accounted for over 3% of Soviet foreign trade in 1979 but 
this figure fell dramatically to less than 2% and never 
rose above 2% again during the 1980s. In 1987 it even 
dropped to less than 1% (0.9%) .
1.2 THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN' TRADE PRESSURE OH THE
AGGREGATE VOLUME AND PATTERN OF SUPERPOWER
TRADE 197 9-88
(a) Aggregate Volume of Soviet-American Trade (1979-88)
The evidence of any substantial impact of American 
trade pressure on the total volume of superpower trade 
during the course of the period 1979-88 is not easily 
determinable by simple observation of the total volume of 
superpower trade. As Appendix Table 3.2 reveals the 
volume of superpower trade fell by a massive amount (47%) 
in 1980, the result largely of the comprehensive package 
of economic sanctions imposed by President Carter 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan^ (see 
Chapter two) . Thereafter, during the remainder of the 
period 1981-88 the volume of trade between the two 
countries followed a fluctuating path, with trade 
turnover increasing in 1981, 1982 and 1984 but falling in
1983, 1985, 1986 and 1987. American trade measures
designed to punish the USSR had no uniform visible impact 
on the aggregate volume of Soviet-American trade, with 
the exception of 1980. Caution must be taken when 
attempting to explain the depression in various years of 
Soviet-American trade since the downward trend may be the 
result of economic factors and cannot be attributed
127
solely to American trade pressure applied for political 
purposes.
b Pattern of Soviet-American Trade
The story is much the same when we analyze the 
volume of Soviet imports from the United States, and the 
volume of Soviet exports to the United States during the 
period 1979-1988. The year 1980 stands out once again as 
the exception to the rule largely because American trade 
pressure was targeted on the commodities which made up 
the bulk of Soviet-American trade (see section 2) . This 
is represented by a decrease of 46% in goods imported 
from the United States, and a fall of 56% in Soviet 
exports to the United States. Despite further American 
sanctions in late 1981 and in 1982, Soviet imports from 
the U.S. actually rose in both these years. As with the 
total volume of Soviet-American trade, Soviet exports and 
imports to and from the United States followed no obvious 
pattern. Appendix Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate the 
fluctuating path followed by Soviet imports and exports.
SECTION TWO: ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE SOVIET UNION AS A 
RESULT OF U.S. TRADE PRESSURE ON THE 
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF SUPERPOWER TRADE 
1979-88
2.1 The Structure of Soviet-American Trade
(a) Structure of Soviet Imports from the United States
A look at the commodity composition of Soviet 
imports from the United States (Appendix Table 3.3) will 
show that they can be divided into two categories : 
selected agricultural products and selected non-
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agricultural products. Of the first category the most 
important of those imported were grain, wheat, maize and 
soyabeans; while machinery equipment and means of 
transport, chemical products and superphosphoric acid 
represented the most important non-agricultural imports, 
in terms of volume.
b Soviet Imports of Agricultural Products
and American Trade Pressure
After 1950 North America emerged as the undisputed 
bread-basket of the world (the USA and Canada being the 
largest net exporters of grain), with the USSR and 
Eastern Europe emerging as the leading importers after 
Africa. For the Soviet Union, the United States became a 
particularly important source for agricultural products 
due largely to poor Soviet grain harvests and generally 
poor agricultural performance which yielded less output 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1979, grain, maize 
and wheat were by far the largest Soviet imports from the 
United States. In fact America took well over half the 
Soviet market for these products in 1979. This seemingly 
apparent dependence of the Soviet Union on America for 
major agricultural commodities came to the forefront in 
19 80 when in response to the events in Afghanistan 
President Carter announced a wide ranging package of 
economic sanctions^ which included an embargo on future 
grain e x p o r t s , l e a d i n g  to a cancellation of an offer of 
17 million metric tonnes of wheat and corn. This had a 
dramatic domestic effect on the volume of these goods 
imported by the Soviet Union (as can be seen in Appendix
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Table 3.3). Imports of each of the four main agricultural 
products from the United States plummeted by massive 
amounts. Grain fell by 51.6%, maize by 46,4%, wheat 
imports plunged 59.3%, while soya beans were drastically 
reduced by 80%.
What about the economic effect on the Soviet Union 
or the economic impact of the denial of all or a 
substantial quantity of such important food products from 
an important source? Clearly the aim of the United 
States government was to impose the maximum economic cost 
(punishment) on the Soviet Union by drastically cutting 
back on its exports of agricultural goods.
However the American move backfired. Such an 
approach could only be effective if it were backed up by 
all leading exporters of the same commodities, who were 
willing to bear the substantial economic cost themselves 
by undergoing a simultaneous reduction or total embargo 
of these goods to the USSR for an unlimited period. 
But the other leading exporters were not willing to 
follow the U.S. In other words the USSR had available 
alternative supplier countries who were more than willing 
to meet the Soviet demand for agricultural products.
As a result, the United States share of agricultural 
exports to the USSR fell while other countries, most 
notably Argentina, Australia and Canada increased their 
share (see Appendix Table 3.4) . In 1981, despite the 
lifting of the grain and agricultural embargo by 
President Reagan, Argentina and Canada surpassed the 
United States as the leading exporters of grain to the
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Soviet Union. Likewise, Argentina which on July 10 19 80 
had signed an agreement to provide the Soviet Union with 
22.5 mmt of soyabeans, corn (maize) and sorghum during 
the five years beginning January 1, 1981, became the top
exporter of maize moving ahead of America, while Canada 
became the leading exporter of wheat. It appeared as 
though despite assurances later in 1982 from Reagan that 
agricultural exports would never again be subject to 
restrictive trade measures for political reasons, the 
Soviet government saw America as a unreliable source for 
important products and opted for more politically risk 
free countries such as Argentina and Canada. The Soviet 
Union was in fact able to increase its imports of grain, 
wheat and soyabeans in 1980 and 1981.^^ The United States 
did gradually recover between 1982 and 1987 the ground it 
had lost to other countries by re-establishing its share 
of the Soviet market particularly in regard to maize and 
grain. But it was not until 1988 that America regained 
the position of leading exporter of agricultural 
commodities to the Soviet Union (see Appendix Table 3.4).
The fall in the U.S. share of agricultural exports 
to the USSR during the 19 8 0s was the result of a self 
inflicted policy started in 1980 which put political 
goals before economic gain. This coupled with increasing 
competition from other nations meant that for the most 
part of the 198 0s America was no longer the dominant 
supplier to the USSR. The analysis has shown that 
American trade pressure on the Soviet Union with regard 
to agricultural products was unsuccessful on the whole,
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and the USSR encountered no difficulty in diversifying 
the source of its imports. Alternative suppliers were 
available and Moscow was able to import as much during 
the 1980s as it did before 1980, despite U.S. trade
pressure.
Ç Soviet Imports of Non-Acfricultural Products and
American Trade Pressure
Soviet imports from the United States of non- 
agricultural goods consisted largely of industrial items 
( see Appendix Table 3.3) such as machinery equipment, 
chemical products, and superphosphoric acid. Other items 
imported but on a much smaller scale included energy 
equipment, agriculture equipment and metal working 
m a c h i n e s . T h e s e  non-agricultural items were also 
subject to American trade pressure. Appendix Table 3.3 
will show that imports of machinery equipment and 
transport means fell in each year from 1979 to 1988 with 
the exception of 1986. This category not surprisingly 
came under close scrutiny during the 1980s because many 
of the items in this category constituted what were 
termed as dual use items. These were Civilian items with 
potential military applications whose transfer to the 
Soviet Union America was keen to prevent, particularly at 
a time of heightened political tensions (see the next 
chapter for a more detailed study of U.S. and Western 
control of modern and sophisticated technology to the 
USSR) . As a result such items became a major part of 
American trade controls and embargoes.
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The West had become an important source for modern 
technology for the Soviet Union which was lagging behind 
the West in industrial development due to the very nature 
of the commeind economy system. Problems such as outdated 
technology and lack of incentives for innovation meant 
that the USSR would be to some degree dependent on 
Western imports of machinery and technology in order to 
modernize and renovate its industrial base.
The United States' use of trade pressure in this 
area was more successful in its goal of attempting to 
punish the Soviet Union. The USSR was unable to 
compensate for the fall in American imports of machinery 
equipment by turning to other major Western nations. 
Imports of machinery equipment from Britain, France and 
W.Germany saw a largely downward trend in the period 
1979-88.^^ The consequences of this were serious for the 
already ailing Soviet economy. The improvement in Soviet- 
American relations which began to take shape in 1985 (see 
Chapter 3) did not rectify the Soviet position, and 
machinery imports from the West continued to fall. The 
Soviet Union was able to increase its overall volume of 
imports of this category but had to settle for Eastern 
Europe as the s o u r c e . M o s c o w ' s  East European allies, 
most notably Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, GDR and 
Czechoslovakia, were already the largest suppliers of 
machinery to the Soviet Union. In other words the USSR 
was unable to find other countries which were alternative 
and acceptable sources of supply.
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Soviet imports of chemical products and 
superphosphoric acid were heavily hit by U.S. trade 
pressure in 1980. On February 25, 1980 the United States
embargoed exports of phosphoric acid and phosphate 
fertilizers to the USSR.^^ This followed an effective 
suspension in early February 1980 when the Commerce 
3Department required validated licences, and suspended 
issuance of such licences. However restrictions on the 
export of these products were greatly eased, and Soviet 
imports of these products from the United States actually 
rose for the most part of the 1980s (see Appendix Table 
3.3).
It is very important to consider the availability of 
alternative supplier countries to the Soviet Union for 
any major commodity it is denied or the supply of which 
is severely curtailed by A m e r i c a . A s  seen, American 
attempts to punish the USSR economically by restricting 
or denying various agricultural products were generally a 
failure. This was because substitute countries - namely 
Argentina, Canada, and Australia - were available to meet 
the amount of the products demanded by the USSR. 
Therefore the intended negative economic impact on the 
target country - the USSR - did not materialize to the 
desired extent. In this case American trade pressure 
ended up being nothing more than a gesture having no more 
than a symbolic effect, rather than any intended economic 
effect. In some ways the United States contributed to 
its own failure in instituting effective agricultural 
trade pressure on the USSR. For a start the American
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agricultural embargo of 1980 was beset with problems. It 
failed to take into account the availability of other 
exporters to the USSR and underestimated their ability to 
meet the level of Soviet demand. To add to this, the 
embargo was short lived with Reagan lifting it in April 
1981. To have any chance of success the embargo had to 
be sustained over a longer period of time. The United 
States ended up suffering considerable economic costs. 
There was considerable domestic opposition from farm 
lobby groups whose menbers' incomes were significantly 
reduced, and the loss of a major Soviet market.
The key problem, however, for the United States was
the lack of market power it had over the trade in 
agricultural commodities. A market structure known as 
perfect competition prevailed in international 
agricultural trade, with a large number of suppliers such 
that no one supplier country was able to exercise 
exclusive control over the market for agricultural goods. 
Only in a situation where a country exercises 
considerable monopoly power (cases where it is the sole 
producer and supplier of a commodity) can unilateral 
trade measures such as embargoes or sanctions be expected 
to work. Even then the target country may overcome the 
problem if the commodities denied to it have a close
substitute which can be attained elsewhere. In the 
absence of such monopoly power the formation of an
international cartel by the leading suppliers of the 
commodity in question can sometimes be effective.
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U.S. attempts to deny or curtail other exports to 
the Soviet Union, particularly machinery equipment and 
means of transport, met with more success. This was 
because the Soviet Union had no other sources available 
from which to obtain Western technology since America's 
allies in Europe also tightened their exports of this 
item to the East because of its possible strategic and 
military applications. In short there was no substitute 
for Western technology and its particular qualities. The 
USSR was forced to turn inward to Eastern Europe to meet 
its demand for machinery equipment not attainable from 
the West.
2.2 (a) Soviet Exports to the United States
Soviet-American bilateral trade amounted to a very 
insignificant proportion of the overall trade conducted 
by each side, and trade was dominated mostly by Soviet 
imports from America. Nevertheless the Soviet Union did 
export a number of goods to the United States, the most 
important of which are illustrated in Appendix Table 3.5.
fo U.S. Trade Pressure on Soviet Exports
American imports from the USSR comprised such as 
small amount that they appeared to be no more than a 
symbolic gesture on part of the United States that trade 
should be conducted on a mutual basis. Therefore it was 
not surprising why many political analysts argue that 
American-Soviet trade was a 'one-way street' with trade 
flowing principally from the United States to the Soviet 
Union. America was not dependent on the Soviet Union for
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its most important imports. It was either self- 
sufficient in these or could attain them from other 
countries. The United States had always been anxious to 
avoid purchasing large volumes of goods from the Soviet 
Union which could contribute significantly to the 
Soviet's stock of hard currency earnings. This anxiety 
was demonstrated by Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger 
when commenting on America's dispute with its Western 
European allies over what was the most desirable level of 
trade with the Soviet Union. In a statement the Defence 
Secretary spoke of Soviet earnings from gas sales as 
providing the hard currency to obtain militarily useful 
technology from the West thus threatening one of the 
principal objectives of the Reagan administrative to
check and contain Soviet military power.
A look at Appendix Figure 3.3, which shows the 
percentage change from 1979 to 1980 in selected American 
imports from the Soviet Union, will reveal evidence that 
the United States took measures to restrict purchases of 
certain Soviet exports. Out of the six major Soviet 
exports to the United States, four suffered from the 
American policy of trade pressure. Imports of oil and 
oil products fell by a huge 91.7% in 1980. Imports of 
machinery equipment went down by 56.2%, vodka by 12.3%
while consumer goods were reduced by 45.4%. In contrast 
there were increases of 96% and 105% respectively in
Soviet, exports of ammonia and chemical products to the 
United States. Even by the end of 1988 Soviet exports of 
machinery equipment, oil and oil products and consumer
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goods were significantly down on their 1979 level (see
Appendix Table 3.5), while chemical products and ammonia 
exports only increased slightly in 19 88 in comparison to 
their 1979 level. 1979 was the last year before the
deterioration in Soviet-American relations was to begin 
and which was to be accompanied with U.S. trade pressure 
which was to hit superpower trade very hard during the 
course of the 1980s. The improvement in Soviet-American 
relations in the post-1985 period failed to increase 
trade ties by any significant level and in many years
during the 1980s Soviet exports continued to suffer from
a restrictive U.S. trading policy.
What about the economic impact on the Soviet Union 
of the American policy of curtailing purchases of Soviet 
goods or boycotting Soviet exports? It is doubtful 
whether the Soviet Union suffered very badly since Soviet 
exports to the United States formed a very small 
proportion of overall Soviet exports of these products to 
all countries. The United States never accounted for 
more than 1% of Soviet exports of consumer goods 
throughout the entire period 1980-88. The same can be 
said of machinery equipment, and oil and oil products (up 
unto 1986). Only in chemical products, ammonia and vodka 
did the United States account for more than 5% of Soviet 
exports during the period 1980-88, and coincidentally 
these were the very products which suffered least from 
U.S. trade pressure.
In addition the USSR's leading exports - energy and 
arms - were not exported to the United States, meaning
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that its most important or leading export sectors back 
home were fairly secure.
As far as the effect on the USSR's hard currency 
export earnings is concerned it is not likely to have 
been particularly disastrous. While a reduction or 
boycott by the United States of various Soviet exports 
would certainly have depleted Soviet hard currency 
earnings, Moscow was able to compensate for this by 
increasing its volume or maintaining the same volume of 
its overall exports of the goods in question to the rest 
of the world. As a result the Soviet Union managed to 
offset any negative impact resulting from the U.S. 
measures by either finding alternative export markets or 
by increasing its exports to existing markets, thus 
preventing any serious erosion of its hard currency 
earnings. Of course there would be some depletion of 
hard currency earnings, since increased sales to the rest 
of the world aimed at offsetting reduced sales generated 
from the United States need not mean increased exports to 
hard currency countries. This is because not all 
countries have convertible currencies and are not 
therefore able to meet payment in hard currency, as in 
the case of many developing countries. A substantial fall 
in hard currency earnings can be more serious as it 
reduces the ability to purchase hard currency imports and 
a country may have to do without important imports. For 
the Soviet Union the situation was never that serious. 
The USSR was believed to have a substantial gold stock 
that acted as a guarantee that in any particular year the
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Soviet economy could absorb a fairly severe blow to its 
hard currency earnings (due to e.g. a fall in demand by 
the U.S. for certain Soviet goods) without having to seek 
new credits with which to pay for hard currency imports.
However it was always questionable whether in fact 
the USSR could enter the gold market with large amounts 
of gold without pushing down the price of gold which 
would be of no use to it, and indeed whether the Soviet 
Union had enough freedom to manoeuvre with regard to gold 
that would allow it to attain hard currency imports.
With trade playing a very little role in Soviet- 
American relations, and with the USSR managing to sustain 
to a large extent its export volume to the world - even 
though exports of some products to America drastically 
fell, there was very little chance of U.S. economic 
measures against Soviet exports causing any significant 
damage economically. Only a large scale boycott of 
Soviet exports by the United States and its Western
allies on a multilateral basis could seriously be 
expected to have damaged the Soviet Union by eroding its 
export base and depleting its hard currency earnings.
However in a world of diverse political views and 
alignments coupled with the availability and opportunity 
to find and exploit new export markets there are ways of
circumventing trade pressure on one's exports. Moreover
such a scenario where Western Europe supported a full
scale boycott of Soviet exports was unlikely in view of 
the expanded economic contacts between the Soviet Union 
and Western Europe and the latter's degree of dependence
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on trade with Moscow, an issue which proved to be a major 
point of contention between United States and its
European allies with the two sides differing on how trade 
with the USSR should be conducted (especially in the case 
of trade in technology: see the next chapter).
Another way in which the United States punished the 
Soviet Union through the use of trade pressure was by
denying it most favoured nation status (MEN). As a 
result the high rate of tariffs on Soviet goods entering 
America meant that any prospect of new products 
successfully breaking into U.S. markets was greatly
diminished. Furthermore existing Soviet exports to the
United States became uncompetitive as the discriminatory 
measures imposed by America in the form of high tariff 
rates made it difficult for Soviet goods to compete in 
the U.S. market. The only option left to Moscow in order 
to counteract the high tariffs was to lower its export 
prices, something which the exporting nation would rather 
not d o .
The effect on the target nation's employment, in 
this case, was likely to be negligible. This is because 
in the USSR (as in the other socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe) employment was determined by government 
economic planning (everyone was given a job) and not by 
external factors like international trade performance. 
The low levels of unemployment achieved by the USSR and 
its East European allies after the Second World War was
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something of which they were very proud and was not 
immediately prejudiced by external trade sanctions.
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CONCLUSIONS
It can be concluded that American trade pressure on 
the Soviet Union during the period 1980-88 had only a 
very limited negative economic impact on the USSR. Indeed 
the United States suffered considerable economic costs 
itself, and in the case of the grain embargo in 1980-81 
it arguably suffered more than the target country - the 
USSR.
The lack of overall success of the United States 
strategy of trade pressure adopted against the Soviet 
Union can be attributed to a number of factors. For a 
start the US policy was not universally supported, not 
even by its staunchest allies. The lack of allied support 
was noted by Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev in 
an interview he gave in 1981. Asked about how the other 
Western countries had reacted to the trade boycott 
imposed by the US against the USSR, the Minister replied 
"... the facts tell us that our Western partners in 
Europe were not influenced by this US policy directed
against the USSR .... " . He went on ".... the business
circles in Western Europe in particular were keen to 
continue to broaden business links with the USSR 
More importantly America was unable to form any sort of 
cartel with major exporting nations in order to 
effectively curtail supplies of sanctioned commodities to 
the USSR. America was unable to exercise monopoly power 
due to the fact that markets of the commodities concerned 
exhibited a perfectly competitive structure, so it was 
not able to wield much market power. This meant that the
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Soviet Union was able to circumvent the denial of certain 
imports to it by a certain amount of trade diversion. 
Alternative suppliers were in most cases very easily 
found. To safeguard against overdependence on one nation 
for its most important imports (particularly agricultural 
products) the Soviet Union spread its share of such 
imports to a number of countries. In such a case the 
United States sanctions proved to be nothing more than a 
short term inconvenience quite easily overcome.
In the case of the boycott of Soviet exports and
limits on Soviet goods entering America the results were 
mixed. Soviet exports were always on a small scale to 
the United States, and the denial of most-favoured nation 
status meant that there was little opportunity for 
existing and new Soviet products to make any significant 
impact in the U.S. market, with Soviet goods being priced 
out by foreign competitors who benefited from the 
granting of more preferential tariff rates against their 
countries.
There was also some limited effect on Soviet hard
currency earnings, which fell during this period. 
However even in this case the USSR managed to cushion 
much of the adverse impact by finding alternative buyers 
for its goods, thus safeguarding its export earnings.
There was no particular pattern in the figures for 
total trade and in the volume of Soviet exports and
imports to and from the United States to suggest any
major impact of U.S. trade pressure on the aggregate flow 
of American-Soviet trade, with the exception of 1980 when
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trade pressure was most marked. After 1980 American 
trade pressure became more of a selective policy with 
measures taken largely with regard to particular 
commodities rather than a whole package of general 
sanctions as in 1980. So it is trends in the commodity 
composition of superpower trade (particularly trends in 
the major commodities traded) which provide real evidence 
of US trade pressure.
Also it can be seen that American trade pressure 
during the 1980s, in particular its ferocity in the years 
1980-84, was in line with the overall state of U.S.- 
Soviet relations which were tense during this period. 
However as relations improved after 1985 U.S. trade 
pressure did ease somewhat (with the exception of the 
transfer of strategic goods). Nevertheless this slight 
relaxation of trade policy towards the USSR was not 
really reflected in the figures of the commodity 
composition of trade, partly because the USSR was no
longer willing to engage in trade with the United States 
to the extent it had done prior to 1980, with America now 
seen as a unreliable trading partner and Moscow opting
for politically safer markets.
The United States failed to punish the Soviet Union 
economically for the reasons m e n t i o n e d . A  country of 
the size of the USSR was also an unsuitable target for 
economic sanctions. The USSR was not very dependent on 
trade, had a formidable reservoir of basic energy
resources and raw materials, and was reasonably self
sufficient.
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Appendix Table 3.1 (a) and 3.1 (b) : Trade with the UnitedStates as a proportion of Overall Soviet Foreign Trade and Trade with the Soviet Union as a Proportion of Overall United States Foreign Trade (1979-1988).
a Trade with the United States as a proportion of overall Soviet
Trade with the Soviet Union as a proportion of overall AmericanYear Foreign Trade * Foreign Tra
1979 3.5% 1.1%1980 1.6% 0.4%1981 1.7% 0.5%1982 1.9% 0.6%1983 1.5% 0.5%1984 2.2% 0.7%1985 1.9% 0.5%1986 1.1% 0.3%1987 0.9% 0.2%1988 1.6% 0.4%
* derived from figures in the following volumes of
Vneshnvaya Torgovlva SSSR: 1980, 1982, 19 84, 1986 and1988.
* * derived from figures in the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States for the following years: 1985, 1988,1989, and 1991
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Appendix Table 3.2; Total Volume of Soviet-AmericanTrade 1979-88 and % change from previous year*
(in millions of roubles)
Total Volume % Change FromYear of Trade Previous
1979 2837,1 + 531980 1502,5 -471981 1845,4 + 231982 2226,4 + 211983 1900,5 -151984 3134,9 + 651985 2703,1 -141986 1458,5 -461987 1198,5 -181988 2104,1 + 76
Source; Vneshnvaya Torgovlya: Volumes for 1980, 1982, 1984,
198 6 and 19 88
* According to figures in the Vienna Institute publication 
COMECON DATA which have also been taken from Vneshnyaya 
Torgovlya, the figures for the total share of Soviet-American trade represents millions of foreign exchange roubles at 
current prices.
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Technical Note On Sources^
Soviet foreign trade statistics in this chapter have 
been taken from the official Soviet source: Vneshnyaya
Torcfovlva. This is an annual publication of the Soviet 
ministry for foreign trade, and since this thesis is the 
culmination of research conducted at the Soviet 
Institute, it is only appropriate that Soviet sources are 
utilised wherever possible.
However, because it is widely accepted that Soviet 
statistics as they are presented can be quite ambiguous 
especially as there is no footnote explaining any 
technical points which may arise. An example of this can 
be seen in Vneshnvaya torgovlya which gives no adequate 
information as to whether Soviet trade figures are based 
on current or constant prices. In view of this 
alternative sources have been referred to in order that 
one can make a comparison with the Soviet sources and/ or 
use them as a back up to the official Soviet sources . 
Furthermore alternative sources such as the Statistical 
Yearbook of the United Nations also provide Soviet 
foreign trade figures in their international denomination
i.e. dollars.
The aim of this chapter is simply to get an 
indication of the volume and value of Soviet - American 
trade over a period of time in order to analyse trends 
and patterns in superpower trade. As a result whether 
the figures are expressed in roubles or dollars should 
not make a difference.
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The figures provided by the Vienna Institute in its 
publication Comecon Data are more or less identical to 
the figures in this chapter since in both cases 
statistics have been derived from Vneshnyaya Torgovlya. 
But the publication Comecon Data provides more 
explanation as to the technical aspects.
In the case of Soviet imports of agricultural 
products one could refer to the International Wheat 
Council Grain Market Reports. An advantage of using these 
reports is that they provide figures for products in 
terms of their weight and not just their value in 
monetary terms. These reports can be used in conjunction 
with Table 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter.
Some of the shortcomings of the data on foreign 
trade as published in official Soviet sources like 
Vneshnvava torgovlva is highlighted by B.P.Pockney in his 
publication; Soviet Statistics Since 1950 (New York: St.
Martins 1991) See Section 5 on Foreign Trade.
The Vienna Institutes' publication, Comecon Data, 
provides conversion factors which allow the conversion of 
Soviet trade figures in roubles into dollars. This can be 
done by multiplying the conversion factor by the 
export/import figure.
Current and Constant Prices
Constant prices are a measure of an economic 
variable (in this case exports or imports) deflated to 
allow for price changes: thus the imports of a country at 
constant prices would show imports for a number of years
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at the price of one year. In contrast current prices are 
a measurement of an economic variable at the prices of 
the period at which data were collected, e.g. imports at 
current prices would show for years X,Y, and Z the actual
cost of purchasing such goods at the prices ruling in
years X, Y, and Z respectively.
Measurement of a country's trade can be provided in 
a numlDer of ways. Two of these are the volume of trade 
and the value of trade. Although both the volume of 
trade and the value of trade are expressed in monetary 
terms, the volume of trade is a more accurate reflection 
of trade since it is an attempt at giving figures in real 
terms i.e. inflation is taken into account. It is 
similar to the idea of constant prices where the figures 
have also been deflated and are expressed in constant 
monetary units. In comparison the value of trade
actually includes the inflationary element. In other 
words the value of trade represents what are in effect
nominal figures, similar to the concept of current prices 
where the figures have been taken as they are. Even then 
we may see the use of value of trade despite the fact 
that volume of trade is a better measurement. This could 
be because the figures for the inflation rate may not be 
available.
a Full details of the sources referred to in this 
technical note can be found in the bibliography.
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GLOSSARY
The following short glossary will define some of the 
key economic terms used in this chapter, and with which 
the reader may be unfamiliar.
1. Economic Sanctions
This is the economic boycott of a nation by another 
nation or a group of countries (e.g. the United Nations), 
as a protest against the policy that country is pursuing 
at home or abroad, and in order to make it change its 
policy.
2. Embargo
This is a ban on imports of certain goods coming 
from a particular country and / or a ban on exports to a 
particular country of a certain good usually for 
political reasons. The embargo may be imposed by either 
side and prevents the unloading or loading of certain 
goods.
3 . Most-Favoured Nation Status (MFN)
The concept of MFN status embodies the idea of 
preferential or non-discriminatory treatment. It implies 
the same tariff rates as those extended to the most 
favoured nation, i.e. accorded the lowest rates.
4. Tariffs
This is the most used instrument of commercial 
policy. It involves the imposition of an indirect tax on 
imported goods (although it can also take the form of 
export tariff imposed on exported goods, but this is far 
less common).
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5. Market Power / Monopoly Power / Perfect Compétition/
Cartel
We have seen that the degree of market power a 
country (in this case the United States) has in relation 
to a particular commodity or in the market for that 
commodity can be crucial in determining whether it can 
prevent the target country (in this case the USSR) from 
acquiring that commodity. In a situation where a country 
applying sanctions has monopoly power in the world market 
because it is the sole producer or supplier of a 
commodity then it can use this considerable market power 
to regulate output, and has a chance of preventing the 
target from obtaining that commodity.
However, as we have seen (for example in the case of 
the grain embargo) this is very rarely the case as there 
are usually more than producer or supplier countries of a 
commodity. This means that the target country has 
substitute countries available from which to purchase the 
commodity denied by its original supplier. In this 
situation a country like the U.S. would have little or no 
market power, and a situation similar to perfect 
competition (where there are a considerable number of 
supplier countries such that no one supplier nation can 
alone influence the market), or an oligopoly (where there 
are a few but more than one producers) would exist.
Nevertheless even in such a situation it is still 
possible for a nation to exercise monopoly power through 
some form of cooperative agreement with other nations or 
through the creation of a cartel with other major 
suppliers, allowing them as a group to restrict output.
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However such cooperation in reality is difficult to 
achieve especially since the different nations may have 
totally diverging political interests which may make 
effective cooperation impossible. Even if they are 
political allies economic interests may make cooperation 
unlikely.
It has to be stressed that the analysis here has 
deliberately been simplified and that in reality there 
are much more complex issues of costs and revenue 
involved in the formation of a cartel, or in any economic 
grouping of countries.
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CHAPTER 4
THE IMPACT OF AMERICAIN TRADE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET 
P-NION; 2 - THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC TRADE
INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter was concerned with American
trade pressure on the Soviet Union involving non- 
strategic goods. This chapter will look at United States 
unilateral and multilateral {in conjunction with its NATO 
allies) trade pressure concerning the export of strategic 
items, mainly the transfer of Western technology to the 
Soviet bloc^, during the period 1980-88.
Different schools of thought emerged over the years 
on the idea of using technology denial as a form of trade 
pressure by the West against the Soviet Union. There were 
those such as Hanson^, who argued that Western strategic 
trade pressure in the form of technology denial was "part 
of the necessary defensive arrangements" and that the
'strategic embargo' acted as an obstacle to the Soviet 
Union's bid to acquire Western technology.
On the other hand, another school of thought
illustrated by Parrott^ believed that United States 
economic measures against the USSR in the form of
technology denial had not been very successful, as could 
be said of the general use of trade pressure by the US 
against the Soviet Union. Although they did not dismiss 
the idea of using economic sanction as a "tool of 
diplomacy", they believed that the effect of such a
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policy on the Soviet Union was limited because "the USSR 
has achieved an impressive measure of success in the 
independent development of a wide range of military 
technologies"^ and that American measures to greatly 
expand technology controls did not contribute "... to 
attempts to shift the military balance... in America's 
favour" .
Not surprisingly the issue of technology transfer 
(particularly militarily sensitive technology) to the 
communist countries was always an important topic of 
discussion for the United States and its NATO allies ever 
since the cold war began. ^  Indeed COCOM - the 
coordinating committee on multilateral export controls - 
was created in 1949 to regulate the export of technology 
to communist countries. On the unilateral front the 
United States passed legislation, aimed at curbing the 
transfer of its own strategic exports to Soviet bloc 
nations.^ The first American national controls on exports 
to the USSR and its allies were introduced in 194 8, and 
formalised in the Export Control Act of 1 9 4 9 .^  in 1969 
this act was replaced by the Export Administration act. ^  
To this day, the United States maintains a unilateral 
commodity control list which is somewhat wider in scope 
than the COCOM control lists. Controls on U.S. strategic 
exports to the USSR were somewhat relaxed during the 
period of detente in the 1970s.
However, with the deterioration in the Soviet- 
American relationship following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan^^ the debate over technology transfer to the
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Soviet Union heightened. Soviet international behaviour 
coupled with reports that the USSR was ahead in the arms 
race made technology transfer a sensitive issue, and a 
major national security concern in A m e r i c a . T h e
formidable growth in Soviet military power which had
occurred during the 1970s appeared to have given Moscow 
an edge entering the 1980s.
Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the Soviet- 
American trade relationship once again came under close 
review from the United States. The renewed tension in
East-West relations (particularly in US-Soviet relations) 
led America to formulate a radical reappraisal of the
conditions and procedures for the transfer of Western
technology to the Soviet Union. Only by denying
important technology and know-how to the USSR could
America and its Western partners be sure of maintaining 
their qualitative edge over the Soviets, which would go 
some way to compensating for Moscow's apparent
quantitative supremacy.
As in the case of non-strategic trade pressure, U.S. 
restrictions and bans on certain types of technology to 
the USSR were imposed chiefly for political reasons. But 
there was more to it than just the aim of illustrating 
American displeasure at Soviet international actions, and 
concern over Soviet internal policies in areas such as 
human rights. Reasons of national security and the state 
of the East-West military balance also played no small 
part in the hardening of American policy on technology. 
President Reagan, on taking office in 1981, was very keen
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to redress the military balance in favour of the United 
States, and realised that this could only be achieved by 
adopting a strict policy of technology denial, something 
that would have to be carried out with the effective 
cooperation of its West European allies. In other words, 
the tough American policy on technology transfer was part 
of the overall grand strategy of the Reagan 
administration when it assumed office, and a central 
premise of what later became known as the Reagan 
doctrine.
As mentioned, the objective of this chapter is 
similar to the previous one in that we are looking at 
United States efforts to punish the Soviet Union for 
political reasons (in this case for national security 
reasons as well) by applying trade pressure, in this case 
strategic trade pressure involving the denial and 
curtailment of advanced technology. The aim was to hurt 
Moscow in an area where it would be greatly affected. 
All this of course depended on the continuing assumption 
that the Soviet Union was still dependent to a degree on 
Western technology. It was widely believed that this 
indeed was the case with Western technology being in 
great demand in the East, and many Soviet activities 
legal and illegal to acquire Western technology proved 
this fact. The Soviet interest in Western technology 
stemmed from the fact that there existed a gap between 
Soviet/East European and Western standards of technology 
and know-how with the former communist countries of 
Eastern Europe lagging quite a distance behind the West.
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The very nature of the Soviet-type system which inhibited 
individual initiative and provided few incentives for 
innovation meant that the results of practical scientific 
reasearch were not able to be incorporated into the 
manufacturing process in a variety of different fields, 
leaving the Soviets behind the West in the technology 
race and in search of Western technology in order to 
bridge the gap, and at the same time help the cause of 
economic development. For the West, the danger was that 
Soviet acquisition of Western technology for potential 
use for military and strategic purposes would threaten 
their national security. The aim was therefore to 
deprive Moscow of advanced Western technology through 
trade pressure and policies symptomatic of economic 
warfare. In some cases even non-military technology was 
embargoed with the argument that the Soviets did not 
deserve to benefit from Western advances in technology 
until there were irreversible changes in Soviet policies.
The division of this chapter into three sections 
will allow an analysis of the following areas: Section
one will give an outline of U.S. government policy on the 
issue of technology transfer to the Soviet bloc in 
Carter's final year in office and under the Reagan 
presidency, and the domestic political debate this policy 
generated. Having established American policy on the 
issue. Section two will look at the measures-unilateral 
and multilateral - taken by the U.S. to implement this 
policy. The final Section will examine the effectiveness
167
of these measures in preventing the Soviet bloc nations 
from acquiring Western technology and know-how,
SECTION ONE
AMERICAN POLICY ON TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER TO THE SOVIET BLOC
Under Jimmy Carter's presidency U.S. policy on 
technology transfer to the Soviet Union and its allies 
had always been restrictive. However, by about 1979 
amidst growing fears that the restriction of American 
exports was threatening to harm the balance of payments, 
and that the export sector needed a boost, Carter signed 
into law the new Export Administration Act^^ which was 
intended to minimise controls and facilitate the
licensing of exports. These signs of optimism for a
flourishing U.S.-Soviet trade relationship were short 
lived because of the rapid deterioration in superpower 
relations at the start of 1980 which brought to the
forefront the "complicated and politically sensitive 
question of technology transfer to the Soviet Union". 
Following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan the
administration of President Carter in its final year in 
office hardened its policy on technology exports to the 
Soviet Union. As part of his package of sanctions 
against Moscow the President suspended licensing for all 
high technology and other products requiring validated 
export licences pending review. This was followed 
shortly afterwards in March 1980 by a announcement from 
the Department of Commerce that the government would be
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further tightening controls on American exports of high 
technology products to the USSR^^ thus ending the 
administration's review of export control policy that had 
been prompted by the events in Afghanistan. In a 
statement, the Commerce Department said that the new 
guidelines adopted would impose tighter controls in 
various areas such as computers, software and
manufacturing technology. So as Carter left office he 
left behind him a drastically hardened American attitude 
towards strategic trade with the Soviet Union.
When Reagan came to office in 1981 his 
administration voiced concern over its predecessor's 
policy on technlogy transfer. The new administration was 
unhappy that although Carter's policy was strict enough 
in theory it had not been effective in practice from the 
point of view of preventing the drain of military related 
technology to the USSR, and had not implemented
effectively the various clauses of the Export
Administration Act.
The Reagan administration had come to power in a 
context of a steadily deteriorating East-West climate. 
Therefore it was hardly surprising that Reagan, a fervent 
and committed anti-communist, adopted a tough approach 
towards the Soviets on issues such as East-West trade. 
Reagan's policy on technology transfer to the Soviet bloc 
was simply that the Soviets must not have access to
Western technology with military applications". He made 
this clear at an address on East-West relations delivered 
at Eureka collge in 1982.^^ Defence Secretary Caspar
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Weinberger had earlier reiterated this point in his 
annual report to Congress when he stated that the major 
aim of national strategy should be to cut off Western 
technology to the USSR.^^ It quickly became evident that 
the Reagan administration was r e a d y  to take steps to put 
into practice this policy which had begun to evolve in 
the administration's first two years in office. On 
October 1, 1982 the U.S. government was reported to be
seeking to toughen the multilateral system (COCOM) that 
America and its allies used to control the flow of 
technology, and other strategic exports to communist 
n a t i o n s . b e c a u s e  as Undersecretary of Defense for 
policy. Department of Defense, Richard Perle put it "the 
US government recognises a critical need to overhaul and 
modernize the existing system of controlling militarily 
relevant Western technology
Reagan's policy on technology transfer to the Soviet 
Union was the same as his overall approach to economic 
relations with the USSR namely that security and foreign 
2policy concerns should normally take precedence over the 
economic interests and economic benefits that might be 
derived.
Many in American political circles recognised and 
acknowledged that the Reagan administration was truly 
committed to stemming the flow of Western technology to 
the East in a consistent and effective manner. At the 
1982 Senate Hearings on the transfer of American 
technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc nations, 
James Buckley - under secretary of state for security
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assistance, science and technology eit the Department of 
State said that "this administration has placed a very 
high priority on improving the effectiveness of the 
executive branch in enforcing export c o n t r o l s " . H e  
added further that the various initiatives launched by 
the Republican administration would be focused "on those
elements of advanced technology ....  which are of the
most critical importance to the Soviet bloc".^^ Others 
such as the Commissioner of the US Customs Service, 
William Von Raab, also noted the Reagan administration's 
efforts to thwart "the flow of high technology to the 
Soviet bloc and other unfriendly nations".
The United States governement was naturally keen to 
enlist the help of its major allies in Western Europe in 
curbing the transfer of technology to the communist 
b l o c . 24 The cooperation of America's allies would be 
imperative in order to ensure success in the excecution 
of U.S. policy on the issue. Reports that the leakage of 
American technology to the USSR had been damaging to U.S. 
national s e c u r i t y ^ ^  gave Washington's allies in Europe 
food for thought, after all the Soviet Union posed 
probably just as serious a threat to Western European 
Security as it arguably did to American national 
security.
In its attempt to execute its restrictive policy on 
technology transfer, the Reagan administration faced 
problems similar in nature to those confronted by Carter, 
which had forced the latter into a certain amount of 
liberalisation of export controls by the time the Export
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Administration Act came up for renewal in 1979. As well 
as facing intra-alliance problems which stemmed from the 
fact that many West European governments believed that 
America wanted to improve restrictions on the transfer of 
items to the Soviet bloc which had no relevance to the 
politico-strategic debate (see section C for a fuller 
discussion of U.S.-West European differences), and the 
fact that Western Europe had stronger commercial links 
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe which they saw 
being unnecessarily jeopardized in some cases, the Reagan 
administration faced domestic pressures over its policy 
as well.
These came to the forefront during the debate over 
the renewal of the Export Administration Act (EAA) which 
was set to expire on September 30, 1 9 8 3 . The renewal
of this act had always been a constant source of 
controversy in America even during the term of the 
previous Democrat administration. The whole affair 
turned out to be a highly politicized one, and the act 
which was set to expire on September 19 83 was extended 
until 1985. The debate over the renewal of the act 
highlighted the dilemma facing the Reagan administration 
in its attempts to reconcile its free market orientations 
with its intention of more strictly curbing the transfer 
of strategic goods to the Soviet Union. The continued 
debates about the issues and the legislation required to 
update fhe act brought to the forefront differences 
between those who were worried about the discriminatory 
effect on U.S. exporters and who favoured relaxation of
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controls - the pro-traders, and those who believed in the 
continuing need to prevent the diffusion of strategic 
goods and technology and the need to toughen up the act. 
They were the so called anti-traders who were keen to 
promote the restrictive policies of the American 
government on all trade with the Soviet Union and not 
just on strategic trade. They pointed out that trade 
with the USSR was threatening to erode America's 
traditional technological superiority, and was therefore 
dealing ci damaging blow to American attempts to check 
Soviet military growth. The fact was that the whole 
issue of strategic trade with the Soviet Union had 
ignited a debate over the overall conduct of U.S. 
economic policy towards Moscow with both pro-traders and 
anti-traders using the opportunity to make their 
respective cases.
In addition, there was also a substantial and 
serious amount of dissension within the Reagan 
administration itself on the issue of strategic trade 
with the Soviet Union. In 1983 the director of the 
office of East-West trade, William Root, resigned^^ over 
technology export policy, saying that any further 
attempts to tighten controls on East West trade would 
lead to a major justified explosion of allied resentment. 
Earlier in June 1982 Secretary of State Alexander Haig 
had resigned^^ as a result of what many political 
commentators saw as being linked to the decision on June 
18 of that year to widen the U.S. embargo on the export 
of technology and equipment to the USSR,
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Despite the domestic and alliance repercussions of 
the Reagan administration's hardline policy on strategic 
trade with the Soviet bloc, the established policy by and 
large remained in place for the remainder of the 
administration's term characterized by strict strategic 
export controls, and aided by unilateral and multilateral 
measures designed to promote this policy. Table 4.1 lists 
the key legislative measures, newly passed, renewed or 
amended by the American government during the period 
1979-88, affecting the control of technology transfers to 
the Soviet Union.
Table 4.1; Key United States Legislation Relating to the 
Control of Technology Transfer to the Soviet 
Union 1 97 9- 8 8 .
LEGISLATIVE MEASURE* YEAR PASSED, AMENDED
Export Administration Act** 1979 (Renewal)
Amendment to the Atomic
Energy Act*** 1981 (Amendment)
Executive Order 12356 1982
Defence Authorization Act 1984
National Security Decision
Directive 145 1984
National Security Decision
Directive 189 1985
Invention Secrecy Act**** 1988 (Amendment)
* These legislative measures are referred to in more 
detail in Section B (1) of this Chapter
* * The Export Administration Act was first passed with
this title in 1969. The 1979 version represented a
renewal of this Act which was subsequently renewed
again throughout the course of the 1980s.
* * * The Atomic Energy Act was originally passed in 1954,
and in 1981 an amendment to this Act was passed.
**** The Invention Secrecy Act, passed in 1951 was 
amended by Congress in 1988.
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SECTION TWO
A - UNILATERAL AMERICAN MEASURES TO CONTROL THE TRANSFER 
OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC
During the course of 19 80-88 the United States took 
a numlcer of unilateral measures to enforce the policy of 
controlling the transfer of technology to Soviet bloc 
nations.
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
President Carter announced a package of economic 
sanctions against the USSR which included a review of 
American technology export policy towards Moscow during 
early 1 9 8 0 . 2 0  The steps taken included moves to tighten 
the unilateral commodity control list.^^ This list 
covered industrial items which might have potential 
military application. It is similar to the COCOM list 
but much wider in scope with many items appearing on this 
list which were not on the COCOM list. All technologies 
which appear on this list require a validated export 
licence and are "subject to a rigorous application 
process".22 There would also be a revision of licensing 
policy. In a speech on January 4, 1980, Carter announced
that "no high technology or other strategic items will be 
licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further 
notice...."22 in addition to the halting of new licences 
the Carter administration announced that it would be 
reviewing licences already issued with the possibility 
that some may be revoked. In March 19 8 0 the debate over 
the export of high technology to the Soviet Union, which 
had been fuelled by the events in Afghanistan, finally
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ended with an announcement by the U.S. government that 
there would be a substantial tightening of controls on 
the transfer of high technology to Moscow with the areas 
most likely to be affected being computers, software and 
manufacturing technology.24
President Carter departed from office leaving behind 
him a tough American policy on exports of technology to 
the USSR, and his successor Ronald Reagan adopted a 
similar policy and gained the opportunity to put into 
practice this policy towards the end of December 1981 
following the imposition of martial law in Poland. 
Citing Soviet complicity in the events in Poland, Reagan 
announced a list of sanctions against Moscow similar in 
nature to those imposed by Carter in January 1 9 8 0 .2^ 
Reagan effectively ordered a total ban on exports of high 
technology goods. In a speech in Los Angeles he announced 
that the United States would be suspending any further 
issuing or renewal of licences for high technology
exports to the Soviet Union such as electronic equipment 
and computers.2^
As part of its drive to stem the flow of
sophisticated technology to the Soviet bloc, and to 
address increasing concerns about the illegal transfer of 
U.S. technology by American and foreign companies which 
were infringing U.S. export laws, the Reagan
administration unveiled in January 1982 'Project Exodus' 
"a national enforcement program" integrating ".. the
various operational units of the U.S. customs s e r v i c e " . 27 
The customs service which was to be the linchpin of this
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enforcement operation was to have the task of launching 
new initiatives "aimed at combating the trafficking in 
illegal e x p o r t s " . 22 Its activities would include
intelligence, investigation and inspection in both 
America and abroad. The objectives of 'Project Exodus' 
were essentially threefold2^: one was to stop the illegal 
flow of technology to the Soviet bloc and other 
"unfriendly nations". The second aim was to disrupt the 
flow of technology to the USSR. The third was to 
"intercept shipments" of goods being exported in 
violation of other U.S. sanctions and embargoes against 
nations like Libya and Cuba. William Von Raab,
commissioner of the U.S. customs service, emphasised the 
importance of distinguishing between 'critical 
technology' which represented "technological advances to 
the Soviet bloc", the curtailment of which would be 
essential from the point of view of achieving and 
maintaining military parity with the Soviet Union, and 
'high technology' which Moscow could manufacture itself 
but chose to obtain from the U.S. "in order to reduce 
costs and improve q u a l i t y " . Disrupting the flow of 
this type of technology would go some way in adversely 
affecting the "Soviet military c o m p l e x " . The objectives 
implicit in 'Operation Exodus' served to typify overall 
U.S. policy on technology tranfer to the Soviet Union 
which was based on increasingly restrictive criteria.
It was becoming evident that the Reagan 
administration would not hesitate to take unilateral 
steps to stop the transfer of technology to the Soviet
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Union even if it led to disagreements and a conflict of 
interests with its West European a l l i e s . ^2 This situation 
arose in June 19 82 during the dispute over the 
construction of a gas pipeline from Siberia to Western 
Europe. The sanctions imposed by Reagan over the events 
in Poland in December 1981 which included a ban on U.S. 
exports of equipment for the pipeline did in a way set 
the scene for the full-blown crisis over the issue which 
culminated in 1982.42 in June 1982 Reagan antagonised 
the allies by extending the pipeline sanctions to include 
exports of oil and gas equipment technology by foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. firms or by foreign firms holding 
U.S. l i c e n c e s . 4^: The Reagan administration made no
secret of the fact that it was dedicated to preventing 
construction of the pipeline as Secretary of Commerce 
Lawrence Brady pointed out in early 1982.45 American 
reservations about the proposed pipeline centred on the 
dangerous degree of dependence on the Soviet union that 
it would entail for Western Europe, and further when 
completed "would provide the Soviet Union with huge 
amounts of hard currency .... which in all likelihood 
will be used .... to acquire and exploit further Western 
technology for Soviet a i m s " . 42
United States legislation in the form of the Export 
Administration Act of 1979 was the basis by which the 
Americans sought to control technology exports to Soviet 
bloc and other 'unfriendly n a t i o n s ' . 47 Both U.S. 
unilateral and multilateral measures involved as their 
basis this Act which was renewed at various times
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throughout the 1980s amidst much domestic political i
debate. The primary aim of the act, which outlined the ;
fundamental reasoning behind U.S. export policy, 
particularly towards the Soviet bloc nations, was to 
restrict the the export of commodities and technology 
which make a significant contribution to the military 
capabilities of a country or countries which would prove 
harmful to American national security. Various sections 
of the act outlined measures which the President could 
take to curtail the export of technology. The Export 
Administration act (EA) as it stood in 197 9 did not 
adequately reflect the Reagan administration's policy on 
technology transfer since it appeared to be inclined more 
towards encouraging trade rather than retarding it, much 
to the concern of the Reagan administration who felt that 
this bias in favour of trade allowed certain high 
technology items to be diverted to the communist bloc.
Therefore in order "to improve the ability of the United 
States to curtail the flow of military relevant 
technology to the Soviet Union and her a l l i e s Reagan 
proposed somewhat controversial amendments to the act 
which was set to expire on September 30 1983.49 Reagan's 
proposals for major revisions to the EAact would create 
far tighter restrictions on technology exports to the 
Soviet bloc. Among the most important changes proposed 
were: tougher sanctions on individuals and companies that 
violate export regulations; controls on foreign based 
U.S. subsidiary companies with strict penalties for any 
company suspected of violating export controls. On April
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4 1983 as part of his proposed amendments to the EAact, 
Reagan asked Congress to allow him "to restrict imports 
from countries that sell to communist bloc nations in
violation of an American trade s a n c t i o n " , According to 
Assistant Undersecretary of State Richard Perle, Reagan's 
proposed legislation "would sharpen the distinction 
between critical and non-critical i t e m s t h u s  making it 
easier to export technology with little or no military 
applications, while at the same time making it more
difficult to sell technology that had important military 
uses. On September 30 1983, the Senate agreed to a 14
day extension to the EAact while the debate on proposed 
major revisions to the act went on. On October 14 Reagan 
invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
in order to continue the authorities of the EAact because 
Congress was still unable to agree on a new act. The 
deadlock continued and the Act was extended once again, 
this time to the end of February 1984. Finally on July 
12, 1985 a new version of the 1979 EAact was passed into
law. Some of the most important measures which this new 
revised version of the act provided for included: a
broadening of the range of punishable offences in cases 
where controls were breached and the granting of power to 
the President to block imports from the U.S. by any party 
which violated American security controls. The Department 
of Commerce and the U.S. customs service would share the 
task of drafting and enforcing guidelines on the export 
of sensitive technology. This new version of the EAact 
represented a victory for Reagan in the sense that most,
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if not all of Reagan's major proposals, first announced 
in 1983, were accepted as part of the new act.
As it stands today the EAact gives the American 
President the power to control exports for two main 
purposes; (i) to protect national s e c u r i t y ^ ^  _ commonly 
known as national security controls - under this the 
President can curtail the export of any goods and 
technology which would contribute to the military 
potential of any country; and (ii) to further 
significantly the foreign policy of the United States^^ _ 
commonly known as foreign policy controls - under which 
the President can restrict virtually any exports whether 
strategic or non-strategic. It was the foreign policy 
controls which often led to disagreements between America 
and its allies when the former attempted to apply the act 
in unison with its allies on a multilateral basis. The 
allies shared concern over technology transfer and were 
as a result more cooperative over national security 
controls.
The Reagan administration even illustrated a 
willingness to take unilateral measures to prevent non- 
COCOM, non-communist industrialized countries from 
diverting U.S. technology they had acquired to the Soviet 
Union. The U.S. applied increasing pressure on these 
countries after 1982 over the issue of technology 
exports. In March 1984, Reagan gave the Department of 
Defense advisory authority it had been seeking to stop 
"diversion to the Soviet Union of US high technology 
products exported to non-communist industrialized
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c o u n t r i e s 54 in one serious case in 1982, the United 
States government threatened to impose trade sanctions 
against Austria if it did not stop the transfer of 
military sensitive technology to the Soviet b l o c . 55 
Pentagon officials claimed that Austria was providing the 
base from which many Western companies were shipping 
sensitive high technology to Eastern Europe.
Overall, the United States concern centred on the 
use of non-cocom, non communist countries by business and 
smugglers to transport embargoed Western technology to 
the Soviet Union and its allies. This led, in early 
1985, to the compilation by the United States of a list 
of fifteen countries which were to be affected by the new 
procedures announced by Reagan in 19 84 giving the 
American Defense Department full advisory authority to 
review all licences for exports of high technology to 
these countries because of fears that they might be re­
exported to the Soviet bloc. Singapore, one of the 
nations on the list, held talks with the United States in 
August 1985 on ways to prevent the use of that country as 
a transit point for diverting high technology to the 
Eastern b l o c . 52 Sweden, another country on the list, 
took measures of its own which led to a ban on the re­
export of sensitive technology.
The Americans had always expressed some reservations 
about the commitment of some of its allies in COCOM in 
applying technology controls against the Warsaw Pact 
countries. Throughout the 1980s the Reagan administration 
constantly asked its West European allies to take more
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steps to curb technology exports to the USSR. Indeed 
this led in early 1984 to controversial proposals by the 
United States to limit certain technological sales to 
other Western countries including fellow COCOM members, 
which were not well received. The question of
sovereignty often arose, leading to a rift between 
America and its allies. But Reagan never appeared to 
refrain from taking controversial steps. In the case of 
the pipeline crisis of 1982 America applied sanctions 
against Western European companies in their home country 
for attempting to adhere to the terms of supply contracts 
in respect of the construction of the pipeline. This 
angered West European governments, who saw it as an 
attempt to enforce US law in foreign countries. 
Provisions in the US EAact requiring that foreign 
companies should seek permission from the American 
government before re-exporting U.S. high technology was 
another unilateral American measure which provoked much 
criticism in Western Europe. Such U.S. efforts to apply 
its own export controls extraterritorially were seen as 
unwarranted interference in the sovereignty of other 
nations, and thus a violation of international law.
Both Presidents Reagan and Carter, as William Root, 
director of the office of East-West trade (1976-83) 
revealed, were interested not only in controlling the 
transfer of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc but also 
"restricting the flow of knowledge" and information as 
w e l l . 5 7 The problem was that America being a free and 
open society allowed information about the development
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and manufacture of new technologies to be readily 
avialable. This plethora of information forms the basis 
from which new discoveries and inventions are made. Easy 
accessibility to it meant that the Soviet Union exploited 
it to learn Western developments in science and 
technology. This situation threatened to erode America's 
technological superiority. Thus the Reagan administration 
throughout the 1980s took measures to control the 
dissemination of vital information and technical know­
how. These included amendments to the EAact, to the 
Atomic Energy Act, and to the Invention Secrecy Act plus 
various national security directives (see Table 4.1).
President Reagan in particular was concerned about 
the transfer of scientific, technical and engineering 
information. In this connection the Reagan administration 
adopted the National Security Decision Directive 189 
which was announced at the White House on September 21, 
1985.52 The directive established American policy "for 
controlling the flow of science, technology, and 
engineering information in federally funded fundamental 
research at colleges, universities, and l a b o r a t o r i e s " . 5 9  
The directive went on to emphasize the importance of 
maintaining what it said was America's leadership 
position in science and technology. According to many, 
this directive was long overdue. Leading political 
figures such as Senator William Cohen(Maine) had during 
the 1982 hearings on transfer of technology to the Soviet 
bloc highlighted the problem of academic exchanges which 
although they could be mutually beneficial often
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contributed to possible damage to American national 
security.25 This was because the Soviets sent students 
on educational exchanges to study research in areas 
involving technologies in those fields "that have direct 
military applications and in which the Soviets are 
technologically d e f i c i e n t " . i n  September 17, 1984 the
White House had issued another directive Wo. 145 - the
aim of which was to protect unclassified information seen 
as particularly sensitive, and to protect information 
retrievable through databases.22 in a bid to control 
the dissemination of technical data, 1984 saw the passing 
of the Defense Authorization Act which had the 
""authority to withhold from public disclosure certain 
technical data" which has military or space application 
and was under the possession of the Defense Department 
"if such data may not be exported lawfully outside the 
United States without an approval, authorization, or 
licence under the Export Administration Act of 197 9 or 
the Arms Export Control Act".22 in 1982 Executive Order 
12356 was adopted prescribing "a uniform system for 
classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national 
security information".24 While acknowledging the
necessity of the public to be informed of what the 
government was doing, the Order stressed that "certain 
information concerning national defense and foreign 
relations be protected against unauthorized 
disclosure ", 25 in 1988 Congress amended the Invention 
Secrecy Act of 1951.22 Under this act the Patent and 
Trademark Office may take steps to prevent the spread of
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technical information by excercising its authority to 
place patent applications under secrecy orders.
Any move to control the conduct and results of 
scholarly research always raises new controversies about 
academic freedom, and the freedom of the academic 
community to conduct research without excessive 
government interference. It also attracted criticism 
from a wide section of society who saw the measures 
intended to control information as inhibiting future 
research in science and other fields by witholding data 
and information required for continuing and advancing 
technical and scientific reasearch. Thus the very base 
from which American advances in research are derived - 
the academic community and academic institutions - would 
be retarded by the denial of information of certain types 
of disclosure and dissemination. As the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies put it restricting
the academic and scientific communities' access to 
general information .... is as likely to hinder Western 
scientific breakthroughs as it is to deny those 
breakthroughs tp potential adversaries of the W e s t " . 27
B - MULTILATERAL MEASURES TO CONTROL THE TRANSFER OF 
TECHNQLBGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC
U.S. sponsored efforts to control the transfer of 
Western technology to the Soviet bloc centred around the 
activities of COCOM, membership of which comprised all 
the NATO countries (except Iceland), Japan and more 
recently Australia, which joined in 1989. Created in
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1949, COCOM's primary activity was to have its national 
delegations agree on a list of technologies and products 
they as individual nations would control in their trade 
with certain countries for reasons of national security. 
Proscribed destinations included the Warsaw Pact, and 
other communist countries such as China, North Korea and
Albania. COCOM members drew up three lists^^; the first
list covered munitions and included all military items. 
The second list was composed of atomic energy items, 
while the third list covered industrial or dual use 
items. Items on the third list were civilian items with 
potential military applications. These lists were not 
made public in the same way as the deliberations of COCOM 
meetings and decisions reached were kept confidential. 
Initially COCOM members reviewed the three control lists 
every three to four years. However, in 1985 they agreed 
to undertake a rolling review i.e. each year some parts 
of the list would be reviewed in order to keep the
control lists up to date in view of rapid advances in 
technology. During the review of lists member states put 
forward proposals for additions or deletions to the 
various lists. These proposals were then sent to the 
national delegations in Paris (where COCOM was based) 
where negotiations were conducted on each item. Any 
changes to the items on a list required the unanimous
consent of member states.
Only through adopting a much wider forum than COCOM 
provided could the United States realistically expect to 
excercise effective control over certain technologies.
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As director of office of East-West trade William Root
(until his resignation in 1983) stressed "multilateral 
cooperation has become essential to effective security 
controls. The United States is no longer a unique
supplier of most high technology
There were also summit meetings of the Western
alliance NATO, which addressed the problems posed by the 
transfer of technology, and decided on steps that the 
allies would take in their attempts to counteract the 
problem through the COCOM mechanism or in conjunction 
with COCOM.
The 198 0s was to prove a period of hectic and 
intense activity for COCOM, with the Americans not
surprisingly taking on the leading role always 
encouraging and urging its allies in COCOM to do more. 
The United States took it upon itself to provide the lead 
for a hardening of strategic exports policies towards the 
USSR.
As early as 1980 following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, COCOM adopted a "no exceptions" policy on 
trade with the USSR, which meant in practice that the22 
Soviets would be denied exports of highly advanced 
Western technology even for civilian applications. Under 
the agreement between COCOM members, a country or 
countries could seek exemptions from particular items on 
the COCOM embargoed list thus allowing them to export 
these items to the Soviet bloc as e x c e p t i o n s . I n  the 
late 1970s COCOM became rather lax in enforcing strategic 
controls and many Western countries including the United
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States itself began to conduct deals with the Soviet 
Union on the basis of exemptions.
However, the events in Afghanistan and the renewed 
concern over technology transfer prompted the United 
States to revitalize COCOM, and tighten export
controls. On March 19, 1980 a commerce department
official said that "the administration would seek few if 
any exemptions from COCOM controls in the future". 
Similarly, earlier in January 1980, Deputy Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher, speaking in Brussels where he 
was attending a NATO meeting to discuss a unified
response to the Soviet intervention of Afghanistan, 
reported that agreement had been reached that the COCOM 
list "should be made tighter and be more stringently 
applied with far fewer exceptions than in the recent 
period of indulgence".
When Reagan assumed the Presidency in 1981 he was 
determined to make COCOM the centre of his efforts to 
enforce his policy on technology transfer to the Soviet 
bloc, realising the importance of allied cooperation on 
the matter. At the Ottawa Summit in July 19 81 Reagan 
appealed to the allies to do more to curb transfers of 
Western technology to the Soviet Union. The result of 
this was the first top level meeting of COCOM in twenty 
five years. It took place on January 19-20, 1982 in
Paris. The central aim of the meeting was to improve
export controls on high technology. The Americans put 
forward a number of proposals such as strict enforcement 
of the embargo on the sale of critical technologies
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embodying advanced computers, fibre optics, and some
other items, and abolishing the 'exceptions' system which 
allowed member countries to export embargoed goods to the 
Soviet Union. In the end the COCOM members agreed on the 
need to update the list of prohibited items to include
new technologies.^^ On October 4-5, 1982 another COCOM
meeting was held at which the body agreed to review the 
existing embargo list (a study which was completed by 
mid-1984) , as it was required to do every three to four 
years. The meeting saw the United States call, yet 
again, for tougher restrictions on technology exports to 
the Soviet bloc. This was expected because earlier 
before the meeting the United States was reported to have 
proposed more than one hundred changes including many
additions to the COCOM control list.^^ America also 
pressed for a strengthening of COCOM through an increase 
in its budget, and an expansion of its enforcement 
capabilities. However, American attempts to establish a 
permanent subcommittee to assist the working of COCOM was 
rejected by leading allies such as France and West 
Germany. On December 9-10, 1982 a meeting of NATO
foreign ministers discussed East-West t r a d e . A  
communique issued after the meeting stated that trade 
with the East would contribute to "constructive East-West 
relations" as long as technology exports did not endanger 
Western security.
The third COCOM meeting in less than sixteen months 
took place on April 28-29, 1983. At this meeting the
member states agreed to about only half of the proposals
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put forward by America in February, calling for tight 
restrictions on the transfer of oil and gas equipment to 
the Soviet bloc. A statement issued at the end of the 
meeting revealed that it had not achieved much by way of 
new initiatives except agreement that the joint system of 
checking sensitive technology exports should be effective 
as possibe and continually adapted to developments in 
technology and equipment.
On December 30 1983 COCOM members agreed to embargo 
silicon and silicon making equipment to the Soviet bloc^^ 
in what was seen as a major boost to the coordinated 
allied effort since Moscow was said to be dependent on 
imports of silicon, and the decision was set to hamper 
the USSR's plan for military modernization. This 
agreement was in addition to an announcement that more 
funding and new equipment would be available for COCOM.
At the COCOM meeting on July 12 1984 changes were
revealed to the organisation's list of restricted items 
following the review of the list which the committee had 
undertaken at its October 1982 m e e t i n g . T h e  agreement 
reached provided for, amongst other things, sweeping 
changes to controls on the export of computers including 
an embargo on the sale of portable microcomputers ; and 
the first ever controls on software.
Reagan's second term of office saw a continuation of 
COCOM's now familiar and regular meetings. The
organisation met again on February 6-7 19 85 and
"expressed general satisfaction with the way controls on 
exports of sensitive technology to Soviet bloc countries
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have been coordinated" and on the "updating of the lists 
of controlled products and technology". The meeting
also decided that one third of the embargo list would be 
updated each year instead of a full review of the list 
every three to four years. Later on February 26, COCOM 
issued guidelines which appeared to be more liberal than 
previous arrangements.®^ In June 1985 COCOM drew up new 
rules which represented "a mixture of tightening and 
relaxation" of c o n t r o l s . The new guidelines allowed 
computers with slow processing speeds to be exported 
while more advanced computers which could be used for the 
manufacture of microchips would be subject to continued 
restrictions. But America and its allies stressed that 
the overall controls of the committee were still heavily 
tilted towards restricting the export of equipment to the 
Soviet bloc which had military uses.
The next major COCOM meeting took place in 
Versailles on 27-2 8 January 1988 at which the member 
states agreed to tighten controls on the export of 
sensitive technology.®^ This was much to the relief of 
the United States which had expressed its anxiety that 
"its allies were becoming lax in monitoring exports" of 
high technology to Soviet bloc nations. The meeting 
actually reduced the number of high technology items 
banned for sale to communist countries on the basis that 
they were widely available (the concept of foreign 
availability), but tightened controls on products 
remaining on the list, and agreed to strengthen 
enforcement procedures.
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Quite often COCOM sessions revealed disagreements 
between the United States - the most hardline member of 
the organistazion - and its major West European allies, 
particularly France, West Germany and Britain. The 
fundamental problem was that America was keen to tighten 
controls on the transfer of sensitive goods whereas many 
West European nations were concerned about the possible 
damage to their economic relations with Eastern Europe, 
which in some cases were very substantial. They believed 
that at times the U.S. went too far by wanting to ban 
technology items which often had very limited or no 
military significance. What they wanted was a fair 
balance between strategic and commercial interests. 
Furthermore the Europeans were more willing to propose a 
relaxation of export controls®® as a reward for good 
Soviet behaviour and internal reforms in the Soviet bloc. 
The United States continued to resist this 'carrot' 
approach. In February 1988 U.S. Defense Secretary Frank 
Carlucci rejected West European appeals that controls on 
the export of high technology to the Soviet Union be 
loosened in response to Soviet progress on reforms and in 
the field of disarmament.
Towards the end of February 1988 COCOM issued tough 
new controls on the export of advanced technology to the 
Soviet Union.®^ Heading the list of embargoed products 
was equipment for building nuclear submarines followed by 
a wide range of advanced electronic equipment with 
possible military applications. A further meeting of 
COCOM on 25-2 7 October 1988 recommended the speeding up
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of the streamlining of high technology especially machine 
tool exports to the Soviet bloc.®®
Despite the fact that COCOM was a multilateral body 
with all countries in theory having an equal say the 
general view throughout the 1980s was that the United 
States virtually ran the show, using COCOM to impose 
stringent controls on technology trade to the Soviet 
bloc. Most of the initiatives and proposals put forward 
at meetings came from Washington, the leading player, and 
only really enthusiastic member of COCOM.
In addition to working in conjunction with its NATO 
allies, the United States even devised a system by which 
it prevented neutral countries from re-exporting Western 
as well as their own technology to Eastern Europe. This 
saw the United States working together with various 
groups in the countries concerned. An article in the 
Times®^ reported the existence of a number of diverse 
organisations such as the Irish Government's export 
control delegation, the Swedish industrialists' group, 
the Swiss ministry of defence, and South Korean business 
groups who attended meetings with American defence 
officials. Officials in the United States claimed that 
the American government placed no pressure on these 
countries but simply reminded them that if they 
transferred high technology to the USSR, which was on the 
U.S. and COCOM list of banned technologies, they would 
not receive any more American technology in future. In 
November 1983 it was revealed that America in conjunction 
with the authorities of Sweden, West Germany and South
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Africa had foiled a well organised illegal operation by- 
Soviet agents to "acquire key components of a U.S. 
produced VAX computer system used in missile guidance"/®®
SECTION C
AMERICAN UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO 
CONTROL THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET 
BLOC - SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
If one considers the success of U.S. efforts to stem 
Western technology flows to the Soviet bloc, it would be 
fair to say that the results were for the most part 
unsatisfactory (from a U.S. perspective) or even dismal. 
A number of factors provide proof that U.S. and Western 
efforts to thwart the diversion of technology to the 
Soviet bloc had been for the most part a failure. On the 
whole the United States and its allies had been unable to 
prevent the Soviet bloc from acquiring a signiicant
amount of technology which had been subject to controls, 
and from effectively enforcing the strategic controls 
that were already in place.
To begin with, the United States was unable to forge 
an effective partnership with its allies. COCOM, which
had been established for the purpose of overseeing the 
multilateral control of strategic exports to communist
countries, turned out in many ways to be an ineffective 
regime. Probably the most basic problem with COCOM was 
that the organisation had no treaty status, no formal 
enforcement mechanism, and no system of imposing
sanctions against violators of its controls. Instead
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member governments had the task of administering and 
enforcing agreed upon restrictions through their own laws 
and procedures. This made COCOM's task very difficult 
and the system of control weak because some member states 
interpreted the control list more liberally while others 
(particularly the United States) took a more restrictive 
approach, enforcing controls more actively. This
"inconsistent application of COCOM controls by various 
member nations" coupled with the suspicion "that COCOM 
controls are applied unfairly88 because the process is 
surrounded by excessive secrecy"®^ was at the heart of 
the organisation's problems in the 1980s.
COCOM was further beset by disagreements and 
differences between primarily the United States and its 
Western European allies. Arguments centred around
exactly just what to include on the embargo lists. This 
situation arose when COCOM decided to review the existing 
embargo list in October 1982. In many ways American- 
European differences within COCOM stemmed from their 
differing attitude towards the issue of trade with the 
Soviet bloc. The United States was keen to extend the 
control lists to include items whose military relevance 
could not be precisely verified, and thus wanted to 
include even civilian technologies whose military use had 
not been demonstrated. The European allies opposed this 
expansion of COCOM criteria beyond the currently accepted 
standard of military relevance because of the adverse 
effect on East-West trade. Many West European countries 
had (and still have) strong trade links with Eastern
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Europe, and while they were appreciative and aware of 
Western security interests they also believed that there 
was something to be gained from a policy of economic 
detente towards the Soviet bloc.
It has to be remembered that COCOM was revived
largely at the initiative of te United States, which
often put stringent and at times unacceptable proposals
on the table. Some Western countries such as Holland and
Belgium were reported not even to be very enthusiastic 
9 9about COCOM.^ These countries were happy to go along as
members on an informal basis and rejected calls from
Washington to create a formal international organisation, 
possibly under the NATO umbrella. To add to the problems 
facing the American effort to curb the transfer of 
critical technology to the communist countries, COCOM was 
in need of modernization. The organization, as Richard
Perle pointed out, had an operating budget of less than 
$500,000, lacked modern offices, adequate staff and "more 
significantly COCOM has no systematic way of evaluating 
proposed transfers of technology in the light of the 
strategic criteria it is supposed to apply These
problems meant that the organisation was unable to carry 
out its task effectively and many items on the banned
list found their way to the Soviet Union and other 
communist countries.
Evidence that technology on the COCOM control lists 
had indeed reached the Soviet bloc were confirmed by 
various reports during the 1980s. On September 18, 1985,
the U.S. Defense Department released a report accusing
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Moscow of a "massive well organized campaign" to acquire 
Western technology.®^ It went on to say that about 70 
per cent of military hardware obtained by Moscow was 
export controlled, embargoed, classified or under some 
control by Western governments.
American efforts to control technology transfer to 
the Soviet Union were also hampered by the fact some of 
the strategic items were widely available in neutral and 
non-COCOM nations which were less affected by security 
concerns and thus more likely to take a lax approach to 
any diversion of sensitive technology to the Soviet 
Union. Indeed there were reports of countries such as 
Austria and Sweden providing an outlet for the illegal or 
legal diversion of strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. 
In fact there were even rumours, which appeared to be 
substantiated by much evidence, of violations of COCOM 
rules by companies based in COCOM member states like 
France, West Germany and Italy. The U.S. State
Department often accused Western corporations of 
involvement in Soviet attempts to acquire high 
technology. A report published in the Times said that 
banned exports had made their way into East European 
countries like Poland via the Far East.®® At a fair in 
Warsaw many Polish firms displayed sophisticated hardware 
which it "would not have had access under COCOM's rigid 
export control system".®® This highlighted the growing 
problems the Americans found in their attempts to prevent 
non-COCOM countries from re-exporting Western technology 
and some of their own to the Soviet bloc.
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Deficiencies in the USA's own unilateral control 
system and enforcement mechanism allowed banned items to 
find their way into Soviet bloc countries. The U.S. 
commerce department came under increasing criticism 
throughout the 1980s for making "an inadequate commitment 
of resources and moral support to the task of controlling 
U.S. technology" because it was said to be more 
interested in promoting t r a d e . I n  a report based on 
investigations by the Senate subcommitee, and hearings 
into the effectiveness of the executive branch in 
enforcing export controls, it was noted with much concern 
that "advanced American microelectronics, laser, radar 
and precision manufacturing technologies" have been 
obtained by the Soviets "enabling them to make great 
strides in military strength ....".®® In 1987 in a 
report which provoked much controversy in America, the 
U.S. National Academy of Sciences vehemently criticised 
the Reagan administration's attempts to curtail high 
technology exports to the Soviet Union. The findings 
which were compiled by former defence and intelligence 
officials deduced that "the administration's much 
publicized efforts to crack down on the diversion of 
technology has largely failed at a cost, of more than 
$9billion a year to the U.S. economy".®® The same panel 
of former defence and intelligence personnel had claimed 
in a report in 1982 that there had been "a substantial 
and serious" transfer of advanced technology from the USA 
and other non-communist countries to the Soviet bloc. 
Many articles claimed that the United States had indeed
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been "... the source of many of the most damaging 
technological leakages".^®®
Probably the single apparent violation of America's 
policy of restricting technology to the Soviet bloc 
nations came from the numerous reported cases of illegal 
shipments of banned technologies by companies, 
individuals and the Soviet KGB, which only served to 
highlight the flaws and loopholes present in the American 
unilateral and multilateral system for controlling and 
Scoordinating technology exports.
In 1988 the government of Japan and Norway admitted 
that companies in their countries - Toshiba and Kongsberg 
had exported hi-tech computer and manufacturing 
equipment which had ended up in the Soviet Union.^®^ 
More specifically these companies had provided the 
equipment to manufacture submarine propellers so that 
Russian submarines would run more quietly and be harder 
to detect. This would mean that NATO listening devices 
on patrol which could previously hear Russian submarines 
at a range of 2 00 miles would now only be able to hear 
them within a range of about 10 miles.^®®
In December 1988 a Dutch national was arrested and 
charged with the illegal export of high powered computers 
to East European countries.^®® He was said to be part of 
a operation involving some 12 U.S. and West European 
companies and a number of other individuals.
Articles in the American newspaper, the New York 
Times in July 1983 traced an upsurge in KGB espionage 
activities in Western Europe. One article claimed that
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the KGB had entered a "phase of aggressiveness in its 
a c t i v i t i e s A  second article published on July 25 
said that "every year Western technology with military 
applications worth millions of dollars" disappeared 
beyond the borders of the Soviet Union and its allies.^®® 
It. went on and stressed that the KGB had intensified its 
programme for acquiring technology with a massive input 
of manpower since the 1970s. The Russians were said to 
have scored a number of notable success by acquiring 
items such as advanced computers, lasers and missile 
guidance subsystems. In 1985 West Germany announced that 
it had acquired a Soviet directory ordering secret agents 
to obtain Western technology and information, with top 
priority on radar and rocket technology, anti-submarine 
systems, and missile guidance systems.^®® A U.S. 
official claimed that Soviet agents working outside the
USSR had acquired Western technology for the Soviet 
military which had enabled Moscow to improve the accuracy 
of its ICBM's (intercontinental ballistic missiles).
Although the results were largely negative, the 
American drive to stop the flow of military technology to 
Eastern Europe also scored some notable successes.
According to a U.S. Defense Department report released on 
September 18 1985 Western efforts to stem the flow of
military technology had made Soviet acquisitions "more 
difficult and costly than at any time in the past".^®^ 
Not surprisingly it was costing Moscow much more to 
acquire Western technology through illegal means. In
1988, the U.S. customs service broke up one of the
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largest international high technology smuggling 
operations involving the illegal export of high powered, 
computers to the Soviet bloc countries.
Overall, from the evidence before U.S. it would be 
fair to say that the failures outweighed the successes by 
a considerable margin.
CONCLUSIONS
The deterioration in the superpower relationship at 
the start of 1980 led to a rethinking in America on many 
aspects of the Soviet-American relationship. One of 
these was the question of technology transfer to the USSR 
and its allies. Throughout the 1970s and particularly 
during the heyday of detente liberal American policies on 
both strategic and non-strategic trade to the Soviet 
Union had allowed a substantial export of military 
sensitive technology to the East. Over enthusiasm to 
maintain peaceful and friendly nations with Moscow meant 
that the West underestimated the later repercussions of 
this rather lax approach to trade with the Soviet Union. 
COCOM - the multilateral body established for controlling 
technology exports-had virtually become obsolete (indeed 
it was formally disbanded on March 31, 1994) , and the
trend within the organisation was one tilted more towards 
trade promotion rather than the curtailment of strategic 
trade with military applications. This was witnessed by 
the fact that in 19 79 alone it was reported that around 
1500 Western deals with the USSR were exempted from COCOM
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controls with the United States topping the list of COCOM 
countries that used the exceptions procedure.^®®
As detente collapsed and the Soviets revealed their 
true colours at the start of the 1980s, American policy 
drastically hardened on the issue of technology trade 
with the Soviet bloc. Carter first set the tone in 1980, 
in what became a concerted U.S. effort to deprive Moscow 
and its satellite states, American and Western
technology. The new administration which took office 
under Reagan in 1981 inherited Carter's stringent policy 
on technology transfer, and soon adopted it believing it 
to be a vital element if the United States was to
challenge the Soviet threat with any real purpose.
Many unilateral steps were taken by Reagan but the
President, acknowledging that the United States no longer 
enjoyed monopoly status on sophisticated technology with 
military relevance, enlisted the help of major allies in 
Western Europe by reviving the now defunct coordinating 
committee on strategic export controls (COCOM). Under 
American hegemony and pressure COCOM met frequently and 
adopted a restrictive role towards the export of 
strategic items to communist nations during the 1980s, 
reflecting the central premises of American policy on 
the issue.8
However, a combination of factors rendered U.S. 
multilateral and unilateral measures virtually useless. 
On the unilateral front departments such as the Commerce 
Department failed to comply with policy regulations which 
had given them responsibility for implementing measures
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to control the transfer of technology because of pro­
trade tendencies prevalent in the department. Indeed many 
political figures were unhappy at the direction of 
administration policy on the issue and in 1983 William 
Root President of the Office of East-West Trade resigned 
criticising American policy on trade with the Soviet bloc 
countries.
On the multilateral front COCOM proved to be an 
ineffective regulatory regime for the management of 
strategic export policy towards the Soviet bloc nations. 
There proved to be a lack of whole hearted commitment on 
the part of many COCOM countries which were unimpressed 
by American hardline tactics to include almost all types 
of technologies including those with little military 
relevance on the embargo list, and were more concerned 
about the potential damage to their trade with Eastern 
Europe.
To add to the problems facing America in its quest 
to prevent Moscow and its allies from obtaining Western 
technology, the Soviets had devised a highly intricate 
and complex web of clandestine activities through its KGB 
agents operating in Western Europe, many under the 
sanctuary of embassies and protected by diplomatic 
immunity. What didn't help was the activities of 
individuals and businesses in the West and other 
countries which allowed a considerable consignment of 
illegal technology to be shipped East. As Dr. Bryen, 
director of the US defense technology security
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administration during the 1980s, put it quite simply 
"technology is a saleable commodity".^®®
Although there were many reported instances of the 
seizure of technology destined for the Soviet bloc,and
the break up of major international smuggling networks 
this was usually after the damage had already been 
inflicted, and technologies had already reached their 
destination on the other side of the 'Iron curtain'. The 
success stories were far and few and virtually irrelevant 
in the context of the harm already done. The analysis in 
this chapter has shown that the school of thought
illustrated by Bruce Parrott was correct. Parrott
concluded that trade pressure in the form of technology 
denial is not usually successful, as in the case of 
American strategic trade pressure on the Soviet Union. 
We have seen that this indeed was largely the case during 
the years 1980 to 1988.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSESSING THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF AMERICAN 
TRADE PRESSURE 1; SOVIET POLICY ON HUMAN RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
We now come to the wider question of whether United 
States trade pressure on the Soviet Union actually
achieved its declared political purpose.^ The prime
objective of American trade pressure was to impose
economic costs on Moscow by denying the Soviets the 
benefits of trade, to such an extent that it would over a 
period of time influence the Soviet Union to change its 
behaviour in areas identified by the United States
government, namely Soviet policy on human rights, and 
Moscow's direct and indirect involvement in the Third 
World (which will be the subject of the next chapter).
Trade pressure employed by Carter in his final year, 
and then by the Reagan administration, was at its most 
stringent during the years 1980-84 (see Chapters 4 and 
5) . There were already other US measures such as the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment® which had been in place since 
the 19 7 0s.
It has to be remembered there is a time lag between 
when a policy is implemented or takes shape, and its 
results or effectiveness, which can only by judged over a 
period of years. In this case one can realistically 
assess the results of US trade pressure at its peak 
during the years 1980-84, in the period 1985-88 by which 
time the policy had been firmly established and had been
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in operation for a number of years to see if it had 
indeed had any impact on the relevant areas of Soviet 
behaviour which were the target of American trade 
pressure. Therefore, using the period 1985-88 as a 
benchmark for judging Soviet compliance with U.S. 
objectives is an ideal base as it allows as assessment of 
Soviet behaviour over a number of years rather than just 
one or two.
In view of all this, the chapter again will be 
divided into two sections. Section one will restate the 
political objectives of American trade pressure. In 
other words what the Americans specified during the 
period 1980-84 as what they were looking for in terms of 
changes in Soviet behaviour, and in what areas. In order 
to know whether US trade pressure achieved its political 
purpose it is necessary to define precisely what the 
objectives were as publicly stated. Section two will 
concentrate on the question of Soviet performance on 
human rights. Part a of this section will concentrate on 
the issue of dissent. Part b will continue on the theme 
of human rights but with the focus of attention shifting 
to the issue of emigration, in particular Jewish 
emigration.
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SECTION 1 : US TRADE PRESSURE - RESTATING THE 
POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
The use of trade pressure for political aims was not 
a new phenomenon in American - Soviet relations during 
the 1980s. Indeed as was seen in the previous chapter, 
COCOM was set up in 1949 to regulate Western exports to 
the communist countries. Then in 1975 there was the 
passing of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which made the 
granting of most favoured nation status conditional on 
the liberalisation of emigration policies in the Soviet 
Union. Throughout the early 1980s the United States 
government made clear the areas in which it was looking 
for changes with regard to Soviet domestic and 
international behaviour. These were the very issue areas 
which had been contributing to a souring of Soviet- 
American relations since the turn of 1980.
The first of these issues was the Soviet record on 
human rights (the second being Soviet involvement in the 
third world, which will be the subject of the next 
chapter). On numerous occasions and at various 
international forums the United States expressed its 
dismay at what it saw as the abysmal Soviet record on the 
issue. Human rights were and has always been an issue 
close to America^ since the principles of freedom and 
democracy form the basis of US society, and on which US 
society was founded. It is hardly surprising that given 
the contrasting ideologies of communism and capitalism, 
which entailed differing conceptions of human rights, the 
issue was always one of the most contentious in the
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superpower relationship. For the United States the more 
traditional concept of human rights covering what are 
known as political rights have generally had precedence 
over the more modern concept which includes economic and 
social rights. On the other hand the USSR in line with 
Marxist conceptions of democracy placed more emphasis on 
social and economic rights believing them to be more 
important than political rights, which were severely 
restricted.^ A common argument employed by Moscow to 
counteract Western criticism of its human rights policy 
was to in turn censure the West for failing to provide 
adequate economic and social rights for its own citizens.
However, on the basis of the adoption of 
international standards on human rights, and through 
various international forums involving the participation 
of European states including the USSR, the United States 
found a pretext to question Soviet policy on human rights 
in terms of Moscow not living up to its commitments. 
Indeed the central American concern was that the USSR had 
not complied with the terms of international agreements 
to which it was a signatory. The Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Helsinki Final 
Act^ were a product of the period of detente in the 
1970s during when the developing dialogue between East 
and West allowed the latter, and particularly America, to 
air its concern over issues such as human rights and gave 
them an ideal opportunity to bring such issues to the 
forefront. In effect by participating in the Helsinki 
process and in the CSCE the Soviets had acknowledged the
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force of Western definitions of human rights, and had 
assumed responsibility for establishing such rights in 
the Soviet Union. The West saw CSCE as a broad 
multilateral negotiating process aimed at not only 
lessening East-West tension but gradually encouraging the 
possibility for development of freedom and democracy (as 
they defined them) in Eastern Europe. The United States 
was keen to emphasize to Moscow the importance of the 
Helsinki process and the CSCE, in particular basket 111 
dealing with "cooperation in humanitarian and other 
fields".G Washington stressed to Moscow the letter's 
obligation to meet its requirements.
As Under Secretary of state for Security Assistance 
Science and Technology, US Department of State, Matthew 
Nimetz pointed out, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 drew 
"a number of Western principles concerning human rights 
.... into the fabric of the East-West dialogue, 
establishing the performance of signatories on human 
rights issues as a legitimate topic for international 
discussion".^ He went on to stress that the human rights 
situation in the Soviet Union was giving considerable 
cause for concern with little movement "to resolve long 
standing cases involving human rights spokesmen and 
prisoners of conscience".^
In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in 1983, on "US-Soviet relations in the context 
of US foreign policy", Secretary of state George Shultz 
stated that amongst other things the United States would
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be seeking an "improvement in Soviet performance on human 
rights".^
In an address on East-West relations delivered at 
Eureka college (Illinois) on May 9 1982, Reagan
criticised the Soviet Union for not relaxing "its hold on 
its own people ..." despite being a signatory to the
Helsinki agreements on human rights. He went on to say 
that America would be willing to respond with an
expansion of trade with Moscow but this would depend on 
Soviet actions.
Further evidence that the United States under the 
Reagan administration envisaged a connection between the 
trade and political aspects of US-Soviet relations could 
be seen in former president Richard Nixon's statement
that trade and political issues were inexorably linked. 
"For the United States to increase trade ... at a time 
when they (the Soviets) are engaging in political 
activities that are opposed to our interests would be 
stupid and dangerous
The questions of dissent and freedom of emigration 
were top of the American agenda of human rights concerns.
Dissent or the expression of one's disagreement with 
the state, openly or publicly for political, religious, 
economic, cultural, national, ideological, or any other 
reason was sharply curtailed in a one party state like 
the USSR.^^ Dissidents expressing their views openly 
found themselves in conflict with the state, with the 
authorities taking measures to punish and bring into line 
human rights activists, and dissidents.
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The treatment of dissidents came under severe 
American criticism before and during the Reagan 
administration's terms of office. In its annual report 
to Congress on human rights practices in 1979 the 
American State Department noted a continuing mistreatment 
of prisoners, harsh conditions in prison, and the 
subjection of political prisoners to interrogation and 
psychological pressure, including threats against their 
f a m i l i e s . I n  its report for 1980, the State Department 
illustrated what it saw as increased repression at home, 
with a crack-down on human rights activities seen as more 
severe than ever b e f o r e . N o  improvement was seen in 
the following year or in 1 9 8 2 . Instead the use of 
powerful drugs against political dissidents who had been 
admitted to Soviet psychiatric hospitals was noted. The 
State Department's survey for 1983 concluded that 
Moscow's performance in the field of human rights had 
fallen far short of acceptable international standards.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s many prominent 
dissidents were sent into internal exile and labour 
camps. The plight of well known activists such as Yuri 
Orlov, Anatoly Scharansky, and Andrei Sakharov was 
highlighted by the West. Many Jews who formed a 
considerable proportion of the most outspoken activists 
suffered severe repression on top of the fact that many 
were denied the right to emigrate. Unofficial groups such 
as the Helsinki Group attempting to monitor Soviet 
compliance with the human rights provisions of the Final 
Act were also hit hard by Soviet repression. Many
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members of such groups were arrested and then imprisoned. 
Some were sent into exile and many were even reported 
missing.
The other area of human rights of most concern to 
the United States was the question of Jewish emigration. 
The treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union, in particular 
the Soviet authorities denying them the right to 
emigrate, was a major topic of c o n c e r n . Although there 
were other ethnic groups such as Germans and Armenians 
who also wished to emigrate, it was the plight of Soviet 
Jews which attracted most concern because of the United 
States' historic friendship with Israel and the pressure 
of a large Jewish community in America with significant 
financial and political clout. Therefore American 
concern on emigration was concentrated largely on the 
state of Jews, and such concern was often relayed to 
Soviet leaders.
As in the case of political dissent the Soviet 
authorities had once again failed to live up to their 
international commitments. By refusing emigration to 
hundreds of thousands of Jews, Moscow had shown an 
unwillingness to implement Basket 111 of the Helsinki 
process which included provisions calling for the free 
mobility of the populations of Europe and other civil 
liberties. The denial of emigration also entailed failure 
to comply with the concluding document of the Madrid 
meeting (the Madrid Conference which ran from September 
1980 to July 1983) which called for the participating 
states to deal favourably with applications "relating to
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contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family 
ties, reunification of families.
For their part the Soviet authorities always denied 
that there existed any mass desire for emigration. 
Instead they claimed that Jews remained an integral part 
of Soviet s o c i e t y . The reality however was very
different. Not only was there a mass desire to leave,
the Soviet authorities used various tactics such as: 
harassment of those applying to leave by KGB agents,* a 
cumbersome and time consuming application procedure with 
applications being " . . . . snagged by bureaucratic 
technicalities".2^ Confiscation of invitations to leave 
through the process of interfering with private mail was 
also used to block potential emigres from acquiring exit 
v i s a s . 22 In addition refuseniks - those refused visas - 
were subjected to various forms of harassment and ill 
treatment.22 The policy of intimidation against Jews 
wanting to emigrate was linked to the general upward
trend in anti-semitism in the USSR in the early 1980s. 
Andropov's policy in this respect was seen as
particularly hostile towards Jews, evoking memories of 
"the Nazi era and of Stalin's last d a y s " . 24 This 
culminated in 1983 in the formation of the anti-Zionist 
Committee of the Soviet Public which denied that there 
had been any curb on Jewish emigration, and linked
Zionism to N a z i s m . 25
While Jewish emigration had peaked in 197 9 there was 
a steady decline thereafter with the lowest figure since 
1971 attained in 1984,25 The continued denial of exit
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visas for thousands of Jews wanting to emigrate led to 
the presence of many refuseniks in the USSR. As Senator 
D ' Amato of New York put it during the hearing and markup 
before the subcommittee on human rights in 1983 "....
getting out remains one of the most difficult tasks for 
Jews in the Soviet U n i o n " .  i n  a statement by the 
Assistant Secretary of State, Elliot Abrams, it was noted 
that "the US Government is deeply concerned about the 
severe downturn in emigration, and the issue is being 
raised with the Soviets at every appropriate
opportunity, both in public forums such as the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and in 
bilateral talks" . 28 He went on and stated that the US 
would in the short run try to help "as many individuals" 
as possible, "limit discriminatory practices, and obtain 
freer emigration".2^
During the period 1980-84 the human rights 
organisation Amnesty International in its annual reports 
noted continued repression of those attempting to leave 
the USSR. In 1982 Amnesty International noted the 
imprisonment of eight Jews who had been campaigning for 
the right to l e a v e . The same organisation noted that 
in 1983 the authorities had continued their prosecution 
and imprisonment of citizens "who sought to exercise 
their right to leave the country".21
This section has pin-pointed the areas in which the 
United States was seeking what it regarded as 
improvements from the Soviet Union. The section also 
gives a brief account of actual Soviet practices in the
221
issues concerned in order to illustrate that there was 
indeed shortcomings or problems with Moscow's behaviour 
in these areas which needed to be rectified and the aim 
of US trade pressure was to do just that. In the case of 
Soviet human rights practices, Washington was looking for 
a substantial improvement so that Soviet practices would 
fall in line with internationally accepted standards. In 
addition Washington was seeking greater tolerance of 
dissent by the Soviet authorities, and an end to the 
repression of dissidents, who were engaged in the type of 
activities that would pose no problem in the Western 
world. On top of all this America wanted Moscow to grant 
Soviet Jews the right to emigrate by greatly liberalizing 
its policy of restricting the freedom of movement.
SECTION 2 - THE EFFECT OF UNITED STATES TRADE PRESSURE ON SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
This section will now analyze whether the 
application of trade pressure achieved the first of its 
political objectives of inducing a modification for the 
better in Soviet behaviour in the area of human rights as 
defined by Washington. Reports from various international 
organisations and bodies monitoring the progress of human 
rights worldwide, plus the work of the U.S. government 
itself, as well as official pronouncements emanating from 
Washington, provide a useful yardstick for assessing any 
changes in Moscow's human rights performance over the 
period 1985-88. Part one of this section will concentrate 
on dissent, the other on the question of Jewish 
emigration. An important question which one must bear in
222
mind is whether any changes were real and fundamental or 
just cosmetic.
A; DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION 1985-1988
Open criticism of the political, economic,
ideological or moral foundations on which Soviet society 
rested had always been severely repressed. The 1970s in
particular saw a rise in dissident activity largely in
response to the increased violation of human rights by 
the Soviet authorities. The emergence of dissident 
m o v e m e n t s ^ 2 invited a severe crack-down by the
authorities characterised by full scale repression of 
human rights activists which continued throughout the 
early 1980s. The limits of permissible dissent were 
narrow in the Soviet Union at this time.
What we are interested in now is to see whether in 
the period 1985-1988 there was any improvement in the 
conduct of Soviet policy on dissent, and whether the 
Soviets were willing to expand the limits of permissible 
dissent by easing restrictions on dissident activities, 
and allowing more freedom of expression and criticism of 
the Soviet system. Also to what extent did Moscow take 
measures to free political prisoners and improve the 
treatment of such prisoners being held? Was the scope of 
political rights and civil liberties available to Soviet 
citizens expanded in response to Western pressure or 
other factors?
If we begin with the question of the imprisonment of 
individuals on political grounds we will find that during
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the years 1985-88 the situation remained the same as that 
which prevailed prior to 1985, with many reported cases 
of imprisonment on political charges. While it is true 
that the actual number of political prisoners held in the 
Soviet Union decreased considerably during 1985 to 1988, 
in comparison with 1980-84, this can hardly be regarded 
as a significant change in Soviet policy since the 
imprisonment of any number of such individuals is 
unacceptable on the basis of the generally accepted 
standards laid down by international law. After all such 
prisoners have not committed a criminal offence (in the 
usual sense of the term such as murder, burglary, assault 
etc.) but have simply exercised in a non-violent manner 
their civil and political rights, including their freedom 
of conscience, expression, and speech.
Under various articles of Soviet law individuals 
were arrested for political reasons. Article 70 of the 
criminal code dealing with "anti-Soviet agitation and 
propaganda" was the article under which dissidents were 
most frequently arrested. It carried a maximum penalty 
of seven years imprisonment and up to an additional five 
years in internal exile. There were other articles such 
as article 190-1; "the dissemination of deliberately 
hostile fabrications defaming the Soviet and social 
system", and article 190-3: "the organisation of, or
active participation in a group actively violating public 
order", which all carried prison sentences, and which 
together were responsible for denying various 
internationally recognised human rights such as freedom
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of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and freedom of conscience.
In 1985 there was a heavy crack-down on religious 
d i s s e n t e r s . 2 4  Amnesty International reported that at 
least 13 2 Soviet citizens were jailed under laws 
curtailing freedom of religion and expression. 
Furthermore, another 65 people were imprisoned for 
producing uncensored literature, thus violating the 
state's monopoly of publishing and censoring all printed 
m a t e r i a l . 2 5  Many of those jailed had allegedly
criticised the Soviet government's treatment of non- 
Russians in the USSR. Thus the continuing poor
performance of the Soviet authorities in the realm of 
human rights saw them fail to meet "even the most
elementary of accepted international s t a n d a r d s " . 2 5
There appeared to be no significant improvement in 
the treatment of dissidents or any relaxation of Soviet 
policy towards dissent in 1986. As before "Soviet 
citizens were still at risk if they exercised their
freedom of conscience in ways that did not conform to 
official p o l i c y " , 2 2  and 150 individuals were prosecuted
on such grounds.22
Amnesty confirmed that a total of about 259
political prisoners were released in 1987, the largest 
number to be set free in any one year since the 195 Os. 2 ^ 
Despite this, at least 3 00 (probably more; see Appendix 
Table 5.1) prisoners of conscience were still being held 
in the Soviet Union at the end of 1987. Indeed, in 1988 
there were reports of new arrests on political charges.
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On top of the imprisonment of prisoners on political 
grounds, another important issue was the treatment of 
'political prisoners'. The period 1985-88 was to witness 
the continued mistreatment of these prisoners of 
conscience. Such repressive treatment was characterised 
by cases of torture, and the continued use of 
"psychiatric confinement for political p u r p o s e s " . This 
saw individuals confined indefinitely in mental 
hospitals, and some were even beaten up and given 
powerful drugs "after they had refused to repudiate their 
v i e w s " . P r i s o n e r s  at corrective labour camps were 
forced to do taxing compulsory labour, with many 
suffering from extreme hunger, which was prescribed in 
Soviet law as a means of punishment. Indeed the US 
Department of State reported that in 1985 political 
prisoners held in psychiatric hospitals against their 
will were subjected to "cruel and degrading t r e a t m e n t " . 42 
In addition, the Soviet authorities continued their 
practice of exiling political dissenters. The prominent 
dissident Andrei Sakharov remained in exile in the city 
of Gorky despite repeated calls from the West for him to 
be released and given adequate medical attention. In 
1985 a total of 46 death sentences were passed and 16 
executions took place (see Appendix Table 5.2). It 
appears as though the Soviet authorities were still 
resisting calls from international organisations like 
Amnesty International to work towards the eventual 
abolition of the death p e n a l t y .  4 2 The U.S State
Department's report on human rights practices for 1985
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reported the death of a number of individuals in Soviet 
custody, who were engaged in religious or political 
dissent. They included well known activists from
Estonia, Armenia and the U k r a i n e . ^4
In 198 6, Dr. Andrei Sakharov and his wife, who had 
been in internal exile since 1980, were released, along 
with the early release of some 12 prisoners of conscience 
from labour camps. These were, however, only minor 
developments in a positive direction. Conditions for 
remaining political prisoners continued to be harsh on 
the colonies of the corrective labour system where most 
were h e l d . 45 Poor medical care, limited rations, and 
high work targets which often involved heavy physical 
labour were the order of the day. The case of one 
activist, Anatoly Marchenko, who died in December 19 86 
following a hunger strike, highlighted the situation 
which dissidents in prison had to e n d u r e . 45 Marchenko 
had constantly complained about ill treatment at the 
hands of colony officials but his complaints were ignored 
and instead he was further punished. The abuse of 
psychiatry continued as w e l l . 42 Amnesty International 
reported that 44 prisoners of conscience were still being 
held in psychiatric institutions and many had been given 
powerful d r u g s . 42
The U.S. State Department noted with much concern 
that the KGB appeared to have been largely exempted from 
the new 'glasnost' (openness) being promoted by the 
Soviet leadership, a disappointing development especially 
since the KGB was heavily involved in the execution of
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the Soviet government's hardline policy on dissent, and 
the organisation was well known for engaging in 
systematic beatings of human rights activists, for spying 
on dissidents, setting up dissidents, and bringing false 
charges against critics of the government.
Further evidence that the Soviet government's 
performance on the question of dissent had not improved 
by much during the period 1985-88 in comparison with the 
early 1980s was provided by the Comparative Survey of
Freedom (see Appendix Table 5.3 for explanation of the 
survey) published annually, and which provided a rating 
for political rights, civil liberties and the status of
freedom in the Soviet Union. According to this survey 
the USSR was ranked amongst the least free nations in the 
world. The USSR was designated as 'not free' in each 
year from 1985 to 1988, representing no change from the 
previous 5 years (see Appendix Table 5.3). A ranking of 
7 for political rights in the period 1985-88 meant that 
the USSR was rated as offering the lowest level of
political rights. This rating of 7 in fact represented a 
further deterioration in the level of such rights 
prevalent in the Soviet Union from some of the earlier 
years, such as 19 80 to 1983, when Moscow had been ranked 
6. A rating of 7 for civil liberties was also in 
accordance with the low level of such rights prevalent in 
the USSR.
So far the analysis has revealed much evidence that 
the same old policies and practices were still in
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operation during the period 1985-88, as they were prior 
to that period.
However, in all fairness there were some positive 
changes that did occur in the area of dissent 
particularly in 1987 and 1988, which are worth looking at 
especially since the prospect for change had been bleak 
for so long.
To start with the limits of permissible dissent were 
expanded. The Soviet authorities allowed debates on 
human rights issues that were previously t a b o o . There 
was the broadening of the discussion of historical, 
social, economic, and to a lesser extent political issues 
in the official media, brought about by the authorities' 
decision to end the requirement that all publications, 
film and television scripts be submitted for censorship 
to the "main administration for safeguarding state 
secrets in the m e d i a " . Also in 1987 the Soviet 
government granted freedom for Soviet citizens "to 
demonstrate against government policies and to form 
independent discussion clubs The abuse of
psychiatry was brought to public attention, raising hopes 
that this truly repressive practice would be brought to 
an end very soon. Indeed, later in March 1988, a new 
decree went into effect which pointed towards an end to 
the practice of committing healthy persons (most notably 
dissidents) to psychiatric i n s t i t u t i o n s .^2 Abuse of 
psychiatry was actually made a punishable offence. On 
top of this a number of prominent political and religious 
prisoners were released from psychiatric hospitals.
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The USSR was also involved in a major review of its 
existing criminal law in order that it meet international 
standards. The review included issues such as
restricting the death penalty; giving defendants earlier 
access to a lawyer; and repealing the law which in effect 
restricted freedom of expression. This led to the 
publication in 19 88 of new draft principles of criminal 
law "which would restrict the scope of the death penalty 
and give precedence to international standards over 
domestic law".52
During the course of 1987, Gorbachev made a number 
of pronouncements which pointed towards a change for the 
better in future Soviet human rights practices. In an 
article in Pravda in September, Gobachev suggested that 
the United Nations play a leading role in the promotion 
and protection of human r i g h t s . ^4 He also stressed that 
governments had a duty to make their laws conform with 
international standards. 1987 also saw the Soviet Union 
ratify the UN convention against t o r t u r e . 55
1988 was a year which saw changes take place in the 
Soviet Union which would have been unthinkable at one 
time, as Soviet leader Gorbachev's policies of glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring) began to take 
shape. This culminated in an expansion of the limits of 
permissible dissent witnessed in many ways.
On July 28 the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium issued 
a decree on "procedures for the organisation and conduct
of meetings, rallies .... demonstrations .... "^5 This
provided a legal basis for demonstrations. Indeed in the
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Baltic Republics and Armenia massive demonstrations took 
place during the year.^2 Positive developments in the 
area of freedom of association saw the formation of large 
organisations for political a c t i o n . 52
At a major speech delivered at the United Nations on 
December 7 1988,59 Gorbachev outlined his proposals and
plans in a number of areas. In the area of human rights 
the Soviet leader pledged that "no persons would be 
confined or persecuted in the Soviet Union because of 
their political or religious b e l i e f s " . 52 He also argued 
that "World Court decisions regarding international 
agreements on human rights should be binding".5^ Earlier 
at the Moscow Summit in May/June even Reagan before 
leaving cited what he described as a "sizeable 
improvement" in human rights observance in the Soviet 
Union.52
Nevertheless, despite some significant changes for 
the better in Soviet performance on human rights 
particularly in the latter part of the period 1985-88, 
the U.S. Department of State reported that "the changes 
were more than cosmetic and less than f u n d a m e n t a l "  . 52 
And as Amnesty International noted "there was a yet no 
changes in law that would protect Soviet citizens from 
being imprisoned for peacefully exercising their rights, 
preventing ill treatment in places of imprisonment 
....".54 The key thing to remember as the US State 
Department stated was that the improvements which took 
place in 1987 in particular had still to be reinforced by 
reform l a w s .55 without changes in the law itself the
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reforms taking place would lack substance, and would not 
provide satisfactory evidence that change would not only 
develop further but would be irreversible. 19 8 8 itself 
did not see many changes in Soviet law in areas of 
relevance to dissent but instead saw mainly hints of 
change, and more draft proposals.
On this basis the U.S. State Department in its 
annual report to Congress on Human Rights Practices (for 
1988) around the world urged caution and stressed that it 
was still not possible to say "that there has been a 
fundamental shift in the Soviet Union's approach to human 
r i g h t s " . 5 5  i t  is clear that the Americans were impressed 
with the changes that were indeed taking place, and 
particularly the profound implications they would have. 
But as before the United States was keen to see changes
in Soviet law in a wide range of issues covering human
rights, which would make the changes real and 
irreversible.
Therefore, judging the period 1985-88 as a whole it 
is reasonable to say that trade pressure appears not to 
have had the far reaching and desired effect that was 
intended. Soviet policy on dissent continued to give 
cause for concern, even under the new leadership of
Mikhail Gorbachev. While Gorbachev expressed his
willingness to open up the Soviet system under his 
programme of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' the changes did 
not go far enough from the American point of view. The 
same old policy characterised by the repression of
dissent was still largely in force. More significantly,
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the apparent movement towards change was not accompanied 
by the far reaching changes in Soviet law, which would 
have ultimately made Gorbachev's new initiatives more 
convincing. Certainly Gorbachev appeared to be moving in 
the right direction by the end of 1988, and if one were 
to compare the Soviet performance in the period 19 85-88 
with the years of the early 1980s there is no doubt that 
Moscow had made great strides forward. However, Gorbachev 
had gone far but not far enough.
Certainly if we were judging Soviet performance on a 
year by year basis it would be true to say that major 
strides were made by the Soviet government in the realm 
of human rights during 19 88 which can be seen in many 
ways as a kind of turning point. Unfortunately it is 
improvements in the period as a whole that are more 
important rather than one single year, since it is the 
period as a whole which is the yardstick for measurement 
here.
Of course no one can or could have realistically
expected all political prisoners to be released within a 
couple of years, and although the changes may have 
disappointed the U.S. officially they could in themselves 
be seen as significant, especially 1988 which laid the 
groundwork or foundation from which real and irreversible 
changes would later emanate.
B : EMIGRATION: THE CASE OF THE SOVIET JEWS
The situation for Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate
had been steadily deteriorating since the record number
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of departures occurred in 1979, In the period 1980-84 
Jewish emigration from the USSR declined at an 
increasingly rapid rate reaching its lowest figure for 18 
years in 19 84 - with only 896 departing (see Appendix
Table 5.4). There was nevertheless renewed optimism that 
the application of American trade pressure beginning in 
1980 would have its effect after a number of years, even 
though similar pressure applied previously in the form of 
the Jackson-Vanik Amendment did not appear to have 
yielded the desired outcome.
We now come to the question of Soviet policy on 
emigration in the period 1985-88 in order to assess the 
performance of Moscow during these years. What will 
matter in this analysis is not so much the Soviet 
performance on emigration year by year but the overall 
Soviet performance in the period 1985-88 in relation to 
this annual analysis.
The year 1985 saw the first increase in the level of 
Jewish emigration for 5 years (see Appendix Table 5.4) . 
It saw 244 more Jews being allowed to leave than was the 
case in 1984, representing an increase of 27%. In terms 
of numbers this represented a very small increase if one 
considered that according to the U.S. State Department 
there remained more than 200,000 Jews who possessed the 
letters of invitation (known as Vyzovs) from Israel 
required for all applications for emigration but who were 
still being denied their right to l e a v e . 5 2  The State 
Department concluded that Jewish, as well as emigration
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of other major ethnic groups wishing to emigrate 
"remained at severely restricted l e v e l s . . . "52
The human rights organisation Amnesty International 
in its annual report covering the year 1985 also noted 
the difficulties which Soviet citizens continued to 
endure in their quest to emigrate, with those attempting 
to leave illegally risking the possibility of up to 3 
years in jail. 59 Amnesty cited the case of eleven Jews 
who were imprisoned for appealing abroad asking for help 
in emigrating. According to the Helsinki Federation^^ 
"even those allowed to leave the USSR in 1985 did not for 
the most part include veteran refuseniks who had been 
waiting for more than ten y e a r s " . R o b e r t  Bernstein, 
chairman of Helsinki Watch human rights organisation, 
said that the old type of repression was continuing under 
Gorbachev's regime.
At the Geneva summit in November 1985 there was a 
unscheduled session between Gorbachev and American 
Senator Jesse J a c k s o n . ^2 At this session Jackson raised 
the plight of Soviet Jews complaining about the treatment 
of Jews, especially with regard to the question of 
freedom to travel. Gorbachev rejected Jackson's 
accusations, instead arguing that there existed no Jewish 
problem. Clearly Gorbachev did not share or recognise 
international, particularly American concern over the 
question of Jewish emigration.
If 1985 saw only a insignificant increase in the 
level of Soviet-Jewish emigration, 1986 proved to be a 
disaster for Soviet Jewry. The downward trend in Jewish
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emigration evident since 1979, and only momentarily 
disrupted in 1985, reappeared in 1986 with a further fall 
of 19.8%. N o t  a significant fall but a drop
nevertheless, taking the number of departures below t h e  
one thousand mark for the second time in 3 years (see 
Appendix Table 5.4). According to Jewish sources there 
were about 383,000 Jews in the Soviet Union in possession 
of a vyzov by 1986 (the first step in the emigration 
process) whose application had been rejected over the 
years, making the figure of 914 departures for the year 
seem even more miniscule by c o m p a r i s o n .^4 This point was 
also noted by Dr. William Korey, public member of the 
American delegation to the Berne experts' meeting on 
human contacts in 1986.^5 Later a t  the Helsinki
Commission hearing on June 18, 1986, Dr. Korey expressed
shock and dismay at what he called "... the almost total 
non-compliance of Basket 111 provisions on reunion of
families by the Kremlin with respect to Soviet Jews 
seeking emigration t o  I s r a e l . ..".25
President Reagan raised the issue of Jewish 
emigration with Soviet leader Gorbachev at the Reykjavik 
summit meeting in October 1986. The President presented 
a list of 1200 Jews w ho he said wanted to leave the 
Soviet Union, repeating that "Soviet human rights
policies were impeding the improvement of our 
relationship".^^ Earlier before the summit, the New York 
Times reported that the status o f  Soviet Jews had emerged 
as the central topic of the summit meeting in advance of
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proceedings, saying that the U.S. was set to give a high 
priority to the i s s u e .
1987 saw somewhat of a turn-round. More than eight 
thousand Jews were allowed to emigrate (see Appendix
Table 5.4), the largest figure since 1982. However, as 
before this increase masked the considerable number 
(possibly up to 50,000) who were denied exit visas.
Nevertheless the 1987 figures did represent movement in a
positive direction of a more substantial nature than 
before with many well known refuseniks being allowed to 
leave as well. Throughout 1987 Reagan had "publicly
excoriated the Soviets for refusing to allow Jews and
dissidents to emigrate"..^0 and the upcoming summit in
Washington later in the year may have contributed to the 
softening of Soviet emigration policy in 1987.
In February 1987 a number of prominent Jewish 
activists held an illegal press conference in Moscow 
calling for increased pressure t o  be applied on the 
Soviet authorities "to adopt a more sympathetic approach 
to their p r o b l e m " . 2^ They expressed concern about new
Soviet laws which were l i k e l y  to make the process of 
emigration more difficult. The activists were referring
to new Soviet regulations which came into force in 
January 1987, which according t o  the U.S. State 
Department made "...family reunification the only legal 
basis for emigration". These new regulations as a result 
"... codified Moscow's long-standing refusal to recognise 
the right to l e a v e . . ".22
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1988 provided the first signs of real evidence that 
the Soviet authorities were opening their doors to allow 
a more sustained exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union, 
19,292 Jews were allowed to emigrate in 1988, the largest 
number since 1980 (see Appendix Table 5.4), representing 
an increase of 13 6% from the previous year. 1988 was to 
begin an irreversible process which was to see emigration 
for Jews increase to unprecedented levels. Many political 
observers saw the liberalisation of Soviet policy on 
emigration as not entirely unexpected in view of the 
changing political climate in the USSR which had been
gathering pace ever since Gorbachev launched his reform 
programme.
Throughout 1988 there was much attention focussed on 
the question of human rights including the treatment of 
Soviet Jews. At the Moscow summit - the fourth Reagan 
and Gorbachev summit - held between May 29 - June 2,
Reagan criticised the Soviet record on human rights as
abysmal, accusing Moscow of violating its commitments
under the Helsinki Accords, with most criticism centred 
on "the government's refusal to allow Jews ... other
minorities and dissident to e m i g r a t e . In a move 
which irritated the Soviet authorities and was 
accordingly denounced by the Soviet p r e s s , R e a g a n  met 
9 8 Soviet citizens including some well known refuseniks 
who had been denied permission to leave.
However, Reagan acknowledged that Gorbachev had made 
great strides in the area of improving human rights, and 
blamed the bureaucracy rather t h a n  the Soviet leadership
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for restrictions on emigration. At the summit, Reagan 
had once again highlighted America's deep concern on the 
issue of Jewish emigration, and had shown that American 
support for Soviet Jewry was stronger than e v e r ,  and that 
Washington always regarded the Jewish question as one of 
the top issues in any superpower negotiations. Reagan's 
confidence in Gorbachev regarding the latter's commitment 
to improving Soviet human rights performance was to be 
further boosted later in the year.
On December 7, at the United Nations, Gorbachev 
delivered a speech, where along with an announcement of 
major t r o o p  cuts the Soviet leader outlined his proposals 
in a number of other issues including human r i g h t s . I n  
the field of human rights, Gorbachev announced that "the 
ban on emigration by p e r s o n s  possessing secret 
information would expire after a specified time limit". 
This represented a significant development since one of 
the reasons often cited by the Soviet authorities for 
denying exit visas to some individuals was that they had 
had access to classified military information.
Total Jewish emigration for the p e r i o d  1985-88 as a 
whole amounted to 29501. This represented a fall of 18% 
from the previous period 1980-84 d u r i n g  which 35817 Jews 
had been allowed to leave. Furthermore, the fall from 
1980-84 to 1985-88 would have been even greater if there 
had not been such a sizeable increase in emigration in 
1988.
The evidence before US has shown that American 
attempts to improve Soviet policy on Jewish emigration by
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the application of trade pressure had limited success. 
The period 1985-88 actually witnessed a fall in the level 
of emigration from the previous period 1980-84, This is 
hardly surprising given that there was no indication of 
any progress in the years 19 85 and 1986, with only a 
slight increase in 1985 and a decline in 1986. The first 
real s i g n  of substantial progress was seen in 1987 with a 
large increase in the number of exist visas granted. 
This progress was further enhanced in 1988 with an even 
larger increase.
However, as the Institute of Jewish Affairs pointed 
out in a 1986 report "even during the years of rising 
emigration the number of refuseniks was growing",
reflecting the fact "....  that the number of
applications constantly exceeds the number of exit visas
granted . . In other words one has to be careful to
concentrate not only on the number allowed to emigrate 
but also on the number of rejected visas in o r d e r  to get 
a more accurate picture of the real changes in Soviet 
policy. Also, despite the increases in Jewish emigration 
in 1987 and 1988 it has to be remembered that there were 
no actual changes in Soviet law in the direction of
easing restrictions on emigration. If anything the new 
Soviet laws which came into effect on January 1987 
regarding emigration were seen as placing further
obstacles to the freedom of emigration, to add to the 
continuing discrimination faced by Soviet Jews in 
society.
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Therefore, an overall view of Soviet emigration
policy towards the Jews in the period 19 85-88 has to be 
that there was still some way to go before Soviet
progress on the issue could be deemed satisfactory. This 
was illustrated by the continuing concern conveyed by the 
Americans to Moscow even by 1988, as at the Moscow 
summit. So if trade pressure was indeed a determinant of 
Soviet policy on emigration it is fair to say that it had 
achieved very limited results in the years 1985 to 1988.
C O N C LU S IO N S
In conclusion it can be said that the use of United 
States trade pressure to secure political objectives - 
namely improvements in Soviet policy on human rights, in 
the areas of dissent and Jewish emigration had if any 
very limited success.
Beginning with the question of dissent, the S o v i e t
authorities throughout 1985 to 1988 displayed their
customary harshness towards dissidents through the 
continued use of imprisonment, internal exile and 
incarceration in psychiatric hospitals, on top of the 
general mistreatment of p o l i t i c a l  prisoners involving 
harsh conditions at labour camps, forced starvation, 
torture and the use of powerful drugs. Soviet citizens 
continued to be denied basic freedoms enjoyed in the 
West, and the country was ranked among the least free 
nations in the world with its citizens having to endure 
the lowest level of political rights and civil liberties 
as measured by Freedom House in New York in its annual
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publication the Comparative Survey of Freedom (see 
Appendix Table 5.3).
The launch of Gorbachev's programme of perestroika 
and glasnost provided some optimism that lasting change 
could be on the way in 1987 but this never really 
materialised, largely because Soviet laws remained 
basically unaltered, thus there still were no legal or 
constitutional guarantees protecting individuals from 
political arrests and safeguarding fundamental freedoms.
Moving on to the issue of Jewish emigration, 
improvements in the rates of Jewish emigration, in terms 
of the number of Jews wanting to emigrate, were largely 
not forthcoming with the exception of 1987 and 1988, two 
years which saw large increases in Jewish emigration. 
But even these increases failed to satisfy the Americans 
who cited the growing number of refuseniks in proportion 
to those granted exit visas. To a d d  to this, the number 
of Jews who emigrated in the years 1985-88 fell by 6,316 
from the period 1980-84 (see Appendix Table 5.4).
All in all, United States trade pressure had not 
achieved its political goals in the area of human rights, 
something acknowledged even by the Americans themselves. 
In March 1988, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead 
indicated that Soviet actions on human rights, while 
promising, had not gone far e n o u g h  to justify an easing 
of U.S. restrictions on t r a d e . S i m i l a r l y  in April 1988 
the U.S. Commerce Secretary Verity pointed out that the 
United States was unlikely to grant most-favoured nation 
status to Moscow until it had made more progress in human
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rights such as Jewish emigration. President Reagan at 
his summit meetings with Gorbachev was quick to denounce 
Soviet human rights practices, seen quite vividly during 
the Moscow summit when both, leaders were engaged in a 
heated discussion on the issue, providing further 
evidence that the Americans were far from satisfied with 
the changes that had t a k e n  place in Soviet human rights 
behaviour. Any improvements in Soviet domestic behaviour 
had been more cosmetic than real. The use of trade 
pressure throughout the 1980s had not succeeded in 
altering Soviet policies to the desired extent as 
witnessed by the analysis earlier in the Chapter. B y  the 
end of 1988 the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was still 
some way behind in meeting its international obligations 
on human rights, such as satisfying the criteria set out 
in the Helsinki Final Act, something which the United 
States had stressed all along Moscow had to achieve.
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Appendix Table 5,1: Number of Political Prisoners Held in
the Soviet Union 19 82-1988*
1981 -1982 8481983 9031984 8871985 8371986 5301987 3001988 140
* The exact number of political prisoners in the USSR
was not determinable. The figures are therefore 
estimates from the work done by organisatons such as 
Amnesty International and the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights. Also the figures are 
likely to be much lower than the real ones because 
of official censorship, restrictions on freedom of 
movement, and limitations on the flow of information 
which mask the real figures (political prisoners as 
defined by the International Helsinki Federation 
were those who were incarcerated in prison, labour 
camps, psychiatric hospitals, sent into internal 
exile as punishment for the non violent excercise of 
their civil and political rights).
Source: Figures for 1982-84 from "Violations of the
Helsinki Accords: USSR" - a report prepared for 
the International Helsinki Federation, pl76. 
Figures for 1985-88 from those reported in 
Amnesty International Reports for the years 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989.
Appendix Table 5.2: Number of Death Sentences Passed, andNumber of Executions in the Soviet Union 1983-88
Year No of Death Sentences No of Exec
1983 24 81984 53 161985 46* 27*1986 17 8
1987 25 81988 15 7
* Amnesty International believed that the figures for 
1985 were probably much higher.
Source: Amnesty International Reports 1984 through to 1989.
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Appendix Table 5.3: Rating of Political Rights , Civil
Liberties, and the Status of Freedom
in the Soviet Union 1980 -88
Year Political Civil Status ofRights Liberties Freedom
1980 6 7 NF
1981 6 7 NF
1982 6 7 NF
1983 6 7 NF
1984 7 7 NF
1985 7 7 NF
1986 7 7 NF
1987 7 7 NF
1988 - - -
Source : "Comparative Survey of Freedom" which is
published annually in Freedom in the World.
In the case of political rights and civil liberties
countries are ranked on a scale of 1 to 7, where a rating
of 1 mean s the country is ranked freest in terms of
political rights and civil liberties, and the lowest
rating 7 means the country is least free i.e. it offers
the lowest level of political or civil rights. NF
designates the status of freedom as "not free"
Appendix Table 5.4: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet
Union in the Period 1979-1988
Year Emigration
1979 51,320
1980 21,471
1981 9,447
1982 2,688
1983 1,315
1984 896
1985 1, 140
1986 914
1987 8, 155
1988 19,292
Source; Figures for years 1979-85 from "Human Contacts, 
Reunion of Families and Soviet Jewry" - Report 
prepared by the Institute of Jewish Affairs in 
London. Figures for 1986-88 taken from the 
annual report submitted to Congress by the U.S. 
Department of State titled Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for the years 1986, 1987, 
and 1988.
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CHAPTER 6
ASSESSING THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF AMERICAN TRADE PRESSURE: 2 - SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS
INTRODUCTION
The second chapter assessing the political success 
of American trade pressure will look at what was the 
second issue of concern to the United States - the level 
of Soviet involvement in the third world and regional 
flashpoints.^ The format used in the previous chapter 
will be applied again.
Section one will restate American concern about the 
scale of Soviet intervention in the third world by giving 
a brief account of the high level of Soviet involvement 
in the third world in the 1970s which continued into the 
1980s^ and which attracted retaliatory American measures 
such as trade pressure. Section two, the main section, 
will judge whether U.S. trade pressure had the desired 
effect of inducing a change for the better as the U.S. 
saw it in the period 1985-88, by making the USSR limit or 
substantially decrease its military involvement in the 
third world.
To do this will require a fairly comprehensive 
statistical analysis in order to determine the level of 
Soviet involvement in the third world, and to assess 
whether Moscow had increased or decreased its commitments 
in the region. Constant comparison of the years 1985-88 
with the period 1979-84 when the Soviets were
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particularly active in the third world will be necessary. 
Such indicators as: the value of arms sales; the share of 
Soviet arms exports to the regions of the third world; 
and the presence of Soviet military personnel in various 
developing countries will help to aid the analysis. The 
main aim of this chapter is not to look at Soviet 
involvement in the global community but instead to focus 
attention on the key client states of Moscow in each part 
of the third world, especially those countries whose 
close military association with Moscow was of particular 
concern to Washington. In view of this the analysis will 
be confined largely to: Cuba and Nicaragua in Central
America; Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in Africa,- and 
Afghanistan in Asia. In addition there will be some 
analysis of Soviet military assistance to the third world 
countries as a whole, which will be referred to in this 
context as developing countries, as well as Soviet arms 
transfers, and deliveries by regional breakdown.
SECTION ONE - RESTATING AMERICAN POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS OVER SOVIET THIRD WORLD BEHAVIOUR
Like human rights, Soviet involvement in the third 
world had attracted considerable American criticism and 
was a major bone of contention in Soviet-American 
relations.^ Indeed it was the direct Soviet involvement 
in Afghanistan which had triggered the rapid 
deterioration in Soviet-American relations, and which had 
invited a harsh American response under Carter and then 
Reagan.^ This tough American response involved the use 
of trade pressure in order to induce more acceptable
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Soviet behaviour in the international arena (as well as 
in domestic policy e.g. the issue of human rights - See 
Chapter 5) . The United States' more short term and 
immediate response to Soviet involvement in the third 
world saw President Reagan initiate a more offensive 
policy which came to be termed the 'Reagan doctrine',^ 
and which involved American support for guerilla forces 
who were struggling to overthrow communist regimes.
U.S. concern in the 198 0s over Soviet activities in 
the third world stemmed from the growing, direct and 
indirect Soviet involvement in the countries of the third 
world, which was posing an ideological, political, 
economic and military challenge to American interests, as 
well as to America's own third world allies. Over a 
period of six years between 1974-80, Ethiopia (1974), 
South Vietnam (197 5), Angola and Mozambique (1975), 
Afghanistan (1979) and Nicaragua (1980) fell successively 
into the hands of ruling groups closely aligned with the 
USSR. Moscow continued to provide military assistance 
and support to these countries well into the 1980s as 
shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Value of Arms Transfers by the Soviet Union to Soviet Clients 1974-78 1979-83(in millions of current dollars)
Recipient Country Supplier - Soviet Union1974-78* 1979-83**
Nicaragua - 100
Angola 410 1500
Mozambique 130 525
Ethiopia 1300 1800Cuba 675 3100
* Source; United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA), World Military Expenditures 
and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978 (Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 198 0) ,
* * United States ACDA, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 19 85 (Washington D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1985) .
The table shows that the USSR's arms transfers to 
major allies in Africa and Latin America increased 
considerably in value from the period 1974-78 to the 
period 1979-83. In the case of the major African allies 
of Moscow - Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia - the 
Soviets consolidated their active involvement in Sub- 
Saharan Africa which had occurred during the 197 0s by 
increasing their arms transfers to these countries by 
large amounts. Also, in Latin America after 1979 and up 
to 19 83 Nicaragua had become the joint second major 
recipient of Soviet military support along with Peru in 
terms of its overall share of arms transfers (after Cuba) 
in that region.^ The Soviets supplied Managua with 36% 
of all arms transfers to that country in the period 1979- 
83.^ This was in notable comparison to the pre-1979 
period during which Moscow supplied no arms to Nicaragua, 
which was ruled by a right wing government at that time.^ 
In the case of Cuba, Moscow accounted for 9 8% of the 
value of arms transfers to that country during 1979-83^
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which was about the same as for the previous period 1974-
78.10
Not only did the Soviet Union continue to provide 
substantial military assistance to individual key allies 
in the third world, its overall value of arms transfers 
to the developing world as a whole remained very high. 
This can be revealed by the fact that in the period 1974- 
78, the USSR's value of arms transfers to the developing 
countries amounted to 20800 million current dollars, and 
it was the second largest supplier (after the United 
States) of arms to the third world during that period.H
However by 197 9 through to 1983 Moscow had not only 
increased its value of arms transfers to the developing 
world by a staggering 1 4 7 % to 5 1 2 8 0  million current
d o l l a r s , i t  had also taken over as the leading supplier 
to that part of the world, with a clear lead over the 
United States. If we look at the picture in terms of 
deliveries of arms by the Soviet Union to the developing 
countries, the story is much the same. While between and 
prior to the period 1973-76 the United States was the
leading arms deliverer to the third w o r l d , t h e  USSR 
overtook America for the period 1 9 7 7 - 8 0 , ^ ^  a trend which 
continued into the next period - 1981-84 - by which time
the Soviets had delivered a further 3 8 billion current
dollars worth of arms to the third world.
The American Department of Defense estimated that by 
1984 the Soviet Union had around 139000 military
personnel in various third world r e g i o n s . These Soviet 
personnel comprised of troops engaged in direct combat as
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in Afghanistan, and military and technical advisers who 
were present in many third world countries. In addition 
there were proxy allies of the Soviet Union, chiefly the 
Cubans fighting on behalf of Moscow. It was estimated 
that by 1984 there were around 40,000 Cubans, mainly 
troops present in the client states of the Soviet Union 
such as Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.
The Soviet-Cuban axis dominated by massive Soviet 
military and economic support for Cuba was a major 
irritant in American - Soviet relations ever since 
Castro's regime came to power on the island. This was 
especially because of Cuba's close proximity to the 
United States, and Washington's suspicions that increased 
Soviet military aid to Cuba and then Nicaragua after 1979 
stemmed from the fact that "Moscow recognises that 
political instability in America's backyard furthers
1 pSoviet interests".
Since 1 9 6 0  to 1985 the Soviet Union supplied almost 
$6 billion worth of military aid to Cuba.^^ This 
military support comprised of significant weapons systems 
with Moscow undertaking to upgrade Cuban forces.
In addition the value of arms transfers from the
Soviet Union to Cuba in the period 1974-78 amounted to
675 million dollars.^0 Since the overall value of arms 
transfers to Cuba was also 675 million dollars for that
period, Moscow had accounted for 100% of all arms
transferred to Cuba.^^ In the period 1979-83 the total 
value of arms transfers to Cuba was 3140 million dollars
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of which 3100 million dollars worth came from the USSR, a 
share of 99% for Moscow.^2
Cuba's importance to the Soviet Union as an vital 
strategic ally in the third world was further highlighted 
by the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and 
the presence of Soviet military advisers. In return for 
Soviet military and economic aid, Havana sent its troops 
to fight in order to promote and protect Soviet interests 
in regional conflicts, particularly in Africa. As the US 
Defense Department noted "Soviet proxies are particularly 
active in Sub-Saharan Africa", the most important of 
these being Cuba and East Germany.
Soviet involvement in the third world was part of 
the superpower rivalry which was a characteristic of the 
Cold War. The increased Soviet activity in the third 
world in the 19 70s saw Moscow take advantage of the 
weakness of the United States in the international arena 
at the time. For the Soviet Union the third world offered 
".... ripe opportunities for expansion and lower risks of 
superpower confrontation".^^ According to the United 
States the USSR took advantage of the period of detente 
between the two countries to expand its power and 
influence in the third world, and at the same time 
establish a political, military and economic foothold in 
the region.
Furthermore, Washington believed that Moscow 
exploited third world nations, and in its bid to expand 
its influence the USSR vigorously promoted the anti­
colonial cause. All this was done at the expense of
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Western interests. The transfer of substantial arms to 
third world countries, many of whom were engaged in civil 
wars, saw Washington accuse Moscow of precipitating 
regional instability and helping to destroy the chance of 
any peaceful resolution of third world disputes. Moscow 
was also seen as forcibly imposing Marxist regimes on 
third world countries through the direct and indirect use 
of force.
When taking office, Reagan was quick to express 
strong objections, and denounce the Soviet Union's direct 
and indirect use of force in the third world. The Reagan 
administration characterised the USSR as the " key 
instigator and exploiter of conflict throughout the third 
w o r l d " a n d  the root cause of the instability affecting 
many parts of Latin America and Southern Africa. Reagan 
argued that detente had not served the purpose of 
moderating Soviet behaviour. Instead, he noted that the 
Soviets had taken advantage of the increase in trade 
which had occurred during the detente years without 
moderating their behaviour. Rather "the USSR had
continued to pursue a foreign policy that includes an 
aggressive expansion of Soviet influence a b r o a d " a n d  
"over the past decade, the USSR had become increasingly 
active in the third w o r l d . Reagan stressed that 
such aggressive Soviet policies would now meet "a firm
O  QWestern response".
However, he also emphasised that if the Soviet 
leadership was willing to improve "its people's lives 
rather than expanding its armed conquests" this would
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attract a positive Western response in the form of
"expanded trade and other forms of cooperation".^^ 
During this address on East-West relations, Reagan also 
stressed that "regional stability with peaceful change" 
would be an essential element in establishing peace with 
the Soviet Union.
In a statement to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on June 15, 1983, Secretary of State George
Shultz heavily criticised what he called "the
unconstructive Soviet involvement, direct and indirect in 
unstable areas of the third world" which had blocked 
peaceful solutions t h e r e . T h e  fact was that the Soviet 
Union's extension of its influence in the third world ran 
counter to American and Western interests in general 
because it saw Moscow impose the very ideology and system 
based on Soviet style communism and characterised by 
repression of human rights and essentially totalitarian 
in nature, which the U.S. and its allies were working to 
alter in the Soviet Union itself.
Therefore on the question of Soviet involvement in 
the third world, the United States was seeking an end to 
Soviet activism in the developing world through the use 
of proxy allies and Soviet military advisers. In 
addition it wanted to see an end to the Soviet occupation 
of Afghanistan and a diminishing of arms transfers to 
third world clients.
In response to the substantial Soviet military 
involvement in the third world during the 197 0s, the 
United States had largely done nothing. However the
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invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops saw Moscow 
extend its third world "adventurism" to an unprecedented 
level, through the direct use of force. Thus, the 
Americans in the 19 80s, first under Carter, and then most 
notably under Reagan, formulated a more active policy in 
response to "Soviet aggression" in the third world than 
mere verbal condemnation. Trade pressure was to be one 
of the instruments of this more active American approach 
by which Washington hoped to relay its concern to Moscow, 
and hope to influence future Soviet conduct. Although 
trade pressure did not deter the USSR from continuing its 
substantial involvement in the third world in the early 
1980s, the question is, did trade pressure eventually 
show signs of success from 1985 onwards when Gorbachev 
came to power? This is the question which we will 
address in the following section.
SECTION TWO - THE EFFECT OF UNITED STATES TRADE PRESSURE ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS 1985-88
As mentioned before this final section will analyse 
whether the USSR showed any willingness to withdraw from 
the substantial military commitments it had undertaken in 
parts of the third world, especially during the 1970s, 
and which had continued into the 1980s.
When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985 the 
Soviet Union was still directly and indirectly engaged in 
many regional conflicts throughout the world. These 
included the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, 
indirect involvement in the Horn of Africa, with Moscow
261
supplying substantial military aid to Marxist regimes 
which it had helped to prop up in countries like Angola, 
Ethiopia, and Mozambique, and where Cuban troops were
involved in direct fighting to protect Soviet interests. 
In Central America there was Soviet military assistance 
to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and support for left wing 
guerillas in El Salvador.
However, Gorbachev's rise to power appeared to 
herald an imminent change in Soviet policy towards the
third world, which would involve a significant de- 
emphasis on the concept of military aid to Moscow's
client states in the developing world.
The 2 7th CPSU Party Congress which opened in 
February 1986^5 provided optimism that the Soviet Union 
was seeking to extricate itself from involvement in the 
third world, where many of the countries were 
characterised by instability, and the transfer of 
military resources to these countries had arguably 
damaged the chances of peaceful settlement of civil wars 
that were raging there. At the Party Congress Gorbachev 
emphasised that Moscow would be looking for ways to shift 
emphasis from the military to other instruments of policy 
such as political and economic. Soviet leaders also 
expressed interest in finding political solutions to 
third world conflicts.
At a speech on March 11 19 85 to the Central
Committee on his election as General Secretary, Gorbachev 
called for sympathy rather than aid for the third 
w o r l d . Gorbachev's seemingly changing position
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regarding the third world was based on a number of 
factors such as a negative evaluation of the cost of 
Soviet involvement in the region over the years, the 
priority attached to internal domestic needs, and the 
need for far reaching domestic reforms with domestic 
policy being more important than foreign policy; and his 
interest in improving East-West relations, realising that 
Soviet activities in the third world had harmed relations 
with the United States and had attracted Western 
political and economic pressure.
Actions speak louder than words. Were Gorbachev's 
pronouncements in 1985 and 1986 signalling a reduction of 
military involvement by Moscow in the developing world, 
and a commitment to peaceful settlement of regional 
conflicts, backed up by Soviet behaviour in the areas?
Figures 6,1 (a) and 6.1 (b) illustrate the value of
arms transferred by the USSR to key third world client 
states in the two periods 1979-83 and 1984-88 (in million 
of dollars) .
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Figure 6.1 (a)
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Figure 6.1 (b)
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Source: United States ACDA, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers 1989 (Washington DC US Govt printing office 1990)
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Taken together, figures 6.1 (a) and 6.1 (b) reveal a
continually intensified level of Soviet involvement in 
the countries illustrated from the period 1979-83 to 
1984-88. Far from backing off, Moscow increased arms 
transfers to its major allies in the period 1984-88 by 
substantial amounts from the previous period 1979-83. In 
the case of all countries shown in figure 6.1 (b) Soviet
arms transfers to these nations increased by more than 
100% from 1979-83 to 1984-88. Nicaragua saw a staggering 
increase of 2 000% in arms from the Soviet Union. For 
Angola the increase was a massive 306%, while Afghanistan 
saw an upward movement of 261%. The other three nations: 
Cuba, Ethiopia, and Mozambique all saw substantial 
increments of over 100%.
If we look at the picture in terms of the Soviet 
Union's share of arms transfers to the developing 
countries concerned each of the countries (except for 
Cuba) increased the proportion of supplies they received 
from Moscow. The USSR accounted for 86% of all arms
transfers received by Angola in 1979-83. The figure rose 
to 88% for the period 1984-88. Mozambique received 97% 
of all arms from the Soviet Union during 1984-88 up from 
77% in the previous period 1979-83. While Nicaragua, 
which only received 35% of its arms supplies from Moscow 
during the period 1979-83, increased this proportion to 
92% in the period 1984-88.
Table 6.2 shows the % share of arms transfers from 
the USSR to developing countries by regional breakdown 
during the periods 1979-83 and 1984-88.
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Table 6,2: Share of Arms Supplied by the USSR to Third 
World Regions, 1979-83 and 1984-88
Share of Arms Supplied Period Third World Region by USSR
Africa 49%
Latin America 3 0%1979-83* South Asia 61%
East Asia 34%
Africa 65%
Latin America 55%1984-88** South Asia 73%
East Asia 41%
* Source: U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers (Washington B.C.US Government Printing 
Office (1985).
** Source: U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers (Washington B.C. US Government Printing Office (1990).
An analysis of Table 6.2 reveals that all third 
world regions increased their share of arms imported from 
the Soviet Union in 1984-88 as compared with the period 
1979-83. Moreover, Africa, Latin America, and South Asia 
all imported more than 50% of all these arms from the 
Soviet Union during the period 1984-88. In other words 
Moscow accounted for over half of all arms received by 
the developing regions in the period 1984-88. Even East 
Asia, although it received less than 50% of its arms from 
the Soviet Union during 1984-88, had actually increased 
its supplies from Moscow as compared with the period 
1979-83.
So we have seen yet again the importance of Moscow 
as a source of arms for all parts of the developing 
world. This is hardly surprising considering that the 
Soviet Union had major client states dispersed throughout 
the third world. In Africa there were the traditional
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Marxist orientated allies in the Sub-Saharan region - 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola. In Latin America there 
was of course Cuba but also Nicaragua, which had become 
an even more important recipient of Soviet arms in the 
mid and late 1980s. As the U.S. Defense Department 
noted, Gorbachev's new thinking had not stopped the 
Soviet Union "... from increasing military aid to 
Nicaragua from $280 million in 1985 to well over $500 
million in 1988...".^® Furthermore "Cuba remains the 
Soviet Union's principal client in the Western Hemisphere
and a huge recipient of Soviet military aid ..... " which
amounted to $1.5 billion in 1988.^^ In South Asia there 
was the Soviet backed regime in Afghanistan which 
received a constant supply of Soviet military assistance. 
In East Asia there was the usual military assistance to 
communist countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and 
North Korea. As we have seen therefore, Moscow continued 
under Gorbachev in the post 1985 period to be the 
dominant supplier of arms to the third world nations.
If we look at arms deliveries by the Soviet Union to 
the developing world in terms of regional breakdown, the 
story is again familiar. Africa, Latin America, South 
and East Asia all saw increases in arms deliveries from 
the Soviet Union in the period 1 9 8 5 - 8 7 . There were 
falls in arms deliveries in 1988 in the case of Africa 
and East Asia but these were minor. By 1986 the USSR
was delivering well over 50% of all arms to the different 
regions of the third world with this situation continuing 
more or less unchanged in 1987 and 1988.^^ Therefore,
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there is no surprise when we look at arms deliveries by 
the USSR to the developing world as a whole, that there 
is no evidence of a reduction in Moscow's deliveries of 
arms to the third world in the period 1985-88, (see 
Figure 6.2). Apart from a fall in 1985, arms deliveries 
assumed the pattern prevalent throughout the pre-1985 
period with an increase of 20% in 1986 followed by 
another increase in 1987, this time of 15%. The fall in 
1988 was a small one of only 4%. Perhaps more 
significantly Soviet arms deliveries were worth $20 
billion in 1987, the largest figure in the whole of the 
period 1980-88. The figure of $19.3 billion for 1988 was 
the second largest in the whole of the period.
Even more significantly the Soviet Union's share of 
arms deliveries increased in the years 1985, 1986, 1987,
and 1988.^3 In fact by 1988 the USSR was supplying over
50% of all arms deliveries received by the developing
w o r l d . I n d e e d  the USSR's share of 51% for 1988 was the 
highest since 1 9 8 0 . In other words not since 1980 had
the USSR delivered over 50% of arms to the developing
countries.
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Figure: 6.2: Arms Transfer Deliveries By
the USSR to the Third World 1980-88
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A look at the number of arms supplied by the Soviet 
Union by major weapon type will give an indication of 
Moscow's contribution to the weapons arsenal of third 
world countries. The major categories of weapons 
delivered by the Soviet Union to third world nations is 
illustrated in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Number of Arms Delivered by the USSR to the 
Developing World by Major Weapon Type
1979-83* 1984-88**
Weapon No Weapon No
Type Delivered Type Delivered
1. Land Armaments 23605 Land Armaments 159402. Aircraft 3680 Aircraft 2538
3. Missiles 12280 Missiles 164804. Naval Craft 214 Naval Craft 149
Note: Category 1 Land Armaments include tanks, artillery,
and armoured personnel carriers
2 Aircraft include combat aircraft and 
helicopters.
* U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1985 (Washington D.C, U.S. Government 
Printing Office 1985).
** U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1989 (Washington D.C. U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1990) .
We can see from Table 6.3 that although the actual 
number of different weapons supplied by the USSR to 
developing countries fell in quantity terms (except for 
missiles) in the period 1984-88 as compared with the 
period 1979-83, this was due largely to the fact that 
there was an overall decline in the import of such 
weapons by the developing countries in the 1984-88 
p e r i o d . Furthermore, despite the fall in the number of
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such weapons supplied, the Soviets actually increased the 
proportion of such weapons s u p p l i e d . T h i s  is 
highlighted by the fact that Moscow increased the 
proportion of land armaments it was supplying from 3 7% to 
46%. The proportion of aircraft supplied increased from 
43% to 47%, while the supply of missiles increased from 
57% to 58% from the period 1979-83 to 1984-88.
The presence of military personnel, whether actual 
troops involved in combat or military or technical 
advisers involved in training the local military in 
maintenance and tactics, and in the construction of 
military facilities in a country, can help to provide a 
clearer picture of the human rather than material 
involvement by a country in a region. In the case of the 
Soviet Union and its proxy ally, the Cubans, the number 
of military personnel present in various third world 
regions is shown in Tables 6.4 (a) and 6.4 (b).
Table 6.4 (a); Soviet Military Personnel In the ThirdWorld - 1984, and Cuban Military Personnel in Third World - 1984
Soviet Military Personnel Cuban Military Personnel
a. Latin America Latin America 2500-3500 
(including Cuba) 7,900
b. Sub-Saharan Sub Sharan
Africa 3,600-4,000 Africa 35000-37000
c . Mideast and
N. Africa 9,000 Mideast and
W.Africa 500
d. Asia (including 
Vietnam) 3,500
e. Afghanistan 115,000
Total around 139,400 Total around 41,000
Source: United States Department of Defense, Soviet 
Military Power 1985 (Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1985).
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Table 6.4 (b): Soviet Military Personnel In the Third
World - 1988/ and Cuban Military Personnel in Third World - 1988^
Soviet Military Personnel Cuban Military Personnel
a. Latin America Latin America 1000-1500
(including Cuba) 7,500
b. Sub-Saharan Sub SharanAfrica 4,000 Africa 40000-45000
c . Mideast and
N. Africa 6,000-7,000 Mideast and
W,Africa 400
d. Asia (including
Vietnam) 4,000-4,500
e. Afghanistan less than 200
Total around 23,200 Total around 47,000
* These figures are Department of Defense Estimates. 
Source: United States Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 198 9 (Washington D.C. U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1989).
Tables 6.4 (a) and 6.4(b) reveal that by the end of
19 88 the Soviet Union had (excluding Afghanistan where 
Soviet troops had already begun withdrawing following the 
signing of a peace accord earlier in 1988) approximately 
the same number of military personnel in each of the 
regions indicated as it did at the end of 1984 (see Table
6.4 (a)) indicating a continuing Soviet military presence
in its by now traditional heartland regions of Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. The same can be said largely for 
the number of Cuban military personnel in the third 
world. The Cubans in fact had increased their number of 
personnel in the third world by the end of 1988 in 
comparison to the pre-1985 period (see Tables 6.4 a and
6.4 b) , while the nuimber of Cuban military personnel in 
Latin America in 1988 had fallen since 1984, Havana 
increased its military personnel in its traditional
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Stronghold - Sub Saharan Africa. In early 1988, the 
Cubans admitted they had some 40,000 military personnel 
in Angola, 3000 troops and advisers in Ethiopia, and 
about 1500 advisers in Nicaragua (this can be seen in
table 6.4 b ) .
As a result, even under Gorbachev's leadership the 
Soviet Union was clearly not interested in scaling down 
(with the exception of Afghanistan in 1988) its
commitment to the third world in the form of military
personnel stationed there.
The analysis has revealed that in terms of the 
projection of military power in the third world through 
the supply of arms, and the presence of military 
p e r s o n n e l , t h e  level of Soviet involvement in the 
third world remained similar to the pre-Gorbachev years, 
and which had attracted American trade pressure. It is 
obvious that even under Gorbachev, Moscow had shown 
little sign of lessening its military commitment to the 
third world despite words to the contrary from the Soviet 
leader in 1985. Washington's continued criticism that 
the Soviet Union's involvement in the third world, 
whether through the shipment of arms or through the use 
of proxies, was contributing to regional conflicts was 
given some credence by Moscow's continued position of
dominant supplier of arms to the third world. By 1987 
there was no sign of resolution of any of the major 
regional conflicts in which the Soviets were directly or 
indirectly involved. Despite discussion of regional
274
issues by Reagan and Gorbachev at successive summit 
meetings there had been little movement on the matter.
However, the year 198 8 can be regarded as an 
exception to some extent. It was a year which provided 
some hope of progress and the possibility that U.S. 
pressure was beginning to work. In line with peace 
accords reached at Geneva, Moscow agreed to withdraw its
troops from Afghanistan. Also in line with an agreement
reached on November 15 1988 between Angola, the U.S., 
Cuba, and South Africa, Cuban troops agreed to leave 
Angola over a period of 27 months. Moreover in 1988 arms 
transfer agreements between the Soviet Union and the 
developing world for the supply of Soviet arms fell for 
the first time since 1983 to 10.3 billion dollars down
from 21 billion dollars in 1987. Central America, where 
a regional peace process collapsed, proved to be a 
difficult area for resolution of conflict, particularly
Nicaragua, on which America and the USSR made no headway. 
At the Washington summit in 1987, Gorbachev hinted at the 
possibility of the USSR ceasing arms supplies to 
Nicaragua but later on it was revealed that such a move 
was conditional on the United States suspending aid to 
all other Central American countries, as well as stopping 
aid to the Contra rebels.
It is clear that while Gorbachev was willing to back 
negotiated settlements to third world conflicts, he was 
not willing to curtail to any great extent the Soviet 
Union's involvement in the region. This is shown by the 
continued Soviet military aid to third world countries.
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Perhaps Moscow was keen to strengthen the bargaining 
position of its client states at any future round of 
peace talks. The strategy would therefore appear to have 
been: to continue high levels of military assistance as
long as civil wars raged but at the same time back peace
efforts in the cause of improving international
relations, particularly relations with the United States. 
The United States Department of Defense noted a disparity 
between Gorbachev's 'new thinking' and the Soviet Union's 
actions in the third w o r l d . I n  a speech marking the 
7 0th anniversary of the Russian revolution, a statement 
by Gorbachev "confirmed that support for revolutionary
movements and wars of 'national liberation' is consistent
with both the 'new thinking' in foreign policy and with 
the declared Soviet goal of "peaceful coexistence".^^
As early as 1986 the US Defense Department predicted 
that "there is little chance that the General Secretary's 
moves to improve the Soviet economy portend a 
modification of Moscow's fundamental goals. The USSR 
still seeks to divide the West and destabilise much of 
the third world through its foreign policy and military 
a c t i o n s " . 5 2  it. seems as though this prediction came true 
if we judge Soviet conduct in the third world over the 
whole period 19 85-88 rather than in any one year. On 
this basis it is fair to say that improvements in Soviet 
behaviour as stipulated by Washington did not 
materialise, and American trade pressure had little 
impact in dissuading continued Soviet involvement in the 
third world.
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CONCLUSIONS
The analysis in this chapter has revealed that 
Soviet policy on regional issues remained largely 
unchanged if one looks at the level of military 
assistance given by Moscow to the various third world 
Marxist regimes during the period 1985-88. While 
Gorbachev acknowledged that the USSR's involvement in the 
third world had been costly, and that he was keen 
extricate the Soviet Union from regional conflicts in 
order to concentrate resources on domestic restructuring, 
the USSR remained the leading supplier of arms to the 
developing world, while publicly Gorbachev was supporting 
peaceful settlement of third world disputes. As the US 
Department of Defense noted "Gorbachev's 'new thinking' 
primarily reflects a change in style, while his
diplomatic initiatives embody new tactics  it 53
went on and said that by cultivating a less
threatening international image Moscow aims to deflect
attention away from Soviet militarism and adventurism in
its foreign p o l i c y " .
Looking at the overall question of Soviet actions in 
the third world during the 1985-88 period we can see that 
the conditions which had existed during the years 1980 to 
1984 and which had attracted United States trade pressure 
still existed at the end of 1988 (with the exception of 
Afghanistan from where the Soviets had began to
withdraw) . For a start Moscow was still by far the
leading exporter of arms to the third world having
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overtaken the United States in this respect in the mid
and late 197 0s. This is illustrated in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Soviet Union's Share of Total Arms Exports to the Developing Countries 1980-88
Year Share of Total Arms Exports (%)
1980 51.8
1981 43.0
1982 42.0
1983 43.8
1984 39.6
1985 40.3
1986 49.2
1987 45.4
1988 51.3
Source: U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms 
Transfers 1989 (Washington D.C US Government Printing 
Office, 1990), pl4.
We can see from Table 6.5 that the USSR actually 
enjoyed a greater share of arms exports to the developing 
countries in the years 1986-88 than it did during the 
years 1981-84. In fact the Soviet Union's share of 
exports in 1988 matched its share of 1980 when Moscow 
accounted for more than half of all arms received by the 
developing world.
Traditional Soviet client states, many of which 
Moscow had helped to bring to power in various third 
world regions, were far from abandoned by the USSR under 
Gorbachev. Instead shipments of conventional arms 
consisting of land armaments, aircraft, missiles and 
naval craft continued to pour into third world countries. 
Cuba as always remained the most important Soviet ally in 
the third world while support for Nicaragua in the form 
of military assistance continued to grow. In the first 
eight months of 1988 "the Soviets provided Nicaragua with
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over twice the amount of economic and. military assistance 
provided by the United States to all of Central
A m e r i c a " . 5 5  Moscow persisted with deliveries of arms to 
third world regions despite the fact that they 
represented regional flashpoints in US-Soviet relations. 
Active Soviet involvement in the third world of a pre - 
1985 scale was also portrayed by the continued presence 
of Soviet, as well as Cuban military personnel in key 
client states.
There is no doubt that if one compares Soviet 
activities in the third world during the years 1985-88 
with the period 1980-84 there is nothing to suggest that 
Moscow had diminished its involvement in any way. Civil 
wars were still raging in countries where the Soviet 
Union was still heavily involved, e.g. Angola, Nicaragua, 
Ethiopia, Mozambique. While there was success in 
Afghanistan the Soviets were still believed to be
supplying the Kabul regime with arms even after having 
agreed to withdraw its troops. Therefore it is fair to 
say that trade pressure failed to influence changes in 
Soviet behaviour in the third world as it had failed to 
do so in the case of Soviet policy on human rights. This 
view was also largely reflected by the United States 
government, which noted under Gorbachev only a change in
style not substance in the execution of Soviet policy in
the third world.
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CHAPTER 7
U.S. TRADE PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION: RECONSIDERED
The beginning of 1980s witnessed a new era of 
decline in Soviet-American economic relations, with 
Washington instigating trade pressure against Moscow in 
response to the downturn in political relations which 
followed Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, While the 
deterioration in superpower relations contributed 
directly to an adverse effect on trade and economic
relations, the emerging rapprochement, when Gorbachev 
took power in the Soviet Union failed to have any real 
positive effect on Soviet-American trade and economic 
relations.
The use of trade pressure embodying the concepts of 
leverage and linkage was not an entirely new phenomenon 
in the 1980s. Trade measures against the USSR in pursuit 
of political goals were used in the 197 0s, and in the 
1950s and 1960s trade controls, in particular those 
designed to check the transfer of strategic goods and
technology, were very much in operation.
However, the practice of 'economic statecraft',^ to 
use Baldwin's term, was executed with more vigour under 
the Reagan administration, and in a way that led to
serious tensions in U.S.-Western European relations.^ At 
the heart of this conflict was the differing importance 
attached to economic relations with the USSR by the
United States and by its European allies. The US
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government believed that improvements in Soviet behaviour 
could only be achieved through economic punishment, 
whereas its allies in Europe believed that behaviour 
could be influenced through economic incentives, i.e. 
economic detente.
This thesis has sought to demonstrate that United 
States - inspired trade pressure on the Soviet Union 
during the years 1980-88 was more of a failure than a 
success. The measures taken by the United States failed 
to impose the necessary economic costs on the Soviet 
Union and as a result failed to alter Soviet domestic and 
international behaviour during the period 19 85-88, with 
only limited progress (in the US view) made on the 
domestic front, and that only in 1988, a year which 
appeared to herald a significant movement towards a 
liberalisation of Soviet human rights policies.
A combination of factors contributed to the failure 
of United States trade pressure. Lack of cooperation of 
allies, stemming partly from alliance disunity, was 
important, with the role of politics in East-West trade 
being at the centre of allied friction. Lack of market 
power in the goods being targeted for trade pressure 
meant that Moscow could obtain goods from alternative 
supplier countries. Special features of the Soviet Union 
have to be remembered - vast resources and a great 
capacity for autarky. In reality there was a low level 
of Soviet dependence on Western goods and markets. The 
Soviet Union's superpower status could not be overlooked. 
A country like the USSR was unlikely to give in to what
it saw as economic blackmail. Soviet leaders throughout 
the 19 8 0s constantly complained about the American policy 
of linkage and leverage. As a result if the Soviets were 
indeed genuinely considering altering their behaviour 
then they might at the last minute refrain from doing so 
if they believed that such a move would be perceived as 
having been made in response to U.S. pressure.
American trade pressure had failed from an economic 
viewpoint not only in respect of non-strategic goods but 
also in attempts by the United States to deny strategic 
goods or technology to the Soviet Union. U.S. unilateral 
and multilateral measures to restrict technology flows 
were rendered ineffective by illegal shipments of banned 
items, limited implementation of laws and regulations by 
the departments of government, and the problems that 
beset the multilateral regulatory regime - COCOM.
SECTION ONE
ANALYSIS OF THE LITERATURE ON THE USE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL GOALS
This section will analyse the work of various 
writers on the question of using economic measures to 
achieve political objectives. The literature on this 
issue is vast, and this chapter will accordingly make no 
attempt to refer to all the literature connected to the 
subject matter of this thesis. Instead it will
concentrate on arguably some of the most important works 
like those of David Baldwin, Margaret Doxey, and more 
recently David Hunter's book.
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If we begin firstly with those wiio have written in 
general terms on the question of the use of economic 
instruments for political goals we could probably divide 
them into two categories; the OPTIMISTS and PESSIMISTS. 
The Optimists led by David Baldwin, (and Philip Hanson 
who wrote in connection with East-West relations) who 
provides in his work Economic Statecraft a very 
comprehensive survey of "economics as an instrument of 
politics".^ Baldwin's line of argument represents a 
school of thought which believes that "the utility of
economic techniques of statecraft has been ....
underestimated since 1 9 4 5 He argues that writings on 
this topic in the past 40 years or so have left the 
impression that economic measures such as sanctions don't 
work. Through his thesis Baldwin believes that he has 
shown the inadequacies of the conventional wisdom that 
measures of economic statecraft have little use.
However, Baldwin points out that he has by no means 
argued that the use of economic instruments for foreign 
policy reasons is necessarily a desirable option. 
Instead Baldwin's work has aimed "to provide an 
analytical framework within which reliable knowledge 
about economic statecraft can be developed to replace the 
conventional wisdom" . ^  in view of this Baldwin sets out 
his own 9 point set of guidelines which according to him 
should help in forging a more adequate evaluation of the 
utility of economic techniques of statecraft.^ Baldwin 
draws attention to the fact that some successful cases of 
the use of economic statecraft have been overlooked by
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scholars because of a lack of understanding of the 
concept. Baldwin goes on to say that attempts to develop 
more knowledge about economic statecraft have been
hindered by the fact that writers have been too quick to 
dismiss economic statecraft as useless. "Economic
statecraft often works slowly, but this is not 
necessarily the inherent weakness it is often made out to 
be" . ^
Despite the optimism prevalent in Baldwin's work, 
most other writers take a much more sceptical view about 
the efficacy of economic measures for political purposes. 
In clear contradiction to Baldwin, Robert Gilpin argues 
that "the utility of economic sanctions tends to be
greatly exaggerated" and that they are of little 
utility.^ In other words Gilpin argues that the
effectiveness of economic sanctions is overestimated. 
Similarly Margaret Doxey stated unequivocally that "in 
none of the cases analysed .... have economic sanctions 
succeeded in producing the desired political result
Furthermore, Doxey outlines a number of measures 
which the target country can take in order to minimise 
the effect of sanctions, and which can render them 
virtually u s e l e s s . T h e s e  include "adaptation, reduction 
of external dependence, and possibly the development of 
new links with non-sanctioning states". Therefore 
according to Doxey it is hardly surprising that 
scepticism about their efficacy and concern over their
drawbacks are widespread, Doxey stresses that 
policymakers must consider not only that economic
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sanctions may fail to alter the target's behaviour "but 
that they could produce the opposite effects from those 
intended", for example "the target may be driven to 
adopt defiant and perhaps more extreme positions as a 
result of sanctions", Doxey notes however that despite 
the shortcomings of economic sanctions they continue to 
be used by governments possibly because they serve 
purposes other than simply to alter the target nations' 
political behaviour. They may serve a symbolic purpose 
in the manner depicted by H u n t e r , by sending a signal 
to third states, and to the domestic audience and by 
demonstrating a willingness to take action, showing 
leadership qualities, and raising the visibility of an 
issue.
A very authoritative and clear analysis of the use 
of "economic sanctions in support of foreign policy 
goals" is provided by Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, 
who note that success in the use of sanctions "has proven 
much more elusive in recent years than in earlier 
d e c a d e s T h e y  emphasise that part of the reason for 
this has been the fact that the frequent use of economic 
measures to achieve what they call "modest" political 
goals have led target nations to become "immune to their 
i m p a c t " . T h i s  development is connected with the fact 
that target nations are nowadays less dependent on trade 
with states imposing the sanctions with "ties between 
target and sender countries" having become weaker.
Despite this Hufbauer and Schott do not suggest that 
sanctions should be dismissed outright as instruments of
foreign policy. Instead they suggest nine conditions 
which they argue that policymakers should seriously 
consider before deploying economic s a n c t i o n s . B r i e f l y  
these are the following:
Don't expect sanctions to achieve too much; The 
sender nation must not set itself virtually 
unattainable goals, and should have fairly modest 
and not inflated expectations.
The chances of sanctions having the desired impact 
are greatly enhanced if the target country is much 
smaller than the sender.
The weakest and helpless target countries are more 
likely to yield to the policy objectives of the 
sender states.
"The shorter the duration of the sanctions the 
greater the likelihood of s u c c e s s s i n c e  sanctions 
applied over a longer time period may allow the 
target nation to develop a greater capacity for self 
sufficiency, and thus make it immune to the economic 
hardship implicit in sanctions.
Comprehensive sanctions that inflict heavy cost on 
the target are more likely to be successful.
A country should not use sanctions when the costs to 
itself are high.
Sanctions used in conjunction with additional 
measures such as military will not ensure success, 
and the accompanying policies will probably not 
succeed either.
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The greater the number of nations required to 
implement economic sanctions the less likely that 
sanctions will be effective.
Finally Hufbauer and Schott advise that "the sender 
government should think through its means and 
objectives before taking a final decision to deploy 
sanctions".22
Much has also been written on the use of economic 
instruments to further political objectives in the 
context of East-West relations, to which we will now turn 
our attention.
Once again most writers express a less than positive 
viewpoint on the exercise of trade pressure, in this case 
by the United States and its European allies against 
principally the Soviet Union.
Gordon B. Smith offers an analysis of the role 
played by politics in the East-West economic 
relationship.^^ Smith outlines his reservations about 
the use of trade pressure by the Western nations against 
the USSR since the Second World War, arguing that 
evidence since 1945 suggests that Soviet international 
and domestic behaviour can be moderated through a policy 
of economic detente which offers Moscow positive 
inducements, making the Soviet Union more cautious about 
undertaking actions in the future which may threaten the 
material benefits it gains from cooperation with the 
West. Whereas a policy of sustained trade pressure 
against Moscow is likely to elicit more aggressive 
international behaviour from the Soviets, and harsher
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domestic policies with the Soviet leadership seeing 
itself in a position where it has nothing to lose from 
further provoking the West.^^ Smith goes on to stress 
that "Western nations must recognise the limits of their 
ability to moderate Soviet policies".
Others such as Reinhard Rode, Hanns Jacobsen^^ and 
Peter Knirsch^^ highlight the failure of Western trade 
pressure against the USSR on the grounds that Western- 
Soviet economic relations are not suitable for use as 
instruments of Western policy. This is particularly 
because the USSR is not "a suitable target for economic 
pressure because of its remarkable capacity for autarky
7 oand independence".
In a view similar to that adopted by Smith, Rode and 
Jacobsen conclude that the history of US-Soviet economic 
relations has shown that "economic incentives can be more 
effective than negative sanctions in the form of 
embargoes or b o y c o t t s . W h i l e  Peter Knirsch states 
clearly that the policy of sanctions used by America 
against the Soviet Union did not work as it failed to 
alter the Soviet Union's political conduct.
Despite Smith's reservations about the use of 
economic punishment to achieve political results, he 
acknowledged that because there was strategic parity 
between the United States and the USSR the use of 
military force in order to satisfy political objectives 
such as moderating Soviet domestic and international 
behaviour was no longer an option for the United States.
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Precisely because of this "economic policies have taken 
on added significance in East-West relat io ns ^^
Gunnar Adler-Karlsson, one of the staunchest critics 
of the effectiveness of Western trade pressure, and 
someone who has analysed Western trade policies towards 
Eastern Europe from the early years of the Cold War, sums 
up his views rather aptly in his statement that "the 
burden of proof is clearly on those who claim that an 
embargo policy is an efficient instrument of foreign 
policy. Experience seems to indicate the c o n t r a r y " . ^ 2  
In later works Karlsson extended this view further and 
concluded that economic sanctions as instruments of 
foreign policy almost never w o r k e d . I n  the context of 
US-Soviet relations this view is given further credence 
by Bruce Parrott's summary that "the 1980s American 
policy of economic sanctions, or negative linkage has 
proved even less successful politically...".^^
Some writers such as Stephen Woolcock expressed 
concern about the detrimental effect that the frequent 
use of economic leverage would have on the scale of East- 
West economic relations, which were already on a very 
small s c a l e . W o o l c o c k  pointed out that since leverage 
depended on there being East-West trade on a scale that 
could be exploited for political purposes, the frequent 
resort to economic leverage threatened to damage East- 
West relations to such an extent that there would be no 
leverage to exploit. Like Smith, Woolcock acknowledged 
that "trade is of limited value as a means of regulating 
political relations between East and West",^^ and argued
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that the West should give priority to the economic gains 
rather than the political advantages to be made from 
mutual trade. In other words, economic factors and not 
political factors should dictate trade. Woolcock also 
mentions that these are precisely the criteria which 
America's European allies apply in their trade with the 
Eastern bloc. They see trade as an important stablising 
element in East-West relations, and doubt the 
effectiveness of using trade links as an instrument of 
East-West politics.
The effectiveness of economic sanctions may also be 
dependent upon the type of sanctions imposed and the 
objective. This is the foundation of David Hunter's 
study: Western trade pressure on the Soviet Union.
Hunter distinguishes between symbolic and instrumental 
sanctions. He defines symbolic sanctions as those which 
are aimed at: deflecting international criticism;
appearing concerned about an issue and drawing attention 
to it; "demonstrating the willingness to take some 
action"; showing leadership qualities; "and assigning 
moral judgement or responsibility".^^ Hunter's 
instrumental objectives include: "encouraging internal
resistance or political reforms; deterring undesired 
action; punishing past errors or extracting reprisals; 
undermining a political regime; encouraging acceptance of 
international reforms; . In the context of US-
Soviet relations examples of symbolic action include 
Carter's boycott of the Moscow Olympics in 1980 following 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Examples of
293
instrumental sanctions can be found in the passing of the 
Jackson-Vanik Amendment by Congress which was designed to 
encourage Jewish emigration reforms in the USSR.
According to Hunter, instrumental sanctions provide 
a "reasonable prospect of s u c c e s s " . B u t  their overall 
success is conditional on factors such as: the
sanctioner's power resources; the target nation's level 
of need for the values being controlled; and the costs of 
compliance to the target.
Hunter appears to adopt a more neutral stance on the 
question of using economic means for foreign policy 
reasons, arguing neither that economic measures such as 
sanctions are never effective at all nor embracing the 
view that they have a high success rate. For Hunter it 
is really a question of satisfying the necessary 
conditions laid out. Even though it is difficult to 
establish the political consequences as against the 1
publicly stated objectives of sanctions Hunter believes e
that "this should not undermine the resort to sanctions 
as an instrument for achieving political objectives''.^^
Having said this Hunter stresses that in the case of 
American trade pressure on the Soviet Union "there is 
simply insufficient leverage in trade and economic i
relations between the USSR and Western nations at the 
present time to influence key Soviet foreign policy 
decisions " .
Writings on trade pressure in the context of East- 
West relations have largely revealed, so far, a great
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deal of scepticism about the successful application of 
economic pressure against the USSR by Western nations.
However, Philip Hanson is an e x c e p t i o n . H e  is 
unwilling to write off Western economic measures against 
Moscow as outright failures, and in this sense provides 
support for Baldwin's line of argument that the use of 
economic measures for political goals should not be 
underestimated. Hanson states that U.S. attempts at 
economic leverage against the USSR cannot be dismissed as 
failures. He believes that U.S. sanctions should be 
judged by their long - term effects on Soviet behaviour, 
and not just by their apparent influence on the policy 
which served as the original pretext for each sanction.
It is possible that U.S. economic measures may have been 
successful in inducing caution in subsequent Soviet 
behaviour in the long term. This is particularly true, 
Hanson says, in the case of Soviet involvement in the 
third world where the use of sanctions over the events in 
Afghanistan and Poland, although it failed to alter 
Soviet policy in these areas, may have had the long-term 
effect of instilling caution in future Soviet actions 
abroad.
Apart from arguing "that U.S. sanctions against the 
USSR should be judged by their cumulative effect over a 
lengthy p e r i o d " , H a n s o n  also argues in similar fashion 
to Hunter on this point that one cannot judge sanctions 
solely on the basis of what economic effects are achieved 
since sanctions also serve the purpose of sending signals
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(what Hunter terms as 'symbolic sanctions') and thus 
"their outcomes must be interpreted with that in mind".^^
The overwhelming conclusion that one derives from 
the selected literature on this topic is that the use of 
economic instuments to attain political goals is seen 
largely as an ineffective policy both in the framework of 
U.S.“Soviet relations, and also in the general context of 
its usage in international relations. Only a few 
writers, such as Baldwin and Hanson, have more positive 
than negative remarks to make about the utility of trade 
pressure. ,
SECTION TWO
UNITED STATES TRADE PRESSURE ON SOVIETUNION: CONCLUSIONS REVISITED
The use of trade pressure by the United States in 
the judgement of this thesis, failed both in its 
objective of imposing economic penalties on Moscow for 
its political behaviour, and also in the overriding aim 
of altering Soviet political behaviour in both the 
international and domestic arenas.
Despite this it would be incorrect to conclude that 
the use of economic pressure by America had no influence 
whatsoever on Soviet political thinking. There is no 
doubt that U.S. trade pressure had some bearing on the 
conduct of Soviet behaviour, with Gorbachev in particular 
sensitive to the damage to East-West relations and to the 
Soviet Union's reputation done by international criticism 
of its actions in the domestic and international arenas.
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Nevertheless, the evidence before us suggests - with 
the possible exception of 1988 - that during the course
of 1985-88 there was little to indicate any positive 
changes in Soviet behaviour as desired by Washington.
Even the changes in 19 88 represented only the beginning 
of possible changes to come. Therefore if one is 
measuring the success of trade pressure in terms of 
whether it satisfied the political goals of the state 
deploying it then one can rightly take the line that 
trade pressure largely failed to produce the desired 
impact in the period 1985-88. The type of economic 
measures taken by the United States against the USSR 
falls more into the category of what Hunter calls 
'instrumental sanctions' in the period 1980-88. In the 
case of human rights (dissent and emigration) the 
objective was to encourage political reforms and |
Iliberalisation. In the case of regional conflicts the ;
aim was to deter undesired action, and end Soviet :
involvement in the areas concerned. ^
If we look at the failure of trade pressure to 
impose the necessary economic costs on Moscow by denying 
the Soviets access to various commodities, both strategic 
(technology) and non-strategic, a whole host of reasons 
may help to explain why this was so. i
Not least, one cannot overlook the relatively low .i
level of American-Soviet trade and the corresponding 
level of economic interdependence between the two
countries. The basic fact is that as Peter Knirsch puts 1
it ".... East-West economic relations are relatively
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insignificant in terms of trade volume, which is 
particularly true for the Soviet Union, and this greatly 
limits the effectiveness..." of measures such as 
s a n c t i o n s . H u n t e r  makes a similar point in this 
statement .... that "there is simply insufficient 
leverage in trade and economic relations between the USSR 
and Western nations to influence key Soviet foreign 
policy d e c i s i o n s " . if we look at U.S. trade pressure 
on Soviet exports any success there was overshadowed by 
the very small level of exports by Moscow to America 
prior to trade pressure. As a result any effect on the 
Soviet Union was almost negligible. Similarly for this 
reason denial of most favoured nation status to the
Soviet Union by the United States also had little 
negative impact on Moscow.
Coupled with the relative insignificance of Soviet- 
American trade is the fact that goods denied to the
Soviet Union were obtained by Moscow through alternative 
sources. Since U.S. trade pressure was a unilateral 
policy action (multilateral only to the extent that it
was supported by some key allies in Western Europe) it 
was unlikely to have universal support. Most countries 
were more than willing to fill the gap vacated by the
United States as was illustrated by the U.S. grain 
embargo of 1980-81. As Hunter says "only if sanctions 
are supported on a multilateral basis will they be able 
to generate a substantial level of economic impact on the 
target c o u n t r y " .  52 The key idea here is that it is not 
multilateral support from allies which was essential but
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more importantly the support of other countries who were 
also major suppliers of the goods which were at the 
centre of U.S. trade denial measures. The availability of 
substitute countries for most commodities meant that only 
the formation of a cartel by leading supplier countries 
could make commodity denial s u c c e s s f u l . p, related
problem for the United States was the structure of the 
market for the various goods which were the target of 
trade pressure. The markets for these commodities were 
characterised by a perfectly competitive structure rather 
than a monopoly one, which greatly diminished the chances 
of success since no one country could on its own
influence the market for these goods.
It also has to be remembered that the United States 
suffered economic costs itself from its use of trade
pressure against Moscow, particularly in the early 1980s 
when its agricultural sector suffered during the embargo 
against the USSR, especially as agricultural products 
dominated its trade with the Soviet Union. In keeping
with the conditions laid down by Hufbauer and Schott, one 
of which states "the more it costs a sender country to 
impose sanctions, the less likely it is that the
sanctions will s u c c e e d " , it is hardly surprising that 
American attempts at trade pressure proved unsuccessful, 
particularly in the early 1980s.
Disagreements, and a conflict of interests to a 
degree between the United States and its allies in 
Western Europe on the conduct of trade with the East, and 
in particular with the Soviet Union, did not help
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Washington in its bid to use trade pressure against 
Moscow in order to extract political concessions. The 
West lacked a coherent policy to tackle this issue with 
the West Europeans more inclined to use economic 
incentives to promote changes in Soviet policy, while the 
United States rejected any use of the 'carrot' but 
favoured the use of policies symptomatic of economic 
warfare. As Angela Stent pointed out European
states rejected the utility of economic sanctions as an 
acceptable means of changing Soviet b e h a v i o u r . .".^5
American unilateral and cooperative attempts with 
its allies to deprive the Soviet Union of Western 
technology also proved a failure. The multilateral 
enforcement mechanism - COCOM - was beset by problems, 
and U.S. unilateral measures were hampered by a clash of 
interests within the various U.S. governmental 
departments between those with pro-trade tendencies and 
that believed in a more liberal interpretation of 
technology controls, and those that were concerned about 
the advantages that were accruing to Moscow from 
strategic trade with the United States.
The second task of trade pressure is to determine if 
it was successful in achieving its political goals. The 
major aims of the United States in its use of trade 
pressure against the Soviet Union were to alter Soviet 
performance on human rights (with specific interest in 
the areas of dissent and Jewish emigration), and to 
moderate Moscow's involvement in regional conflicts. On 
this basis trade pressure failed to produce the desired
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political impact on the Soviet Union. Why? The inability 
of U.S. trade pressure to change Soviet behaviour is not 
altogether surprising.
In the first place the failure of U.S. trade 
pressure to have the desired economic impact limited any 
prospects of inducing the necessary political changes.
Furthermore, the Soviets had made it clear in the 
past that they were unlikely to give in to any form of 
pressure, political or economic. In the early 1980s 
Soviet officials made it known that any form of linkage 
between issues such as trade and human rights was 
unacceptable, and American public criticism of Soviet 
actions served only to make Moscow more stubborn and less 
succeptible to change.
Also the changes initiated by Gorbachev were more 
cosmetic than fundamental. The Soviet leader embarked on 
a process of change which was more effective in the 
perception of change which it put across than in the 
actual results it yielded. Gorbachev had to be careful 
not to be seen as compromising the Soviet Union's 
superpower status if he was to be seen as bowing to U.S. 
pressure. The question of pride and reputation no doubt 
played some part. Gorbachev's realisation of the need 
for change in Soviet policy on human rights and in its 
involvement in areas of regional instability was driven 
by domestic concerns, and was certainly influenced by the 
adverse effect of U.S. trade pressure on the USSR which 
was depriving Moscow of much - needed Western technology 
and credits. However, even then he was only ready to
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initiate the process of change not carry it through to 
the extent that would have satisfied the United States.
The failure of U.S. trade pressure to have the 
necessary political result could also be linked to the 
fact that as Hufbauer and Schott outline in their list of 
advice for the successful application of economic 
sanctions, sanctions cannot "force strong target 
countries into making fundamental changes".
Furthermore the chances of sanctions having an impact are 
greater if the target country is much smaller than the 
s e n d e r . 57 in the case of the Soviet Union and the United 
States it was actually the other way round. In addition 
it is the weakest and helpless target countries which are 
more likely to yield to the policy objectives of the 1
sender c o u n t r i e s . 58 This was certainly not true of the 
Soviet Union.
There is no doubt that trying to measure the j
political success of trade pressure is a difficult task. 4
As Hunter correctly points out "it is not easy to 
identify and measure political consequences against the 
publicly stated sanctions g o a l s " . 5^ if a trade pressure
measure is applied in response to a particular action 
taken by the target, for example an invasion of a 
country, then one must establish the purpose of the 
measure. Is it intended simply to express displeasure 
and anger? In other words is it simply intended to send 
a 'symbolic' message? Or is its goal to force the target y
to reverse its action? If it is the latter then it is not 
difficult to measure effectiveness.
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Problems still arise because of the very fact that 
governments do not always make public or state precisely 
their intended political goals which makes measuring 
success even more difficult.
Further problems arise because often the nation 
practising trade pressure has much wider goals which 
cannot be met in the short run. What is required then is 
to monitor the targets' behaviour over a long term 
period. The success of trade pressure when it is applied 
continuously is best judged from an overall perspective 
and over a long run period rather than episode after 
episode. This is particularly relevant in the study of 
the use of U.S. trade pressure against the Soviet Union 
in the 1980s, which although was initially used in 
response to specific Soviet behaviour for example the 
Afghanistan invasion and the Polish crisis, became a 
systematic policy involving the constant use of trade 
pressure throughout the 1980s whose success could only be 
measured over a number of years.
However, a further question has to be addressed when 
attempting to measure the political success of trade 
pressure in the long run; where change in targets' 
actions and behaviour did occur, to what extent can it be 
attributed to trade pressure? Could it be that other 
factors played a more decisive role in effecting the 
change that occurred? This is certainly a complex 
question, and it is not at all easy to determine the 
relative influence which various factors had on the 
conduct of Soviet policy in certain areas. While Moscow
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may have publicly claimed that U.S. economic pressure was 
unacceptable and would have no bearing on the execution 
of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, in its private 
decisionmaking the Soviet leadership may have had to 
concede that the cost of U.S. trade pressure was proving 
detrimental to Soviet interests, and as a result could 
not be dismissed lightly. At the same time Moscow could 
claim publicly that changes in policy had not been 
influenced by U.S. trade pressure but that other factors 
such as domestic had been responsible for initiating 
change.
Also, as one would expect, there were no official 
statements from Soviet officials indicating that U.S. 
economic pressure had indeed made them rethink their 
policies. If anything the Soviets often criticised the 
United States for even contemplating that trade pressure 
could exert leverage on them.
In the case of Soviet involvement in the third world 
during the 1980s such problems about the role played by 
various factors in changing Soviet policy do not really 
arise since the extent of Moscow's involvement in this 
area remained largely unaltered. Only in 1988 did there 
appear to be signs of a rethink in Soviet policy towards 
the third world. In the case of Soviet human rights 
performance, changes fairly significant in nature did 
occur in 1987 and 1988. It is safe to say that these 
changes can be attributed to a change of leadership 
since before Gorbachev took power there were no signs of 
changes to come in the years preceding 1985 or even in
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the early months of 1985. It appears as though the 
changes can be attributed to Gorbachev's own initiatives.
Equally it could be argued that since changes were 
more pronounced in 1987 and 1988, it could be that trade 
pressure did play a part since it could imply that 
Gorbachev who came to power in 1985 had by 1987-88 
assessed the overall situation and realised that trade 
pressure was causing unnecessary harm to the USSR, and 
then undertook changes that would ease such pressure.
A study of the key literature on the use of economic 
measures for political goals reveals that many writers 
have neglected to offer an assessment of the political 
success of trade pressure but have instead paid too much 
attention to the economic impact generated by trade 
pressure. An example of this can be seen in Gordon 
Smith's studyGO in which he concentrates more on the 
economic impact of trade pressure on various sectors of 
the Soviet economy rather than on the political reasoning 
behind Western trade pressure and the Soviet response to 
it. Doxey^ï herself provides only a brief framework for 
analyzing the political effect of economic sanctions, and 
even this is confined to a couple of pages in the final 
chapter.
Some writers may be forgiven for absence of a 
thorough analysis of the political success of trade 
pressure on the grounds that their study is essentially a 
work of economics, but even this cannot be accepted as a 
valid excuse if one takes into account the inseparability 
of politics and economics in East-West relations.
305
In fairness there are some such as Hunter who 
devotes a chapter to the political significance of 
economic s a n c t i o n s , ^2 and in particular Philip Hanson^^
who offers a concise and coherent analysis of whether 
different economic measures such as sanctions and 
embargoes have been successful in altering Soviet 
behaviour in various areas. Probably most importantly of 
all Hanson's view that "U.S. sanctions against the USSR 
should be judged by their cumulative effect over a 
lengthy p e r i o d " coincides very closely with the advice 
on assessing the political effect of trade pressure 
offered in this thesis, which is that the effectiveness 
of trade pressure applied in the early 1980s and mid 
19 80s can only be adequately measured in subsequent years 
by which time the economic measures implemented have had 
the chance to make an impact (however the longer the 
period of time we use to show whether the measures work, 
the greater the danger that other factors may enter the 
equation and modify the results, as a result of all this 
it can be harder to show the intended effect) . 
Furthermore Hufbauer and Schott^^ also devote a chapter 
in which they concentrate solely on the political 
variables involved in economic sanctions, and provide a 
measurement of success that the pursuit of various 
political goals have had.
Another noticeable deficiency in the literature on 
trade pressure is that there has as yet been no detailed 
study specifically on U.S. trade pressure on the Soviet 
Union, although U.S. trade pressure on the Soviet Union
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has of course been looked at in the broader context of 
Western trade pressure on the USSR. However, this is not 
wholly adequate because of the differences between 
various members of the Western alliance, most notably 
between the United States and its European allies. The 
fact is that the likes of for example Germany and the 
United States both have differing viewpoints as to the 
conduct of economic policy towards M o s c o w . Lack of a 
single Western policy towards the Soviet Union and 
differing approaches to achieve political goals means 
that a separate country by country study would be most 
appropriate.
In addition most writers tend not to employ the term 
trade pressure or economic pressure (an exception being 
David Hunter), which I believe are more comprehensive and 
accurate terms. This is because the term trade pressure 
encompasses everything from economic sanctions and 
embargoes to the denial of most favoured nation status, 
which is a true reflection of the various economic 
measures which countries like the United States had at 
their disposal. Instead most writers appear to have 
preferred to concentrate on economic sanctions, with 
little attention having been devoted to other instruments 
of trade pressure.
Shortcomings can also be detected in the writings of 
those who have offered something on the political success 
of trade pressure. The writers have largely failed to 
take into account the underlying cause of change in 
Soviet policies. In other words they have failed to
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establish whether changes in Soviet policy were the 
result of trade pressure or whether other factors may 
have played a more decisive role.
There have been many instances where economic 
pressure to satisfy political objectives has been used by 
countries like the United States. The application of 
trade pressure by Washington against the Soviet Union 
during the 1980s proved to be a failure as the policy 
objectives were not achieved. This then leads one to a 
perfectly fair question: does the sanctioning state - in
this case the United States - really consider or give 
much time to the important thinking behind a strategy of 
trade pressure? Perhaps not. The United States ought to 
have examined more carefully the probable outcome of such 
a policy. "The sender government should think through 
its means and objectives before taking a final decision 
to deploy s a n c t i o n s ".^7 The failure of trade pressure in 
this instance does not mean that trade pressure is a 
redundant policy which has no role to play in 
international diplomacy. I t  simply means that caution is 
required before exercising it, and in some cases the 
target country is of such a kind that economic pressure 
may not be the most effective policy instrument. 
However, in a highly militarized world where the use of 
force would be highly destructive and as a result is not 
feasible, trade pressure may be the only suitable or 
alternative means of influencing another country, which 
is the position the United States found itself in with
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regard to the Soviet Union during the period considered 
in this thesis.
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